NVIDIA was originally scheduled to hold the AI Day Seoul 2026 event on November 9, and Huang Minshan, the eldest daughter of NVIDIA’s CEO and founder Jensen Huang, was planned to attend this event.
According to previous arrangements, Huang Minshan was to attend the event in Seoul and meet with South Korean government officials to discuss cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence.
South Korea itself is an important semiconductor cooperation market for NVIDIA; companies like Samsung and SK Hynix maintain close business relations with NVIDIA. Huang Minshan has also participated in AI industry activities in South Korea multiple times, so this event is quite important for her.
However, just a day before her departure, her entire schedule was suddenly canceled. At that time, Yonhap News Agency cited insider sources stating that the cancellation may be related to personal family issues, but did not reveal specific reasons.
But looking at the current situation, the reasons for Huang Minshan's canceled schedule are both public and private.
The private matter is her 63-year-old father’s infidelity. The person he was unfaithful with is a Chinese woman named Huang Le, who was formerly an executive at a Singapore data center company called Megaspeed.
On November 8, Jensen Huang personally sent an apology letter to all NVIDIA employees. The founder of this tech giant, who has led NVIDIA for over thirty years, publicly acknowledged his infidelity in the letter.
He stated that his actions hurt his wife and children, and that there is no excuse to justify them, offering apologies to his family, employees, board, and shareholders.
In fact, Jensen Huang met his wife Lori in college, and they have lived together for decades, raising one son and one daughter. Both children later also joined NVIDIA. Now, this tech entrepreneur, once seen as successful in both career and family, must publicly face his marital crisis.
So the public issue is probably the troubles NVIDIA is facing.
On November 7, the Financial Times cited insiders revealing that a previously obtained internal memorandum by U.S. intelligence suggested that the woman, Huang Le, who was in a relationship with Jensen Huang, is suspected by U.S. intelligence agencies of being recruited by Chinese intelligence to approach Jensen Huang and obtain information related to NVIDIA and advanced AI chips in the U.S.
The NVIDIA board is also in a difficult position; they have formed a committee composed of independent directors and hired outside lawyers to investigate whether Jensen Huang has become a target of foreign intelligence operations.
As a senior director, Huang Minshan naturally has to come back to handle this mess together.
At this point, Jensen Huang’s infidelity has actually far surpassed personal family life.
The complex game theory involved in this issue suggests that Jensen Huang's troubles may have only just begun.
What kind of company is Megaspeed?
Why did U.S. intelligence agencies focus on Huang Le? This actually needs to start from the company Megaspeed.
Initially, Megaspeed had nothing to do with artificial intelligence.
In 2015, a company named 7Road International was registered in Singapore, backed by the Chinese gaming company Seventh Avenue (7Road). Seventh Avenue was an important player in China's online game industry, having developed games like "Dantian Hall" and "Shenqu," and later received support from state-owned investment institutions.
In 2023, with the global AI boom triggered by ChatGPT, this Singaporean company's business direction changed.
In March of that year, 7Road International officially changed its name to Megaspeed International and began entering the AI computing power and cloud computing industry. The previously mentioned Huang Le was appointed as the company's managing director during this period.
Subsequently, the company's shares were transferred to Singapore's Swiftdata, with Huang Le exiting the board. In early 2024, Megaspeed established a subsidiary, Speedmatrix, in Malaysia to handle local equipment procurement and related business.
This company, which had little recognition in the global tech industry, subsequently conducted a remarkably large-scale business.
In June 2024, Speedmatrix began large-scale procurement of AI servers equipped with NVIDIA GPUs.
According to an investigation by the New York Times into ImportGenius trade records, from June 2024 to February 2026, Megaspeed’s Malaysian affiliate procured a cumulative total of at least $4.8 billion worth of advanced AI equipment, including a significant amount of NVIDIA chips and related technology.
For a company that had just transitioned to AI business, this procurement scale is quite astonishing.
Its procurement channels have also caught the attention of U.S. regulatory agencies.
A significant portion of the equipment purchased by Megaspeed came from the U.S. server supplier Aivres, which has close ties with the Chinese server manufacturer Inspur Group.
