Thank you for your insightful insights, I have learned a lot. I truly realize that this matter can be big or small. Insiders see the intricacies, while outsiders see the excitement. Here are a few additional points to add: 1) Seeing overseas influencers using this incident to manipulate Bitcoin, the reason is due to the current proportion of mining pool computing power. The top two mining pools, Foundry USA (33.6%) and AntPool (17.9%), have combined to exceed 51%. Therefore, a rough conclusion can be drawn that if the two mining pools work together to commit evil, Bitcoin will also be a panacea. This is a typical case of an outsider blindly watching a lively event because he overlooked two points: 1. Two mining pools accounting for 51% and one mining pool exceeding 51% are completely different things, heaven and earth; 2. The computing power of a mining pool does not necessarily mean that it completely buys off the computing power of miners. When the computing power of a single mining pool is too high, miners usually choose to cut off computing power to avoid risks; So the consensus on Satoshi Nakamoto's POW has reached a delicate balance by integrating factors such as computing power, economy, and interest games, and there is almost no possibility of it being broken in the short term. So, let's take this opportunity to calm down BTC users. 2) Agreeing with Teacher Zhang Ren's statement that the problem of @ monero is not equal to the problem of POW, even if there are security risks under extreme conditions in POW, it does not mean that POS is completely the optimal solution. In fact, the problem with POW lies in the optimal solution chosen by ASIC as a moat, avoiding the pitfalls of general CPU/GPU mining. Even for pure CPU/GPU mining chains, there are various tests for attempting to attack through a disclosed miner bribery method, such as increasing the number of confirmations by exchanges or adding checkpoints by miners, which can reduce the probability of being attacked. You see, when it comes to discussing POW, the focus should be on POW. Cross consensus comparison can lead to misunderstandings. In fact, there are security risk boundaries for both parties to break out of consensus, and the ways to counteract them are also different. We cannot favor one over the other. 3) I saw that Teacher @ 0x_Tod forwarded my post and talked about the concept of "selfish mining". Simply put, it means that miners should immediately broadcast the blocks they mine, but selfish miners will secretly hide the blocks they mine and form a "private chain". When the honest miner announced the new block, the selfish miner suddenly released the longer chain he had hidden, rendering all the honest miner's work invalid. This is actually a very rogue approach, and it is also the main attack method of Qubic this time. In fact, its computing power has not really reached 51%. It is possible to control about 30% and briefly achieve the theoretical "double flower attack"? Because using 30% of miners for selfish mining forms a shadow chain, when honest miners mine new blocks, Qubic suddenly releases its longer hidden chain, causing a large number of real miners' blocks to be invalidated, theoretically causing a destructive effect of over 51% of computing power. Furthermore, if the mining pool controlled by Qubic has a wide distribution of miner nodes, it can also utilize factors such as network latency to further reduce the proportion of computing power and achieve the same effect of controlling the computing power of the entire network. So, @ _Qubic_'s attack this time is highly accidental and covert, which means that once this method is made public, the threshold will increase if it is repeated. 4) But I had a conversation with @ neeksec security experts about a possibility, which is that Qubic will no longer repeat the same trick, but will use a "frog like" attack to further bribe miners to increase the size of their mining pool, and then allow some miners to intentionally empty blocks, creating chaos for the normal operation of the Monero network. If this continues, it will lead to more and more Monroe miners fleeing, as the profits will decrease and the experience will be very poor. As a result, the computational power controlled by Qubic will gradually increase, reaching over 50%, and by then, no one will be able to play Game Over. This chronic attack method is actually quite frightening. Although there is no reason to prove that Qubic needs to do so, there is indeed a possibility of this' parasitic 'chronic attack. Because in the early stages, Qubic doesn't have to worry about some miners digging empty blocks in Monero. They will also receive XMR rewards and can do AI training. In the middle and later stages, if Monero is disabled, the profits will decrease, and they may also attack other chains such as Grin and Beam. Throughout the entire process, Qubic can always adhere to its AI training mainline, which makes the logic reasonable. Because as the demand for AI computing power grows exponentially and mining is no longer the only destination for computing power, the game rules themselves have changed. Previously, the cost of attacking networks was "pure burning money," but now there is an "extra investor" in AI training to pay - the cost of attacks is offset by AI profits. This is the biggest concern of my article: AI demand is breaking the basic assumption of general-purpose CPU/GPU POW mining - 'miners rely on mining profits, so they will maintain the network'. When computing power has a more profitable place to go, this assumption no longer holds true. Although this process may be slow, there is always a possibility.