I have also read Brother Wu's analysis and strongly agree with his viewpoint. Currently, there are no core issues with BlackRock and Blackstone, and redemptions are still possible within the normal redemption range. However, users are starting to see higher redemption requests. At present, neither BlackRock nor Blackstone has encountered any real core credit issues, and redemptions themselves are not completely out of control, but are being handled within the framework allowed by product rules. BlackRock HLEND's redemption application for the first quarter accounted for approximately 9.3% of its net asset value, exceeding the original quarterly limit of 5%. The redemption request received by Blackstone BCRED is approximately 7.9% of the fund shares, and Blackstone has responded by increasing the repurchase limit and internal capital injection. That is to say, the problem now is not the occurrence of thunderstorms or bank runs, but the obvious increase in the number of investors who want to leave. So what I really want to talk about is not whether BlackRock and Blackstone have big problems now, but why there are suddenly a record high number of people applying to withdraw before there is a core credit event? This matter itself is a part of the risk. For private credit products, investors' concerns are often reflected in the net asset value, interest income, and default rate on paper. The default rate of private equity borrowers in the United States has risen to a record high of 9.2% by 2025, and market concerns about the quality of lower tier borrowers have been on the rise. The stock price of listed BDC has also significantly discounted, with the median dropping to approximately 73% of its book value. This is also why institutions are currently shorting credit ETFs. Even Fitch shows that the average redemption rate of permanent non listed BDC has increased from 1.6% to 4.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025. The United States has experienced multiple credit crises, and for institutions, credit risk is either a matter of self-interest or dragging down a bunch of people. Now, short selling credit is not about believing that it will definitely explode, but about preventing possible dangers, and this danger will gradually increase with high interest rates. So personally, I don't think this is just scaremongering. Of course, it could also be due to my lack of ability. In the end, nothing could happen, or the Federal Reserve could cut interest rates faster and reopen the refinancing window, putting back these pressures. However, for credit ETF hedging positions that have already reached historical highs, what I prefer to do is to explain the possible problems that may arise, rather than telling everyone that everything is calm now. After all, institutions are using real money to short (hedge), not just talking.