Some entities under Inspur Group were included in the U.S. export control entity list in 2023 due to their support for the development of China’s military supercomputing technology.
However, as Aivres operates in the U.S. and is not included in the same restriction list, it can still purchase NVIDIA chips in compliance with export regulations.
This has formed a multinational supply chain.
NVIDIA provides the GPUs, Aivres and other server suppliers handle the equipment integration and then export the related products to Speedmatrix in Malaysia.
These servers are subsequently used for data center operations in Southeast Asia.
Megaspeed's business model primarily involves renting out GPU compute power to other companies. It is responsible for purchasing chips and servers, deploying the equipment in data centers, and then providing customers with remote computing services.
Customers do not need to purchase chips; they can simply access computing resources via the internet.
Megaspeed has provided computing services to Chinese enterprises, including Alibaba, from its data centers in Malaysia and Indonesia.
This raises a question about U.S. chip export controls.
Since 2022, the U.S. has limited the export of certain advanced AI chips to China, but these restrictions do not imply that all Chinese enterprises cannot use computing resources located overseas.
If Chinese enterprises lease GPUs from a Malaysian data center, as long as the chips stay in Malaysia, determining whether the transaction violates U.S. regulations requires consideration of export licenses, end-users, and actual transaction arrangements.
However, if enterprises re-ship controlled chips that should be deployed in Malaysia to China without permission, it could directly violate U.S. export control regulations.
U.S. investigators suspect that some of Megaspeed’s operations may involve the latter situation.
In fact, U.S. government interest in Megaspeed had started before the personal relationship scandal involving Jensen Huang was exposed.
In 2024, officials from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security visited Malaysia to inspect a data center used by Megaspeed. Investigators found that some of the purchased NVIDIA equipment was still packed and had not been put into operation, raising suspicions.
By October 2025, the New York Times published a report investigating Megaspeed.
That month, Republican Senator Tom Cotton officially wrote to U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, requesting an investigation into whether Megaspeed is using complex corporate relationships and cross-border transactions to help Chinese clients circumvent U.S. advanced chip export restrictions.
Cotton specifically mentioned the company's connections to suppliers associated with Inspur Group and the ambiguity surrounding the ultimate use of the chips.
As investigations further deepened this year, the U.S. Department of Commerce's inquiries into Megaspeed have been handed over to the Department of Justice, placing the relevant issues within the investigative scope of U.S. judicial authorities.
In response to U.S. suspicions, NVIDIA has consistently maintained its position.
On October 29, Jensen Huang stated in an interview with Bloomberg that NVIDIA's business interactions with Megaspeed are entirely normal. He emphasized that the company has checked Megaspeed’s GPU deployment situation and verified the related equipment, finding no evidence of chips being illegally shipped to China.
Thus, from the current publicly available information, U.S. investigators are primarily focused on two issues:
First, whether the advanced AI equipment procured by Megaspeed has been illegally shipped to China.
Second, whether the computing power services provided by these devices involve assisting restricted entities in circumventing U.S. export regulations.
The ongoing investigation has yet to yield a final conclusion, but Megaspeed's experience reflects the real challenges facing U.S. chip controls.
Even if chips are restricted from being exported to a certain country, local companies may still obtain computing power through data centers in other countries.
The reason the U.S. is so concerned about these chips is also related to the chip blockade against China that started several years ago.
U.S. Chip Blockade Against China
On October 7, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced new export control measures.
According to the regulations, advanced computing chips like NVIDIA’s A100 and H100 need prior government approval to be exported to China. Some semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technologies related to supercomputing have also been included in the restricted scope.
Prior to this, the U.S. had already restricted Chinese tech companies like Huawei from obtaining certain advanced technologies through entity lists and other means. However, this time, the restrictions expanded to include advanced computing chips and related industrial chains, directly impacting China’s access to high-performance computing capabilities in the AI sector.
The rationale provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce was national security.
The U.S. government believes that advanced computing capabilities can not only be used to train AI models but also for military simulations, intelligence analysis, weapon development, and supercomputing. If China can continuously gain access to the most advanced chips, it may narrow the technological gap between the two countries.
