128 million US dollars stolen, 27 forked protocols' lying on the gun '- Three lessons from the Balancing incident for DeFi On November 3rd, the DeFi field suffered a major blow as the vault of the Balancing V2 protocol was hacked, resulting in an initial loss of $70 million and a final figure soaring to $128 million. This attack not only reveals potential technical vulnerabilities in DeFi protocols, but also triggers profound reflections on DeFi security, audit credibility, and the trade-off between decentralization and centralization The core reason for the attack on Balancing V2 this time is a 'flawed access control check', which hackers cleverly exploited to transfer a large amount of assets such as WETH and WStETH * *. Despite undergoing multiple audits in the past and being audited by well-known companies such as OpenZeppelin, this vulnerability has yet to be discovered, raising questions about how much the security of DeFi protocols can rely on under the current audit system? The 27 forked protocols developed from the Balancing V2 protocol as a template also inherit this fatal vulnerability. The attacker broke through the defense lines of these protocols in one fell swoop, causing losses to projects on multiple chains including Berachain, Arbitrarum, Base, and others. For DeFi, this attack reveals the double-edged sword of composability: although DeFi's openness and composability inspire innovation, once there are vulnerabilities in the underlying protocol, this "code contagion" can instantly affect the entire ecosystem. After the attack, multiple affected chains such as Berachain chose to take centralized intervention measures. By suspending network operations, rolling back transactions, and other means, Berachain successfully recovered most of the funds. Although this decision has sparked a heated debate between "decentralization" and "centralization", in practical terms, this measure undoubtedly protects the security of users' assets. This situation prompts us to reflect on whether DeFi protocols can still adhere to the belief that "code is law" when facing security threats? Should more flexible and pragmatic measures be taken in certain situations to protect users? This attack is not only a major test of DeFi security, but also raises three sharp questions for the industry: What is the significance of auditing? If even 11 audits fail to discover vulnerabilities, is there a fundamental problem with the audit system of DeFi protocols? Is composability innovation or a curse? When a vulnerability can affect multiple protocols, does DeFi's innovation also bring hidden risks? Decentralization or centralization? At the critical moment of protecting user assets, should the ideal of decentralization give way to pragmatic centralization measures? The security of DeFi may no longer rely solely on more audits in the future, but will require more robust protocol designs that fundamentally reduce the attack surface. For users who have lost trust and capital in this incident, this costly lesson will have a profound impact on the future development of DeFi.