Charts
DataOn-chain
VIP
Market Cap
API
Rankings
CoinOSNew
CoinClaw🦞
Language
  • 简体中文
  • 繁体中文
  • English
Leader in global market data applications, committed to providing valuable information more efficiently.

Features

  • Real-time Data
  • Special Features
  • AI Grid

Services

  • News
  • Open Data(API)
  • Institutional Services

Downloads

  • Desktop
  • Android
  • iOS

Contact Us

  • Chat Room
  • Business Email
  • Official Email
  • Official Verification

Join Community

  • Telegram
  • Twitter
  • Discord

© Copyright 2013-2026. All rights reserved.

简体繁體English
|Legacy
BTCBTC
💲66913.31
-
0.4%
ETHETH
💲2049.90
-
0.67%
SOLSOL
💲80.24
+
0.94%
WLDWLD
💲0.2718
+
1.34%
USDCUSDC
💲1.00
-
0%
XRPXRP
💲1.32
+
0.76%

DeFi project R0AR recently suffered a theft of approximately $780000 due to contract backdoors

PANews
PANews|Apr 22, 2025 13:38
Web3 security company GoPlus announced on X platform that on April 16th, the DeFi project R0AR (@ th3r0ar) on Ethereum was stolen approximately $780000 due to a contract backdoor. The project team released an incident report today (the report stated that the funds have been recovered, but the address and transaction hash have not yet been disclosed). This is a typical contract backdoor event. Users are reminded to pay attention to preventing backdoor contracts (0xBD2Cd7) and not to interact with them in any way. The contract (R0ARStaking) left a backdoor during deployment, and the malicious address (0x8149f) had a large amount of $1R0R built-in for extraction from the beginning. The malicious address first performed small deposits () and harvests (), and prepared for the execution of malicious EmergenceWithdraw(). According to the code logic in the contract (as shown in the figure below), because rewardAmount>; R0arTokenBalance (contract balance), so rewardAmount is assigned to the token balance in the contract, and then all tokens in the contract are transferred to a malicious address (0x8149f), Similarly, all lpTokens in the LP Token contract were also transferred to malicious addresses. Finally, set userInfo.amount to 0. The userInfo in the contract is a Mapping structure, and its address is a dynamic address calculated through the key (uid and msg. sender) Hash of userInfo. Therefore, it can be inferred that the backdoor was calculated using malicious addresses before the contract deployment.
+5
Mentioned
|
APP
Windows
Mac
Share To

X

Telegram

Facebook

Reddit

CopyLink

|
APP
Windows
Mac
Share To

X

Telegram

Facebook

Reddit

CopyLink

Timeline

May 22, 13:37【Ethereum Foundation dumps another 100MM】
May 22, 13:34【Slow Mist Cosine has obtained some traces of Cetus hackers】
May 22, 13:16【Celebrating pizza festival, hippopotamus prototype hung up, sui's cetus stolen】
May 22, 13:07【Token Hub Cross Chain Bridge Stolen 2 Million BNBs】
May 22, 12:54【150 million yuan stolen from Sui ecological project, stable coin price】
May 22, 12:50【Scholarship is used to introduce new talents for Ethereum core development】
May 22, 12:40【The attacker exchanged USDC for 23K ETH and transferred it】
May 22, 12:32【Attackers deposit stolen SUI assets into suilendprotocol】
May 22, 12:27【The Cetus hacking incident has caused over 260 million US dollars in losses】
May 22, 12:26【Sui network Cetus stolen about $200 million】

HotFlash

|
APP
Windows
Mac
Share To

X

Telegram

Facebook

Reddit

CopyLink

APP
Windows
Mac

X

Telegram

Facebook

Reddit

CopyLink

Hot Reads