BitMEX's quantum canary scheme has an overlooked flaw. The logic of the scheme is: create an address without a private key, put some BTC in it as a bounty, and if someone spends it, it proves quantum computers have arrived, triggering a network-wide freeze. But what if the owner of the quantum computer is a rational person? They have two choices: spend the BTC in the canary address, trigger the network freeze, and lock all quantum-vulnerable addresses, meaning they can’t steal anymore. Or, leave the canary untouched and quietly steal from the 6.9 million BTC in quantum-vulnerable addresses. Which option would a rational attacker choose? A few BTC bounty vs. $74 billion in vulnerable assets. As long as the canary stays alive, they can keep stealing. They could even steal small amounts each time, disguising it as normal transactions and not alerting anyone. The canary mechanism assumes attackers will "flex their muscles." But the most dangerous attackers never flex—they quietly make money. Of course, you could increase the bounty to make it more tempting, but how high is high enough? Higher than the value of stealing Satoshi's coins? BitMEX's scheme solves the "preemptive freeze" political issue, but there's a game theory hole that hasn’t been patched.