In fact, after Wang Shi's retirement in 2017, Vanke was no longer a good student. There are two points: 1. In 2018, shouting "stay alive" warned that real estate had entered the Bronze Age, while expanding wildly. The land acquisition amounts from 2017 to 2021 were 218.9 billion, 135.1 billion, 161 billion, 134.9 billion, and 127.4 billion, respectively. Within a 5-year period, Vanke's interest bearing liabilities soared to nearly 400 billion yuan. 2. The large and complex external capital pool within the company includes the Enterprise Stock Center, Pengjin Securities, which was acquired in 2015, and Boshang Asset Management. Pengjin Securities raised a large amount of funds from Vanke employees, while Boshang Asset Management absorbed a large amount of funds from external sources. These complex capital structures have significant leverage Taking Boshang Asset Management as an example: When a project company under Vanke needs to acquire land or development funds, the Boshang Asset Management Committee takes the lead in establishing a partnership enterprise and collaborates with financial institutions such as China Merchants Fund, Oriental Asset Management, and Everbright Trust to "invest" in the project. Among them, financial institutions provide "big head" funds (usually accounting for over 90%), while Boshang Asset Management provides "small head" funds (usually less than 10%). On the surface, financial institutions are the "shareholders" of the project, but in reality, the Boshang Asset Management Committee has agreed with financial institutions on a fixed return of "annualized returns of 8% -10%" and an exit clause of "shares repurchased by Vanke after 3 years". Through this model, Boshang Asset Management leverages small funds to leverage large capital: its registered capital and paid in capital are both only 100 million yuan, but through leverage amplification, the managed asset scale once reached the level of billions. Most of these funds flowed into Vanke's third - and fourth tier city projects, which had long sales payment cycles and poor liquidity, laying hidden dangers for later debt crises. That's also why Zhu Jiusheng, the former vice president of a branch of China Construction Bank and former president of Vanke, was taken away for investigation. Zhu Jiusheng was the one who built Vanke's complex internal capital chain. And through these funding pools, Vanke's professional management team has actually emptied out this real estate star enterprise. The crazy expansion of the downward cycle and the fragile leverage of the capital chain have crushed Vanke. It's still self inflicted