Written by: Sam, Techub News
Introduction
On the evening of November 14, an 11-page PDF signed by "a former Amber executive" circulated in the cryptocurrency industry WeChat groups. The author claims to have helped Amber "deceive" users, with seven-figure assets locked in their accounts, and states they have submitted materials to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Beijing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and the Hong Kong police. The accusations in the letter range from misappropriation of customer funds, transfer of benefits, abnormal deposit addresses, and extend to executives' personal lives, along with two photos of other people's ID cards.
An anonymous whistleblower letter in itself proves nothing, but some of its points can be verified using documents that Amber submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. For users who still have assets on Amber's platform, the real questions are: which statements are supported by public records, which are merely unilateral assertions, and where their own money stands.
Core Summary
- The whistleblower letter began circulating in WeChat groups on the evening of November 14, with the author claiming to be a former Amber executive, stating they had submitted materials to mainland disciplinary inspection departments and the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, Securities and Futures Commission, and police; as of November 15 when this article was published, the aforementioned institutions had not publicly responded, and Amber Group and the official account of Amber International (NASDAQ: AMBR) had also not commented on this.
- The letter claims Amber is only an "applicant" to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission but falsely asserts that it is licensed in three regions. Public documents show that its Hong Kong virtual asset trading platform license application under WhaleFin Markets has never been approved, and Amber International announced on October 14 that it would no longer pursue this and planned to withdraw; however, licenses in Singapore and Dubai do exist.
- Amber International's annual report explicitly states that the company invests digital assets into related parties' operation platforms' Earn products, which are essentially uncollateralized, uninsured loans, and may "lose part or all of the lent amount in extreme market conditions"; as of the end of June, such loans receivable reached $57.79 million, a 37% increase over six months, with no credit loss provision made.
- During the same period, liabilities to customers purchasing structured products on the Amber Premium SG platform amounted to $49.62 million, with the financial report also noting that these deposits are uninsured and unsecured; the company's revenue in the first half of the year dropped 28% year-on-year, turning from profit to loss.
- The core accusations of misappropriating customer funds, large shareholder deposits, and strange deposit addresses currently lack any public evidence for verification or refutation; the contents related to personal lives and identity information in the whistleblower letter will not be recounted in this article.

What the Whistleblower Letter Said: From "Deposit Address" to "Makeshift Company."
The title of this PDF is "To All Amber Users: Your Deposit Address is Someone's Home...", with the latter part being an accusation regarding an executive's personal life, which will not be recounted here. Based on currently circulated screenshots and a full summary available online, the accusations in the letter can roughly be classified into seven categories.
- Author's identity: The author claims to be a former Amber executive who says they helped the company "deceive" users, with seven-figure assets still in their Amber account, and mentioned having introduced university roommates, former colleagues, and family friends to deposit money into Amber; they wrote the letter to be "a witness" for once.
- Deposit address: The title states that users' "deposit address is someone's home," while the body says this money "is lying in some address I don't know is safe," implying there are issues with the ownership of customer deposit addresses, although the screenshots do not provide a specific address or on-chain evidence.
- Executive and Regulatory Whistleblowing: The letter accuses an executive and their relatives holding public office in mainland China of bribery, assisting users in forging address proofs, and facilitating the illegal outflow of funds, claiming evidence has been submitted to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Beijing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and the Hong Kong police, attaching ID photos of two individuals.
- Founding team: A section of the letter entitled "Written at the Forefront" states that Amber's "corporate culture" is "makeshift teams misappropriating customer funds," mentioning that "one of the six co-founders has died, and three have left," with two having departed within half a year, describing it as "when the ship is sinking, the rats flee first."
- Compliance: The letter claims that Amber is merely an applicant to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission but falsely claims to be "licensed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai," and accuses it of helping mainland clients forge address proofs, illegally exchanging RMB for U.S. dollars, and providing digital asset services to mainland clients under a Hong Kong entity, stating that this is "using an application form as a get-out-of-jail-free card."