Therefore, the U.S. aims to delay China's development in these fields by restricting the supply of advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing technologies.
However, this policy quickly encountered NVIDIA.
At that time, NVIDIA was already a key player in the global AI computing market, with China being one of its significant markets.
To maintain its business in China, NVIDIA began to adjust product designs and launched chips like the A800 and H800 that complied with the then current export regulations.
These products imposed limitations on certain performance metrics and were able to meet the U.S. export requirements while continuing to sell to Chinese clients.
However, the U.S. government soon discovered that Chinese companies could still use these products to build large-scale AI computing clusters.
On October 17, 2023, the Biden administration tightened the restrictions further, adjusting the performance thresholds and applicable scopes for advanced chips, affecting NVIDIA’s A800 and H800 that were specifically designed for the Chinese market.
NVIDIA then launched products like the H20 to attempt to preserve its market in China.
This led to a situation lasting several years, where the U.S. government continuously adjusted export regulations, while NVIDIA modified its product designs according to the new regulations to keep its operations in China running.
By 2025, when Trump returned to office, NVIDIA initially hoped the U.S. government would relax some of the restrictions, but things did not go smoothly.
On April 9, the U.S. government notified NVIDIA that H20 chip exports to China would also require a license application, directly affecting NVIDIA's production plans and customer orders that had already been arranged.
According to documents NVIDIA submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the company recognized approximately $4.5 billion in expenses during the first fiscal quarter due to H20 inventory backlog and procurement commitments.
At the Taipei International Computer Show a month later, Jensen Huang publicly expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. export policies.
He argued that the ongoing restrictions on U.S. companies selling AI chips to China were forcing Chinese clients to turn to domestic suppliers like Huawei.
Jensen Huang revealed that NVIDIA's market share in the Chinese AI chip sector had dropped from around 95% to 50%.
He also predicted that the Chinese AI market size could reach $50 billion by 2026. In his view, if U.S. companies long-term exit this market, they would not only lose chip sales revenue but also the future reliance of China's AI industry on the U.S. technological system.
This situation also involved NVIDIA's own business model.
One of NVIDIA’s key competitive advantages is its long-established software ecosystem, CUDA.
Developers use NVIDIA GPUs to train and deploy AI models, often requiring accompanying software, development tools, and technical support.
As more companies utilize NVIDIA products, the related software and computing infrastructure continue to evolve around it, helping NVIDIA maintain its long-term competitive edge.
China has a large number of internet enterprises, AI developers, and researchers.
If these users are unable to purchase NVIDIA chips for a long time, there will be a stronger motivation to look for alternatives.
Once domestic AI companies gradually adapt to local computing platforms like Huawei, even if the U.S. eventually reopens some chip exports, NVIDIA may not easily regain its previous market share.
In July 2025, things finally took a turn for the better.
After discussions with the Trump administration, NVIDIA announced that the U.S. government had assured the company that it would approve compliant H20 export license applications.
In August, the U.S. Department of Commerce began issuing related licenses, allowing NVIDIA to regain the opportunity to sell H20 to certain Chinese clients.
By December 8, 2025, Trump announced that the U.S. would allow NVIDIA to sell the more powerful H200 chip to approved Chinese clients while proposing that the U.S. government earn 25% of the sales revenue from related transactions.
On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce formally adjusted the license review policy, changing the principle of rejecting licenses for products like the H200 to case-by-case reviews.
Applying companies still need to meet conditions such as customer screening, product safety testing, and ensuring domestic supply security.
However, the relaxation of policies did not immediately lead to NVIDIA's recovery of its business in China.
On one hand, the U.S. still restricts the export of the most advanced chips. On the other hand, China is also promoting the development of its domestic AI computing industry, implementing reviews and restrictions on the procurement of certain U.S. chips.
NVIDIA’s financial report released in August 2026 showed that as of the quarter ending July 26 of that year, the company's total revenue reached $96.2 billion, but revenue from its data center Hopper products in China accounted for less than 1% of its data center business revenue.
The company’s performance forecast for the next quarter did not include revenue from China’s data center computing.
On October 13, 2026, Reuters reported using data from market research firm IDC:
In the first half of 2026, NVIDIA's market share in the Chinese data center AI chip market had dropped to 34%, while Huawei's share rose to 28%.
