A few days ago, a funding proposal from Curve was rejected, which was to allocate 17M CRV development funds to the development team (Swiss Stake AG). Both Convex and Yearn voted against it, and this voting percentage is sufficient to affect the final result. After the Aave governance issue began to ferment, governance began to attract market attention, and the inertia of giving money for money began to break. There are two key points behind the Curve proposal: 1. Some voices in the community do not oppose providing funding to AG, but they want to know how the previous money will be used, how it will be used in the future, whether it is sustainable, and whether it will bring benefits to the project. At the same time, this overly primitive grant model results in no constraints as long as the money goes out. In the future, DAOs need to establish Treasury, make revenue and expenditure transparent, or increase governance constraints. The big vote holders of veCRV do not want to dilute their value. This is a clear conflict of interest, and if the projects supported by the CRV grant cannot create predictable benefits for veCRV, there is a high probability that they will not receive support. Of course, Convex and Yearn also have their own selfishness and influence, let's not talk about this issue for now. This proposal was initiated by Curve founder Mich, and AG is also one of the teams that have been maintaining the core code repository since 2020. The roadmap provided by AG for this funding includes continuing to promote Llamaend, including support for PT and LP, as well as expanding the on chain foreign exchange market and crvUSD. It may seem worthwhile, but whether it is worth the 17M CRV funding needs to be calculated separately, especially since Curve's governance differs significantly from Aave's, with its power distributed among several teams with distinct positions, Compare VE with conventional governance models: First of all, the conclusion is that most conventional governance models currently have no advantages in terms of design. Of course, if DAO is mature enough, traditional structures can also run well. However, unfortunately, there is currently no Crypto project that has matured to this level, such as the market consensus leader Aave, which may also have problems. So if we talk about model design separately, VE has certain advanced aspects. Firstly, it has cash flow, and behind it is liquidity control. When there is a demand for liquidity from the outside world, this power will be bribed. Therefore, even if you do not want to lock up your position for a long time, you can entrust your token to proxy projects such as Convex/Yearn to obtain profits. So VE is a model that binds voting rights to cash flow, so the future evolution is likely to be the "governance capitalism" route. VEToken binds voting rights to "long-term lock up", essentially screening those with large amounts of funds, able to withstand liquidity losses, and capable of playing long-term games. So over time, the result is that the rulers gradually shift from the ordinary user group to the 'capital group'. At the same time, due to the existence of proxy layers such as Convex/Yearn, many ordinary and even loyal users, hoping to gain profits without losing liquidity and flexibility, will gradually choose to entrust governance in these projects. From this vote, we can also see some clues that in the future, Mich may not be the protagonist in the governance of Curve, but rather in the hands of these powerful voters. When Aave's governance had problems before, some people proposed the idea of "delegated governance/elite governance", which is actually quite similar to the current structure of Curve. As for whether it's good or bad, it takes time to verify.