The on-chain address 0xde8d...9524 associated with the UXLINK security incident, which was a dramatic heavily long position on Hyperliquid three months ago, has suddenly initiated a large-scale liquidation process overnight. According to AiCoin data, this address will inject funds derived from the incident into Hyperliquid in August this year, establishing a staggering long position in ETH, SOL, and XRP perpetual contracts: approximately 30,282 ETH, 550,000 SOL, and about 35.03 million XRP, with a total nominal value close to 148 million dollars. This position was silently maintained on-chain until early November, but on November 9, it suddenly began liquidating long positions in batches using the TWAP tool provided by the exchange, expected to be fully executed within about 16 hours. More ironically, according to Yujin's monitoring estimates, this liquidation will result in a loss of approximately 3.3 million dollars—not a dramatic liquidation event but rather a "surrender" conclusion made between a massive position and a relatively limited loss. This action occurs against the backdrop of the address being continuously tracked due to the UXLINK security incident, rapidly fueling the narrative of "the hacker's address being trapped and forced to liquidate in decentralized derivatives," and turning this very liquidation into a new signal connecting on-chain security and the risks of decentralized derivatives.
Hackers Can Also Lose Money: The Irony of 148 Million Long Positions
If we only look at the security incident itself, many people will instinctively assume that the hacker, after obtaining the assets, would either quickly launder them in layers or let them sleep for a long time, trying to minimize any additional risks. However, the choice of address 0xde8d...9524 is completely opposite: it pushed the large chips obtained from the UXLINK incident into Hyperliquid in August this year, building a total value of approximately 148 million dollars in long positions on ETH, SOL, and XRP perpetual contracts, effectively placing assets that were already "of unknown origin" back into a high-volatility risk environment. This behavior resembles that of a radical speculator, rather than the traditional image of an attacker who only seeks concealment and preservation of value, showing a strong subjective judgment of market direction and even a tendency to "gamble."
On November 9, this long position was gradually liquidated using the TWAP tool. According to EmberCN and Yujin's monitoring estimates, the expected loss is about 3.3 million dollars, leading the media and on-chain analysis to summarize it as "hacker long position trapped." In terms of results, this is merely a few percentage points of paper drawdown, yet it breaks the myth that "hackers can only profit, not lose"—attackers can not only make mistakes technically but can also misjudge the market direction. For observers of subsequent security incidents, this case reminds us that transferred assets do not necessarily only move along traditional money laundering paths; they may go through the entire cycle of position establishment, holding, and passive liquidation in decentralized derivatives, intertwining security with contract risk. This makes post-event tracing not just about identifying where the funds ultimately stop on which chain, or which address, but necessitates incorporating the hacker's risk preference into the analytical framework to understand their behavior in the market.
Three Months of Holding: A Replay of the Hacker's Long Bet
The timeline can be traced back to August of this year. At that time, the address 0xde8d...9524, which was being monitored due to the UXLINK security incident, established a position on the decentralized derivatives exchange Hyperliquid, directly opting for long positions in ETH, SOL, and XRP perpetual contracts, totaling approximately 30,282 ETH, 550,000 SOL, and about 35.03 million XRP, with a paper scale of about 148 million dollars. This long position was maintained on-chain for about three months, during which it did not fade from view: the background of the address combined with the enormous contracts caused it to be continuously marked by on-chain analysts and media, and every time the position state was updated, it would be discussed again.
The real turning point occurred on November 9. On that day, this address began utilizing Hyperliquid's TWAP tool to gradually liquidate the aforementioned long positions, with monitoring noting a time discrepancy of about two hours between the initiation of liquidation and concentrated media reports, after which the narrative of "the UXLINK hacker being trapped in a long position" rapidly spread. From the outcome, the TWAP liquidation is expected to result in a loss of about 3.3 million dollars, with the execution process lasting about 16 hours. As for the motivations and pressures behind this, we can only cautiously speculate: on one hand, the concentrated bets over three months have been sufficiently exposed on public opinion and risk control levels, and continuing to hold positions means bearing greater price volatility risks under the public spotlight; on the other hand, with the narrative of security incidents heating up, the combination of a tracked identity and massive contracts may have brought additional uncertainties and psychological pressures, prompting this decision to exit the long bet through a systematic tool at a point that is not absolutely extreme in the market conditions.
