I previously wrote an article titled 'How Novices Can Master Web3' which received 600000 views. The required skill in the article is' Mastering DeFi ' The most important aspect of "Mastering DeFi" is: Mastering @ pendle_fi - because DeFi 3.0 only includes Pendle and others. Recently, Pendle gave himself a life, and the last time I wrote 'Pendle Data Evolution', it was also included in the official community. ✅ Today we are deducing Pendle AIM's capital efficiency model Background: Pendle releases Algorithmic Incentive Model (AIM) - a new incentive allocation mechanism. The new model will reduce overall emissions by about 30%, significantly improving incentive efficiency. The reward was originally determined by manual voting/ve vote, but now it has been automated and distributed based on real contributions. On the surface, this appears to be 'replacing voting with algorithms', but in essence, Pendle is transforming' emissions' from a governance game to a capital efficiency model. ✅ We won't talk about concepts below, only use numerical deduction one ⃣ Inference 1: Two pools, TVL is the same, who should take the emissions more? Assuming there are two mature pools on Pendle (>21 days): Pool A: $100M TVL, weekly handling fee of $500000; Pool B: $100M TVL, weekly handling fee of $50000; The TVL of the two pools is identical, but the real trading capacity is 10 times worse. What would happen under the old ve gauge system? It's simple: whoever gets the vePENDLE ticket, whoever gives Bribe a tough deal, will be able to sustain emissions in the long run. Even if Pool B only earns a handling fee of $50000 per week, it can still consume a large amount of PENDLE emissions through voting. Officials themselves have acknowledged a fact: over 50% of emissions in history have flowed into the least profitable pools. This is not an occasional occurrence, it is a structural problem. What happens under the AIM system? AIM has two key hard constraints (emphasis): ① Mature pool discharge gradually shifts towards fee driven approach ② Fee based emission cap for a single pool=4 times the historical handling fee (weighted by time) Now calculate directly: Pool A, weekly handling fee: $500k, theoretical emission limit ≈ $2000k (=4 × 500k) Pool B, weekly handling fee: $50k, theoretical emission limit ≈ $200k (=4 × 50k) Similarly to TVL, the emission ceiling is directly 10 times lower. Do you want to rely on campaigning for emissions? Sorry, the transaction fee ceiling has stuck you first. Conclusion in one sentence: Under ve gauge, emissions are political resources; Under AIM, emissions are a factor of production. two ⃣ Inference 2: How did AIM "give you a way out while forcing you to make money" when the new pool was launched? Many people may ask, "If there is no handling fee for the new pool, won't we be able to get emissions from the beginning No, AIM has dismantled the lifecycle of the pool very clearly. Stage 1: Bootstrap (first 21 days) Assuming a new pool C has just been launched: Week 1 TVL: $0 → $20M Week 2 TVL: $20M → $40M The trading volume is not large yet, and the transaction fee is very low. During the Bootstrap phase of AIM (≤ 21 days): Emissions are more biased towards TVL weight You just need to pull up the liquidity to automatically consume the emissions during the start-up period No need: pull ve tickets, engage in bribery, find connections Stage 2: After 21 days, start "accounting" After 21 days, AIM started doing one thing: gradually shifting emissions from TVL to contribution of handling fees At this point, if Pool C: TVL is still available, but no one is trading and the transaction fee is very low So sorry: Emissions will naturally decrease You can either start the transaction Either the emissions will gradually return to zero What is this mechanism essentially saying? ——AIM allows you to survive on TVL, but does not allow you to lie flat on TVL. ✅ summary The core issue with ve gauge is not that it has been played bad, but that it is inherently suitable for small-scale, strong game, and inefficient early stages. What AIM does is simple: whoever really helps the protocol make money, gets the emissions ceiling. Spend 30% less, but send the money to someone who can create 10 times the transaction fee. This is not 'fairer', this is a more brutal and authentic use of capital.