They are only 6 percentage points apart.
NVIDIA's shipments of AI accelerator chips in the first half of the year in the Chinese market totalled approximately 678,000 units, a 44% year-on-year decline, while Huawei's shipments reached approximately 572,000 units, showing significant growth compared to the previous year.
These figures can explain why Jensen Huang attaches such importance to the Chinese market.
Years of export restrictions are changing the procurement choices and technological routes of China's AI industry.
For the U.S. government, limiting the export of advanced chips reduces China's ability to directly access America's leading computing technologies.
For NVIDIA, however, this policy may help competitors gain more customers and accelerate the development of China's domestic computing ecosystem.
Therefore, there is a clear divergence of goals between both sides.
Additionally, Jensen Huang is well aware that the key to whether NVIDIA can continue to sell chips to China lies no longer within the company.
Chip performance can be modified, product designs can be adjusted, but export licenses are controlled by the U.S. government.
To change the policy, Washington's decision-making must be influenced.
As a result, Jensen Huang began to frequently engage with Trump and U.S. government officials, actively lobbying for the relaxation of AI chip export restrictions to China.
His relationship with Trump gradually developed against this backdrop.
Jensen Huang and Trump
On January 31, 2025, just over ten days after returning to the White House, Trump hosted Jensen Huang.
Just days earlier, a Chinese AI company named DeepSeek released an AI model that shook the U.S. tech community.
DeepSeek claimed to achieve performance close to leading U.S. models at relatively low costs, leading the market to question whether the huge investments made by U.S. tech giants in AI computing had a sustainable long-term advantage.
On January 27, NVIDIA's stock price plummeted nearly 17% in a single day, wiping out about $593 billion in market value, creating a record for the largest single-day market value loss for a publicly traded U.S. company at that time.
In Washington, the emergence of DeepSeek also prompted the U.S. government to reassess its policies on AI chip exports to China.
The first White House meeting between Trump and Jensen Huang occurred under such circumstances.
In this meeting, they discussed DeepSeek, the development of the U.S. AI industry, and the issue of further restricting advanced chip exports to China.
After the meeting, Trump told reporters that their exchange was pleasant and referred to Jensen Huang as a gentleman. NVIDIA stated that they discussed how to strengthen America's leadership in the semiconductor and AI fields.
In the following months, Jensen Huang gradually became one of the entrepreneurs frequently engaged with the Trump administration in the AI industry.
In April 2025, NVIDIA announced an expansion of its production footprint in the U.S. with partners like TSMC, Foxconn, and Wistron, planning to produce AI infrastructure products worth up to $500 billion through domestic supply chains within the next four years.
The plan involved chip manufacturing in Arizona and AI supercomputer production in Texas.
This news delighted Trump.
On April 14, the White House issued a statement declaring NVIDIA's expansion of U.S. manufacturing plans as a success of Trump’s industrial policy.
This also reflected the gradually forming intersection of interests between the two.
Trump's political agenda is to bring advanced manufacturing back to the U.S. and encourage American tech companies to expand domestic investment while creating jobs and economic growth through the development of the AI industry.
Jensen Huang, on the other hand, needs support from the White House to minimize the impacts of export controls on NVIDIA's global business.
Both parties have something each needs from the other.
In May 2025, when Trump visited Saudi Arabia, Jensen Huang also appeared in the accompanying American business delegation.
At the U.S.-Saudi investment forum held in Riyadh, Trump publicly mentioned Jensen Huang, calling him his friend, and introduced the significance of NVIDIA's position in the global AI chip market.
At that time, the U.S. was promoting cooperation on AI infrastructure with Gulf countries, and NVIDIA was a key technology supplier among them.
However, despite the growing closeness of their relationship, the Trump administration did not immediately relax restrictions on chip exports to China.
As noted earlier, NVIDIA’s H20 faced restrictions in April, and only saw improvements in July.
On July 10, Jensen Huang visited the White House again to meet with Trump. According to the original plan, he was to visit China afterward.
Four days later, NVIDIA announced that the U.S. government had assured that it would approve the export license applications for compliant H20 chips.