- Profitability: A section of the letter titled Amber "only knows how to pimp, deceiving fools in traditional industries," claiming that after the CEO forced out the head of market-making, the company's "profitability" was completely exposed.
- Customer funds: According to the full summary circulating online, the letter also accuses one co-founder of misappropriating tens of millions of dollars of customer funds to trade on another exchange, ultimately leading to account freezes; a shareholder has about $300 million in funds stored in Amber and has previously sold part of their equity; the Fixed Earn product of Amber Premium poses risks in fund operations, and funds' transactions among related parties are not transparent.
Among these seven categories of accusations, only "licensing in three regions" and changes in the founding team can be partially verified with public documents, which will be explained one by one below; the rest are merely unilateral statements from the whistleblower.
Clarifying: Which Amber is Being Named?
The whistleblower letter only writes "Amber," but there are two relevant entities in the market. Amber Group is a private company established in 2017, engaged in trading, market-making, investment, and other businesses; Amber International Holding is a publicly listed company on NASDAQ (stock code AMBR, originally iClick), which will be renamed after merging with Amber's digital wealth management business in March 2025, operating the customer-facing Amber Premium platform. On August 31 of this year, Amber International announced its transformation into a "company focusing on AI intelligent entities in finance, enterprise, and growth areas."
The two were initiated by the same group of founders, with highly intersected personnel and operations, and Amber International's annual and semi-annual reports contain numerous related party transactions with companies within the Amber Group system. However, only public companies are required to disclose financial reports regularly, so the financial data that can be verified below only covers Amber International and does not represent the full picture of Amber Group.
"Licensing in Three Regions": The Hong Kong License Was Never Obtained
The whistleblower letter states Amber "is only an applicant to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, not a licensed institution," yet falsely claims to be "licensed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai." This statement is the most easily verifiable part of the entire letter.
In Hong Kong, the WhaleFin Markets Limited within the Amber system had applied to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission for the necessary Type 1 and Type 7 licenses to operate a virtual asset trading platform, but the application has remained pending and has never been issued. Amber International originally planned to acquire this license after WhaleFin Markets was approved. On October 14, Amber International stated in a 6-K announcement that WhaleFin Markets would no longer pursue this application and plans to withdraw it in accordance with regulatory requirements; the reason is that the company has transformed into an AI intelligent entity, and the "commercial benefits of the license are limited." The acquisition was also terminated.
Licenses in Singapore and Dubai do exist. Amber International's annual report reveals that the wholly-owned subsidiary Sparrow Tech Private Limited holds a Major Payment Institution (MPI) license issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, enabling it to provide digital payment token services under the name "Amber Premium Singapore"; the wholly-owned subsidiary Amber Premium FZE obtained the VASP license from the Dubai Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA) on April 2 this year, strictly limited to serving institutional investors and qualified investors.
Therefore, the accurate statement is: Amber is licensed in Singapore and Dubai but has never held a license in Hong Kong and has given up the application. As for the allegations in the whistleblower letter regarding "providing digital asset services to mainland customers under a Hong Kong entity" and "helping customers forge address proofs," these are specific violations, and currently, there is no public evidence.
Where the Funds Went: The Two Accounts Worth Inquiring About in Public Financial Reports
The most serious accusation in the whistleblower letter is the misappropriation of customer funds. This cannot be directly verified from the financial reports, but there are two related items in Amber International's financial reports that every user should be aware of.
The first is "receivables of crypto asset loans." Amber International explains in its 2025 annual report that the company subscribes to Earn products on a digital asset platform operated by related parties either periodically (1 to 365 days) or on demand; after subscribing, all rights to the principal are transferred to that platform, which does not act as a custodian, meaning the transaction is effectively a loan from the company to the platform. The annual report also clarifies that such loans between the company and related parties are "uncollateralized, with no insurance protection," and in extreme market conditions, the company "may lose part or all of the lent amount." As of June 30, 2026, the receivable from this loan amounted to $57.79 million, a 37% increase from $42.14 million at the end of last year, with approximately $18.16 million in Bitcoin, $18.03 million in USDT, and $13.85 million in USDC, with zero credit loss provisions set aside.
