What I see as the three consequences for @safe from the Bybit hack: 1) No more blind signing from HW 2) Institutional offering 3) Safenet can not come fast enough 1) It is true that HW support for Safe is currently poor. There are a few notable exceptions but this needs to be a no. 1 priority to have a set of recommended HW providers that will show you the "safeTx" you are signing properly on the device 2) The currently Safe wallet serves a large range of users. To many users gas costs or convenience matter a lot. Other users with hundreds of millions or billion should not use the same default setup. This will require an institutional offering. 3) Safenet is the idea to keep Safes in full self-cudtody but by default require also an external processor to confirm transactions. This means - even in the case where n/m owners sign a malicious transaction (like in this case) the processor would have rejected it. While it is possible to opt out, out of the processor, this is only possible with significant delays. So to perform the Bybit hack you would have to corrupt all owners and the processor simultaneously.