AI attacks target mining, 64,000 BTC mining machines were hijacked for 20 hours.

CN
18 minutes ago

Original|Odaily Planet Daily(@OdailyChina)

Author|Wenser(@wenser 2010 )179482147773625.jpg

Just as BTC dropped to $62,000 and market sentiment was low, a little-noticed "on-chain heist" quietly occurred and concluded—featuring approximately 64,000 BTC miners with a total computing power of around 13 EH/s.

At 10 AM Beijing time on November 15, this batch of computing power was stealthily redirected to the OCEAN mining pool, with mining rewards designated to be paid to a BTC address controlled by the attacker. The total computing power of the OCEAN pool once neared 50 EH/s before falling back to about 40 EH/s. Fortunately, a mining machine hosting service provider discovered and issued a timely warning. Mining service provider Luxor subsequently pinpointed the issue to the Commander software. Ultimately, the attacker only obtained 0.162 BTC; however, the mining revenue loss during that period is irretrievable, and Luxor stated it would fully compensate the affected dozen customers.

It is noteworthy that Luxor had just completed a $16 million financing at the end of October. Its CEO Nick Hansen mentioned that this attack involved "a complex AI-assisted attack." The intertwining of mining pools, mining management software, and AI attacks reveals a high-risk side of the BTC mining industry.

64,000 BTC Miners' Scare in 24 Hours: When Mining Machine Computing Power is Hijacked for Profit

Let's first review the incident.

On November 15, the mining machine hosting service provider CoreX Hosting posted, "Just a reminder, there is currently a large-scale hacking attack targeting mining machines in progress. The mining machines are being redirected to the Ocean mining pool, with the corresponding BTC address being bc1qphukp9rjfc4rcej7erpm9ae20xmtspw8pcddrr."

After the warning was issued, Bitcoin Newsquickly followed up, emphasizing that this attack impacted 64,000 BTC mining machines, with a total computing power of approximately 13 EH/s, leading to OCEAN pool's controlled computing power once increasing to 50 EH/s, before falling back to 40 EH/s.

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At 2:40 PM on November 15, CoreXupdated monitoring stating, the redirected computing power had fallen from 13 EH/s to about 100 PH/s, and the attack appeared to be over.

On the early morning of November 16, Luxor Technology responded officially for the first time, stating that internal monitoring had discovered unauthorized redirection of computing power via Commander, affecting a dozen customers. Within two hours, a patch repair was completed, and affected mining machines were beginning to be restored to their original mining pool settings; all affected customers were fully compensated based on "normal mining revenue"; system data had not been leaked; and the impact was limited only to Commander, with the Luxor pool and LuxOS system remaining unaffected.

At 1 AM on November 16, Luxor CEO Nick Hansen posted in response, stating that this attack was a "complex, AI-assisted vector attack"; and reiterated full compensation for customer losses; subsequently, he emphasized again that AI attacks would become more prevalent and indicated that "development of most new features had been paused, with all efforts focused on strengthening various security infrastructures."

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It is worth mentioning that according to on-chain data, the payment address that CoreX previously warned about has now received four payment rewards totaling 0.3244 BTC, valued at about $20,900. However, these payments correspond to different times on November 16, both early morning and afternoon, which conflicts with the patch repair time given by Luxor's official response; thus, a detailed explanation of the attack and a security report are still needed from the latter.

When Control Software Becomes a New Attack Vector: Luxor Commander Software Becomes Key to the Hijacking Incident

In this nearly day-long mining machine hijacking incident, no consensus rules on the BTC network level were breached, blocks continued to be produced; there was no double-spending attack, and the impact on the BTC network was close to zero. However, it exposed another layer of risk factor in the BTC mining chain—the mining group management software.

Convenience and risk are often two sides of the same coin for such control software.

Software like Luxor Commander can push mining pool settings in one go to thousands of mining machines, but this often means that once the software is attacked, the impact isn't limited to just one or two BTC mining machines, but could spread to tens of thousands of BTC mining machines.

In extreme cases, an attacker only needs a credential, an API endpoint, a session to quickly gain similar power redirection capabilities as the operating party of the mining group. Various internal control checks and certifications conducted by Luxor cannot guarantee that the "credential channel entering the mining machines from the customer side" will never face issues.

However, regarding the methods of the attackers in this incident, the non-custodial mining pool OCEAN acts like a transit station that pays based on computing power. What the attackers targeted was not the 13 EH/s computing resources owned by the 64,000 mining machines, but rather the rewards directly paid by Coinbase to miners at designated addresses behind the mining pool.

In simpler terms, the attackers did not need to steal the BTC mining machines' computing power resources; they only needed to redirect them to a mining pool with "rewards," achieving computing power redirection merely by changing parameters like the stratum endpoint and worker name to cash in on the attack profits. This incident also tells us that the security of BTC mining pool architecture and the security of BTC mining group management software are two different layers, and it was indeed the latter that faced issues this time.

Finally, let's roughly estimate the potential losses involved in this incident: based on the current mining difficulty and BTC price, 13 EH/s of computing power can average about 2 blocks per day, corresponding to 1.3918% of the approximately 450 bitcoins produced daily across the network. At a price of about $65,000, the produced value is around $17,000/hour, $410,000 daily income. A preliminary estimate of the amount Luxor promised for "full compensation based on normal mining" is approximately between $34,000 to $340,000 (calculated based on 2 hours and 20 hours of non-profit duration).

This figure is certainly not a bone-deep loss for a company that has just completed a strategic financing of $16 million, but it has set an example for all mining operation service providers in the industry—losses incurred from attacks on mining group management software necessitate company responsibility for bottom-line compensation. Moreover, for the mining group management panel evolving from "monitoring dashboards" to unified entries for computing power, energy contracts, and even AI computing power scheduling, its security and management permissions will become increasingly important.

Follow-up Focus: Mining Pool Settings Will Become A Continuous Tug of War

The aftermath of this "64,000 mining machines hijacked" incident continues. On one hand, Luxor needs to provide detailed explanations for the entire security incident, particularly regarding the number of mining machines involved, the actual redirected computing power, the start and end time of the attack, and the amounts to be compensated; the previous mention of "dozen affected customers" was merely a rough statement. On the other hand, the hijacking of mining computing power is no longer a new occurrence. Previous reports have indicated unauthorized changes to related settings by mining pool operators, fully demonstrating that various roles in the industry, including mining pool operators, custodians, and service providers, need to jointly face security attack and defense risks, and this is destined to be a protracted battle.

How to avoid the occurrence of similar risk events in the future may warrant vigilance not only regarding the operational management of mining pool hardware but also concerning the security of related software.

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