Jensen Huang then traveled to Beijing to engage with representatives from the Chinese government and technology industry.
This time, he returned with the policy signals that NVIDIA hoped to receive.
However, Trump clearly had his own commercial calculations.
In August 2025, Reuters disclosed that NVIDIA and AMD agreed to pay the U.S. government a percentage of sales revenue from chip sales to China, set at 15%, as one of the arrangements to obtain relevant export licenses.
This move sparked significant controversy in the U.S.
Because past U.S. export restrictions on sensitive technologies primarily focused on national security and technological risk, it was rare to condition licenses on companies paying a percentage of sales revenue to the government.
But Trump was willing to consider such arrangements.
In his policy logic, as long as the relevant technological risks could be controlled, the U.S. government could still gain economic benefits by allowing some commercial transactions.
Later, the export arrangements proposed by Trump for the H200 also reflected this line of thinking.
For Trump, permitting China to purchase certain U.S. AI chips involves another consideration.
If Chinese AI companies continue to use NVIDIA GPUs, they may maintain reliance on the U.S. software ecosystem, technology standards, and supply chains.
American enterprises can gain revenue from it, and the U.S. can continue to have significant influence over the global AI industry.
This is a different competitive path compared to completely cutting off technology supply.
Of course, this policy is also controversial, as chip sales may similarly enhance the computing capabilities of Chinese companies.
But at least from Trump’s perspective, the export control of advanced technologies is not entirely without negotiation space.
Jensen Huang clearly agrees with the underlying commercial logic.
The cooperation between the two in the AI industry has also increasingly brought Huang closer to the White House.
On October 8, 2026, Trump presented the U.S. National Medal of Science to Jensen Huang at a science and technology award ceremony in Washington, which is one of the highest honors bestowed upon contributors in the field of science and engineering in the U.S.
The White House’s award statement acknowledged Jensen Huang’s contributions in advancing GPUs from graphics processing devices to general computing architectures, laying an important foundation for artificial intelligence and scientific computing.
Also awarded that day were Elon Musk, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, and AMD CEO Lisa Su.
However, just a month later, Jensen Huang found himself embroiled in a political storm involving Chinese intelligence agencies due to private matters.
On November 8, reporters asked Trump about this matter.
Trump stated that he had not yet discussed the related allegations with Jensen Huang, but still regarded him as a respected individual.
He particularly praised Huang's contributions to America.
When further questioned if he would take Huang along on the upcoming visit to Asia, Trump replied, while specific arrangements were not yet determined, he would certainly be willing to bring him along.
From Trump’s attitude, it was obvious he had no intention of cutting ties with Jensen Huang at that moment.
This is not difficult to understand.
Trump needs NVIDIA to continue expanding domestic manufacturing and support the construction of America’s AI infrastructure while helping the U.S. maintain technological advantages, and Jensen Huang also needs support from the White House regarding chip exports, international cooperation, and industrial policies.
The interactions between the two over the past nearly two years have forged quite a clear shared interest.
However, Trump's support certainly has its limits; if subsequent investigations reveal serious national security issues with Huang, Trump will still have to face pressure from U.S. regulatory agencies and the political system.
Moreover, within the U.S., the decision over whether advanced chips can be exported to China is not solely in the hands of the White House.
Although Huang has gained Trump's support, there remains a group in Washington that consistently opposes his positions.
Interestingly, many of these individuals come from Trump's own Republican Party.
Another Force in Washington
In July 2025, shortly after Huang secured the Trump administration's reopening of some H20 chip exports to China, a Republican congressman publicly expressed his opposition.
This individual is John Moolenaar from Michigan, who chairs the U.S. House of Representatives’ Special Committee on China.
Moolenaar believes the prior decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce to restrict H20 exports was entirely correct, and now allowing these chips to enter China would be tantamount to weakening the U.S.'s technological advantage in AI.
He specifically wrote to U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, urging the government to reconsider this decision.
The policy support Huang just secured from the White House faced opposition from members of Trump’s own party.
Moolenaar is a representative figure in Congress advocating for stronger tech restrictions on China.