The second amount is the liabilities to customers. As of the end of June, Amber International had liabilities of $49.62 million to customers, mainly for structured products purchased on the Amber Premium SG platform, which are valued in cryptocurrency, amounting to approximately $34.68 million. The financial report notes that these deposits are "not protected by any insurance and are unsecured."

Looking at these two accounts together: the company absorbs uninsured crypto deposits from customers while simultaneously uncollateralized lending a nearly equivalent amount of crypto assets to related party platforms. This structure is not uncommon in the industry and does not equate to misappropriation, but it means that the security of customer assets ultimately depends on the repayment capability of that related party platform, whose financial status is not disclosed by the public company. During the same period, receivables from related parties increased from $32.34 million to $60.08 million, and collateral payables rose from $10.94 million to $75.56 million, without detailed explanations in the financial report for these changes.
From an operational perspective, Amber International's revenue in the first half of the year was $23.95 million, a year-on-year decline of 28%; net loss was $2.23 million, compared to a net profit of $1.64 million during the same period last year. The company stated that the decline in wealth management revenue was partly due to actively lowering Earn interest rates offered to clients and reducing deposit volumes. In the second quarter, the revenue grew by 38.8% quarter-on-quarter, and operating profit turned positive. As of the end of June, the company's total assets were $298 million, total liabilities were $195 million, and equity on the books was $103 million, including $53.14 million in goodwill.
Founding Team: Only a Portion Can Be Verified
The whistleblower letter claims that Amber's six co-founders "one has died, three have left, with two leaving in a panic within half a year." The public information that matches this includes: one co-founder has passed away in 2022; another co-founder stepped down as Chief Operating Officer of Amber Group in March 2025, took over as CEO of the listed company, and stepped down again five months later, but remains a director. The status and reasons for the remaining founders are not verifiable with public documents.
Unanswered Questions
Several accusations named in the whistleblower letter, including one co-founder misappropriating tens of millions of dollars of customer funds to trade on other exchanges, a shareholder having approximately $300 million in funds at Amber, abnormal deposit address ownership, etc., currently only have unilateral claims from the whistleblower, without transaction records, on-chain addresses, or regulatory investigation results available for verification. Contents regarding executives' personal lives and attached ID photos of others are not directly related to company operations and customer assets, so they will not be recounted here.
For users, the more urgent question than the truth or falsehood is whether assets on the Amber platform are independently custodied or can be lent out? Who is the borrower behind the Earn products? In the event of repayment issues on the related party platform, where do the listed company and customers stand? There’s no public information on whether the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission has received the report or intervened. Before Amber provides a response, these questions remain unresolved.
References
1. Amber International 6-K: Update on Proposed Acquisition of WhaleFin Markets Limited (2026-10-14)
2. Amber International 6-K: 2026 Mid-Year Financial Statements (2026-09-10)
3. Amber International 6-K: 2026 Mid-Year Management Discussion and Analysis (2026-09-10)
4. Amber International 20-F: 2025 Annual Report (2026-05-13)
5. Amber International 6-K: Second Quarter Performance (2026-09-03)
6. Amber International 6-K: Brand Transformation to AMBR (2026-08-31)
7. Wikipedia: Tiantian Kullander
8. X User's Summary of Whistleblower Letter (2026-11-16)
Editor's Note: The content of the whistleblower letter is an anonymous unilateral statement, and the relevant accusations have not been verified; this article's recounting of the whistleblower letter's contents is based on circulated screenshots and full summaries available online, Techub News has not obtained the complete original document; the screenshots in the article have ignored ID documents and personal accusations. The financial and licensing information cited in the text is from Amber International's annual reports, semi-annual reports, and announcements submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, with financial data as of June 30, 2026, unaudited figures, only covering the listed company Amber International, not including the private company Amber Group. As of the publication date, Techub News has not seen any public responses from Amber or the relevant regulatory agencies and will report if a response emerges.
Disclaimer: This article is strictly for informational reporting and analysis and does not constitute any investment advice.
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