Understanding why banks are unwilling to earn interest on stablecoins through JPMorgan's NII returns JPMorgan Chase's net interest income (NII) for the fourth quarter of 2025 is $25 billion. What is net interest income? Net interest income=interest income earned by the bank minus interest expenses paid by the bank This indicates that banks can allocate higher yielding assets with lower capital costs (providing depositors with less interest). To put it simply, banks are essentially "using cheap money to earn expensive interest". Although banks still take a large share, they will at least pay interest to users because they know that only through interest can people be willing to provide funds. In the latest bill discussion, banks are unwilling to distribute one cent of interest to users on stablecoins, mainly due to the following reasons: 1. Interest payment may trigger systemic risks of "deposit relocation". The banking system is most afraid of users moving their current deposits on a large scale. Interest paying stablecoins will become super current accounts, which will deplete the low-cost deposit base of banks, forcing them to use more expensive debt financing, squeezing interest spreads, shrinking credit supply, and even forming faster run chains during periods of pressure. From the perspective of financial stability, banks naturally oppose designs that accelerate capital outflows. Interest will blur the boundaries of responsibility. Once the market becomes accustomed to stablecoins being equal to high interest cash, users will consider it a default when interest rates fall or reserve returns are insufficient. Banks do not want to turn stablecoins into products that fluctuate with interest rate cycles, require explanations and guarantees, but rather prefer to lock stablecoins into digital cash with 1:1 redemption. The most crucial thing is that stablecoin interest will directly consume the bank's NII (profit pool of 25 billion). The essence of NII is "return on assets - cost of liabilities". The moat of banks is not the asset side (everyone can buy treasury bond to lend), but whether the liability side can get enough low-cost funds. If stablecoins also pay interest, it will turn "low-cost funds" into "high cost funds that require pricing competition". Banks either follow suit by raising deposit interest rates to retain customers, or watch as current deposits are moved away and turn to more expensive wholesale financing to fill the gap. Regardless of the path, the result will be an increase in debt costs and a decrease in NII. So from the perspective of JPM 25 billion, banks' opposition to interest bearing stablecoins is essentially to prevent the "cheapest funds" from becoming funds that must be distributed. Banks believe that the "value" of stablecoins should come from payment efficiency rather than revenue. The bank believes that the stable currency provides 7 × 24 clearing, cross-border efficiency and programmable payment, which is essentially an infrastructure upgrade, and the income demands should be solved by eliminating the goods base, treasury bond and wealth management products, rather than being crammed into "payment tools". In other words, banks hope that stablecoins will only serve as a "cash pipeline" and not as "wealth management products", so as not to engage in direct wars with deposits and money market funds, nor to disrupt regulatory boundaries. In fact, the core reason is that the interest earned on stablecoins will affect the returns of NII banks. @bitget VIP， Lower rates and more generous benefits