Hacker Long Position Game on the Hyperliquid Stage
In this three-month-long bet, Hyperliquid more resembles a brightly lit main stage. As a decentralized derivatives exchange, it provided the address 0xde8d...9524 with leveraged tools for ETH, SOL, and XRP perpetual contracts, with the latter stacking approximately 30,282 ETH, 550,000 SOL, and about 35.03 million XRP to build a total value of around 148 million dollars in long positions, directly transporting the on-chain narrative surrounding the UXLINK security incident to a visible leveraged battleground. The scale of the position coupled with identity labels means that this long position is not just a financial decision, but also part of the public domain narrative, where any adjustment is inevitably interpreted as a signal of rebalancing risk and reward.
What truly made Hyperliquid the focal point was the way this gigantic long position was programmatically dismantled. On November 9, this address chose to utilize the TWAP time-weighted average price tool provided by the exchange, to gradually liquidate the long positions in ETH, SOL, and XRP over an expected window of about 16 hours, with an anticipated loss of around 3.3 million dollars, completing the entire exit action the following morning around 6 a.m. According to Odaily citing Yujin's monitoring, this rhythm of slicing a massive position into continuous small orders aims to weaken single-order impacts while trying to separate technical liquidation from identity controversies under the premise of being publicly tracked. This process was continuously observed and recorded by multiple parties, bringing the risk management tools of decentralized derivatives and the feasibility of risk control in extreme identity scenarios to the central discussion table, forcing the market to rethink how the boundaries of protocol design and participant behavior should be understood when immense leverage meets marked addresses.
ETH, SOL, XRP: Potential Impact of TWAP Liquidation
Mechanically, TWAP splits large orders into continuous small executions within a preset time window, aiming to get closer to the "average price" in the time dimension, reducing the risk of instant market orders. In this event, according to Yujin's monitoring, the liquidation is expected to last about 16 hours, which means the sell pressure on ETH, SOL, and XRP is stretched and diluted: market making and counterparties have a longer response time, theoretically helping to reduce instantaneous slippage and extreme price spikes. However, with a nominal position scale nearing 148 million dollars, judging solely from the position side, this persistent systemic selling pressure may still alter short-term order book structure and market depth, but the specific strength of the impact can only remain at a theoretical deduction level in the absence of transaction details and price curves.
Existing public materials have not provided specific price trends, transaction scales, or contract data for ETH, SOL, and XRP during the liquidation period, and there is no data confirming whether TWAP has been fully executed or whether the final actual loss amount precisely matches the estimated 3.3 million dollars. Therefore, we cannot directly equate "the hacker long position being forced to liquidate" with a structural shock that has already occurred. What is genuinely worth tracking moving forward is whether address 0xde8d...9524 maintains some exposure in these three assets, chooses to rebuild long positions or turn to other varieties after the event. These on-chain actions regarding position continuation and adjustments will determine whether this liquidation leaves a one-time event trace on ETH, SOL, and XRP, or signals more long-term behavioral patterns.
The Unfinished Chapter of the Hacker Long Position Story
The address 0xde8d...9524's liquidation of its approximately 148 million dollars in long positions for ETH, SOL, and XRP on Hyperliquid adds a rare "extreme sample" for the analysis of hacker funding behavior, on-chain risks, and usage of decentralized derivatives: on one side is a highly sensitive address under continuous surveillance due to the UXLINK security incident, and on the other side is a high-leverage exposure maintained in the public eye for three months, ultimately liquidated through TWAP in batches with an expected loss of approximately 3.3 million dollars. It reveals how when funds arising from security incidents enter decentralized derivatives, various parties pull between a transparent ledger and high-risk strategies; it also makes "will hackers use complex derivatives to hedge or enhance their spoils" a question that can be specifically observed on-chain. However, so far, the public information remains at the estimated loss level, and final settlement results have yet to be confirmed. The specific identity of the address, overall asset structure, and fund distribution outside of Hyperliquid are still blank, and these unresolved issues determine whether we are assessing a limited speculative attempt or witnessing a localized adjustment within a more extensive financial landscape. Moving forward, whether security teams continue to refine the path tracking for 0xde8d...9524, whether related protocols reassess risk control and product design after such extreme cases, and whether the decentralized derivatives track would iterate new constraints and tools under the intertwining pressures of hacker funds, extreme leverage, and security incidents, will all become critical observation windows for determining whether this "hacker long position story" is coming to a conclusion or restarting a new chapter.
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