In the past decade, the safety narrative of the cryptocurrency industry has almost been concentrated in a classic slogan: "Not your keys, not your coins."

Whether ordinary users or institutional practitioners, there has been a long-standing assumption of a linear safety logic - as long as you safely write down your mnemonic phrase offline, buy a hardware wallet, or entrust your assets to top compliant platforms, safety has a fallback.

However, a series of recent emblematic security incidents are thoroughly shattering this illusion of relying solely on a single point of defense.

On one side, attackers are beginning to exploit AI, social engineering, and vulnerabilities in the software supply chain to bypass traditional security protections and directly infiltrate internal corporate systems; on the other side, even cold wallets and hardware wallets, which are considered relatively safe, can become new points of attack due to issues related to internal permission management, device circulation, and third-party vendors.

As AI dramatically changes the methods of attack and defense, the security boundaries of the cryptocurrency industry are also being redefined, and it can be said that from trading platforms to hardware wallet manufacturers, the entire industry seems to be forming a new consensus:

The competition in cryptocurrency security has shifted from who is better at protecting private keys to who can establish a more complete, verifiable, and resilient security system (for further reading "As hackers use AI 'more efficiently', how does the arms race of 'spear and shield' in Web3 upgrade?").

1. Private keys are important, but they are no longer everything

If we review past security incidents in the cryptocurrency industry, the most common risks are nothing more than private key leakage, theft of mnemonic phrases, phishing websites, and vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

These issues have certainly not disappeared, but attackers are searching for more and subtler breakthroughs, especially after the rapid proliferation of AI tools, where traditional security boundaries are changing.

The security incident at Binance on October 29 is a typical case to observe this change.

According to Binance's preliminary investigation, attackers gradually infiltrated the wallet development team's work environment through tampered software installers, fake job interviews, and malicious code, subsequently leveraging infected employee devices and internal AI tools to further acquire credentials with container deployment permissions, ultimately accessing wallet signature services and initiating unauthorized on-chain transactions.

The entire process lasted for months, involving social engineering, software supply chains, employee endpoints, and internal permissions, the attackers did not directly breach Binance's wallet system; rather, they gained a foothold to access corporate internal systems and key permissions through a multi-stage infiltration chain.

This also illustrates that attackers do not necessarily need to directly obtain private keys; as long as they can misuse the calling permissions of key signature services, it is also possible to cause significant asset losses.

Even if private keys are protected using the MPC (Multi-Party Computation) mechanism, it does not mean that the entire signature system is inherently secure, as MPC addresses how to manage keys in a distributed manner and how to complete signatures without reconstructing the private key in its entirety while not automatically solving issues like who has the right to initiate signatures, which authorizations can be executed, and how to revoke faulty authorizations promptly.

In other words, key security and permission security constitute two protection mechanisms that need to coexist.

Taking the Ledger incident as another example, its chips, operating systems, and servers were not compromised; the issue occurred in the distribution phase after the device left the manufacturer's control, and users could still encounter attacks during the purchase and initialization stages.

Viewing these incidents together reveals a common change: attackers are increasingly inclined to exploit trust relationships between different systems, rather than just searching for isolated technical vulnerabilities.

This also means that the cryptocurrency industry needs to redefine security boundaries, shifting from protecting individual assets to protecting the entire asset lifecycle; from focusing on whether a particular device or system is safe to examining the complete trust chain among personnel, software, devices, and permissions.

However, it is worth noting that in the face of these changes, the industry has not merely remained at the level of risk discussions.

2. From Binance to Ledger: How is the cryptocurrency industry upgrading its security defenses?

After a series of recent security incidents, trading platforms, hardware wallet manufacturers, security agencies, and regulatory bodies have begun to push adjustments from their respective segments.

Putting these actions together, it is evident that cryptocurrency security is undergoing several noteworthy changes.

1. Binance and Coinbase: From protecting keys to protecting the entire signature and fund transfer process

Following the Binance incident, the platform rebuilt the affected wallet system and internal AI tools in a new environment, replaced related employee devices, disabled compromised credentials and access tokens, and conducted further security checks on employee endpoints.

At the same time, Binance has strengthened risk controls for wallet services and AI-driven anomaly detection, and plans to introduce independent security agencies to further examine the causes of the incident, internal permissions, and related protection systems.

These measures may seem scattered; however, they are targeting the same issue: Once attackers have entered the internal system, how can we prevent them from continuing to leverage existing permissions to access higher-risk asset operations?

A similar line of thinking can be found in Coinbase's latest public asset protection system.

On November 4, Coinbase published an article introducing its client asset security architecture and stated that currently over 99% of client assets are stored in cold wallets, while disclosing an entire set of fund transfer control mechanisms.

For example, in terms of key management, Coinbase adopts a distributed key protection mechanism to prevent the exposure of single-point private keys; during the allocation process between hot and cold wallets, it imposes strict transfer speed and limit restrictions and identifies suspicious operations through anomaly behavior monitoring.

They also offer a referenceable example: While where assets are stored is certainly important, who can initiate transfers, under what conditions signatures are allowed, and whether operations can be timely halted in case of anomalies also determines the overall security of the system.

This aligns with the core logic of Defense in Depth.

No part of the system is presumed to be absolutely secure; on the contrary, even if a certain employee's device is compromised or certain permissions are abused, other protective measures should still be able to limit the spread of the attack.

2. Ledger and Trezor: Security is beginning to extend to production, circulation, and delivery phases

Changes in the hardware wallet domain are equally representative.

After the hardware implant incident, Ledger began to adjust the equipment management requirements for authorized distribution channels, requiring relevant authorized dealers and distributors to suspend sales in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, and to conduct equipment sampling and inventory checks.

At the same time, Ledger further clarified that dealers must not resale returned equipment, even if the packaging appears intact; devices should not continue to be placed on open shelves or display areas but should be stored in a back storage area and delivered only when users purchase them.

These measures also indicate that the boundaries of hardware security are expanding, essentially narrowing the opportunities for attackers to access and modify devices.

Trezor's adjustments are even more direct.

On November 12, Trezor announced the latest investigation results, confirming that three Trezor Safe 5 wallets sold through the involved dealer CryptoBilis contained hardware implants; at the same time, Trezor announced that it has reduced its authorized dealer network by about 80% and requires retained partners to adhere to stricter procurement, storage, and device access management rules.

On the product front, Trezor released firmware version 2.13.1 on November 11, adding protective measures against the already identified implanted modules, rendering them unable to continue reading screen information.

This reflects a change occurring in hardware security governance, namely that security is no longer judged solely by whether a product was reliable when it left the factory, but on whether manufacturers can continuously manage supply chain risks and provide effective detection, remediation, and user remediation measures when issues arise.

For wallet manufacturers, this means that the necessary management extends beyond chips and firmware to encompass the complete product lifecycle.

3. From CZ's security alliance initiative to regulatory efforts: Industry collaboration is forming real capabilities

In addition to internal security upgrades, another noteworthy direction is cross-platform collaboration.

After the Binance incident, CZ publicly called for the cryptocurrency industry to establish a security alliance to promote security intelligence sharing, cross-security audits, and more efficient tracking and emergency handling of stolen funds.

This reflects a long-standing contradiction in the cryptocurrency industry: blockchain assets can flow quickly across platforms and chains, but security defenses are often dispersed among different exchanges, wallet manufacturers, security companies, and on-chain analysis institutions.

Finding an abnormal address by one platform does not mean other platforms can immediately identify it; a security team that has grasped new attack characteristics does not guarantee that the entire industry can update protective strategies in a timely manner.

This reflects a different defensive model than that of traditional companies building their own security teams: connecting the security research, threat monitoring, and emergency response capabilities scattered across different entities, allowing attack information to be identified, shared, and utilized more quickly.

Of course, cross-platform collaboration does not mean that all companies should unconditionally share information about their internal systems or possess the power to freeze user assets at will.

Establishing clear boundaries between security intelligence sharing, commercial confidentiality, and user asset autonomy also requires further improvement.

But at least we can see that cryptocurrency security is moving from a relatively isolated company self-protection to a collaborative defense involving security agencies, platforms, and communities.

It is noteworthy that after the Binance incident, the Financial Services Commission (FSC) of South Korea urgently convened the Financial Supervisory Service, the Korea Financial Security Agency, and major virtual asset trading platforms to examine the asset custody and security measures of the exchanges.

One of the focuses is to re-evaluate the asset custody ratio of exchanges' cold wallets; according to South Korea's current "Virtual Asset User Protection Act," exchanges must store at least 80% of the economic value of user assets in cold wallets.

However, following this incident, regulatory bodies further urged exchanges to consider increasing the cold wallet ratio while enhancing 24/7 monitoring of deposits and withdrawals, reserve fund management, wallet signature approvals, and administrator privilege controls.

This indicates that regulatory authorities are also beginning to realize that the security of exchanges cannot solely rely on post-incident compensation but also needs to mitigate losses from single attacks as much as possible through pre-emptive asset isolation and operational restrictions.

3. In the AI era, what new security standards do crypto products need?

Linking up these recent industry actions reveals that they are gradually forming a more complete security logic.

Binance is reconstructing internal systems and permissions, Coinbase is emphasizing multi-layer signature controls, Ledger and Trezor are tightening their supply chains, the entire industry is promoting cross-platform emergency collaboration, and Korean regulatory agencies are enhancing around-the-clock monitoring and accountability for incidents.

imToken believes that in the future, cryptocurrency products need to re-establish their security systems from the following aspects.

1. From private key security to full-link permission security

Private keys remain central to the security of digital assets but should not constitute the entirety of the security system.

For trading platforms, it is necessary to protect keys, signature services, administrator accounts, development environments, and production deployment permissions simultaneously; for wallet products, it is essential to clearly distinguish between different stages such as key management, transaction construction, transaction authorization, and final signature.

Especially after AI Agents begin to interface with wallets, trading accounts, and on-chain applications, permission management becomes even more crucial.

An Agent that can read market data and check balances should not inherently possess the ability to transfer assets; an Agent that can assist users in constructing transactions also does not imply it can complete signatures without additional authorization.

A reasonable design should involve assigning minimal permissions according to task requirements, separating queries, transaction construction, transaction approval, and final signatures; setting up independent confirmation mechanisms for high-risk operations, such as out-of-band confirmations, Passkeys, or multi-authorization; all authorizations should have clear scopes, effective periods, and revocation mechanisms; and maintaining verifiable audit records for critical operations.

In simple terms, AI can assist users in accomplishing more tasks but should not gain unconstrained control over assets as a result; this is not only a safety requirement for AI Agents but also a standard of permissions that the entire cryptocurrency product must establish in the future.

2. From one-time audits to continuous validation

In the past, many cryptocurrency products relied on smart contract audits, code reviews, or hardware security certifications to demonstrate their security to users. While this work is certainly important, the issue lies in the fact that audits usually only cover specific time frames, specific code versions, and specific scopes.

Passing a smart contract audit does not guarantee that subsequent upgraded code is free of issues; a hardware wallet passing chip security tests does not imply it will not be tampered with during storage and transportation.

Therefore, future security systems need to shift from one-time audits to continuous validation.

3. From point-based protection to defense in depth

No single technology can solve all security issues.

MPC can reduce the risk of single-point private key leakage, but cannot automatically prevent erroneous authorizations; cold wallets can mitigate remote attack risks, but cannot fully eliminate internal operation and supply chain risks; hardware wallets can isolate private keys but cannot identify all malicious transactions on behalf of users.

Therefore, a truly mature security architecture needs to ensure that different levels of protective mechanisms complement each other.

For instance, using anti-phishing identity verification methods at the identity layer to reduce the risks of account and employee credential theft; employing minimal permissions, temporary authorizations, and multi-person approval at the permissions layer to prevent any single identity from holding complete control; strengthening endpoint security, hardware integrity checks, and trusted boot mechanisms at the device layer; simulating transaction contents, risk identification, and clear display at the transaction layer to avoid users completing signatures without understanding the transaction intentions; utilizing cold wallets, MPC, multi-signatures, limits, and anomaly monitoring at the asset layer to reduce the likelihood of assets being transferred all at once; and establishing emergency pause, permissions revocation, event reporting, and cross-platform collaboration mechanisms at the response layer.

4. From "trusting the brand" to "security can be verified"

For ordinary users, there is a long-standing issue with security: information asymmetry.

Users find it difficult to know how a wallet manages private keys, cannot directly assess whether the internal permissions of an exchange are reasonable, and cannot personally examine the chips, firmware, and supply chains of hardware wallets.

Thus, security products cannot rely solely on brand reputation or marketing slogans to establish trust; what is more crucial in the future is to make security mechanisms as transparent and verifiable as possible.

For instance, trading platforms should continuously disclose asset reserves, custody structures, and key security mechanisms; wallet manufacturers should publicly share private key management principles, code audit status, vulnerability response processes, and version update records; hardware wallet manufacturers should enable users to verify the sources, firmware integrity, and official sales channels of their devices.

5. Returning to user asset control: the value and responsibility of non-custodial wallets

After discussing so many security mechanisms, one question deserves rethinking:

If exchanges, wallet manufacturers, hardware devices, and third-party services can all be potential attack entry points, how should ordinary users choose their asset management methods?

This is also the lasting value of non-custodial wallets. Compared to centralized exchanges, the core difference of non-custodial wallets lies in asset control.

In centralized exchanges, users typically need to go through platform account systems, internal wallet systems, and the platform's signing processes to perform asset operations; the security of users' assets depends not only on their own account protection but also on the platform's internal permissions, custody structures, employee management, and operational mechanisms.

In contrast, in non-custodial wallets, users manage their private keys or mnemonic phrases themselves, and wallet service providers do not directly possess the authority to transfer user assets, which structurally signifies that there is one less level of trust required in the asset custody intermediary, thereby lowering the custody risks associated with centralized holdings of user assets.

However, this does not imply that non-custodial wallets are immune to all attacks.

Users may still encounter phishing websites, malicious contracts, false authorizations, device infections, and mnemonic phrase leaks, necessitating that users pay more attention to their own key management and transaction security.

Therefore, for non-custodial wallets like imToken, what truly deserves continuous improvement is enhancing the security experience throughout the entire process surrounding users' autonomy over their assets.

This also reflects a more comprehensive security concept.

In conclusion

From Binance's internal permission breaches to Ledger and Trezor's hardware supply chain risks, to exchanges re-evaluating cold wallet ratios, a series of recent events remind us that the standards upon which the cryptocurrency industry once built security trust need to be further upgraded.

Private keys remain important, but private keys are no longer everything.

The future of security competition will simultaneously occur across multiple levels, involving cryptography, software supply chains, AI permission management, hardware design, asset custody, and emergency response.

For the entire industry, rebuilding trust cannot be accomplished merely through a one-time security audit, a reserve certification, or a statement assuring "user assets are unaffected."

Security is the foundation of trust, and verifiable, sustainable, and accountable security is the true infrastructure that the cryptocurrency industry needs to establish as it progresses to the next stage.

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