In his policy stance, the development of China's AI industry is already a significant issue related to U.S. national security. Advanced GPUs can be used for commercial model training but can also be applied in military computing, intelligence analysis, and cyberattacks.
Therefore, he has long advocated for stringent limits on China’s access to advanced U.S. computing technology.
In fact, as early as the beginning of 2025, during the controversy over DeepSeek, Moolenaar, along with the leading Democrat on the Special Committee on China, Raja Krishnamoorthi, requested the government to tighten export controls related to the chips used by DeepSeek.
This indicates that the hardline stance in Congress regarding tech policies towards China actually has a degree of bipartisan consensus.
By December 2025, when Trump announced the approval of some H200 chip exports to China, Moolenaar once again spoke out.
On December 12, he wrote to the U.S. Commerce Secretary seeking clarification on the basis for the government’s approval of H200 exports.
In Moolenaar's view, the previous export controls had forced Chinese enterprises to accelerate their search for alternative technologies, which underscored that these restrictions were having an effect.
If the U.S. reopens the export of higher-performance chips, it could help China narrow the gap in computing capabilities with the U.S.
This time, opposition to Trump's policy came not only from Moolenaar.
On January 21, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee held a meeting to review a bill called the "AI OVERWATCH Act."
The bill was proposed by the committee's chairman, Brian Mast, who is also a Republican.
This bill aims to strengthen congressional oversight of advanced AI chip exports, requiring that certain sensitive chip exports must obtain licenses while granting Congress the authority to review or even block related licenses.
According to Mast, advanced AI chips already exhibit clear military applications and cannot be managed merely as ordinary commercial goods.
He even suggested that the export should mimic the oversight mechanisms used in U.S. arms sales.
This is essentially a contest for an important power:
Who should decide whether advanced AI chips can be exported to China, the White House and the Department of Commerce, or Congress should have more intervention rights?
For Trump, export licenses could serve as a policy tool in U.S.-China trade negotiations.
However, for Mast and other members, if the president has excessive discretion, he might approve transactions that they believe carry national security risks for the sake of economic benefits.
This divide quickly became public.
Trump’s White House AI and cryptocurrency special advisor, David Sachs, publicly opposed Mast’s bill, claiming it might limit the president’s flexibility in using export control policies.
Mast then responded that Sachs could suggest Trump sell the H200, but his own suggestion was exactly the opposite.
Ultimately, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 42 in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention to approve progressing the bill to subsequent legislative procedures.
Although this bill had not officially become law at the time, such a skewed vote outcome demonstrated substantial support for strengthening oversight of AI chip exports within the committee.
Democrats also supported stronger controls.
In September 2026, during a visit by a Chinese delegation to the U.S., Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer publicly criticized Trump for relaxing advanced chip export restrictions to China.
Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren pointedly targeted Jensen Huang (she is known for being tough on crypto).
She stated that tech entrepreneurs like Huang should not be able to influence U.S. AI export policies for their business interests.
In her view, national security policy should be formulated by the government and legislative processes, not overly influenced by lobbying from large tech companies.
Thus, the political divisions in Washington surrounding Jensen Huang are quite clear.
The White House wishes to retain some policy space between national security and business interests.
On the other hand, hardliners in Congress wish to further tighten restrictions and enhance oversight of the executive branch.
Moreover, these hardliners exist within both the Republican and Democratic parties.
While there may be heated debates regarding taxes, immigration, and fiscal spending, there is considerable consensus on restricting China's access to advanced AI technologies.
In this political environment, even if Jensen Huang can obtain Trump's support, it will be difficult for him to eliminate pressure from Congress based solely on the president's personal attitude.
By November 2026, the situation changed again.
On November 3, the U.S. midterm elections concluded with the Democrats gaining a majority in both houses, taking control of the next Congress starting in January 2027.
Trump will soon face a Congress controlled by the opposition party, and the Democrats will gain greater powers for committee investigations and oversight.
Just a day after the election, on November 4, Jensen Huang received a letter from Congress.
The letter was signed by three individuals:
Brian Mast, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Special Committee on China; and Rick Crawford, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.
All three individuals are Republicans.
They requested Jensen Huang to attend a joint closed-door briefing with the three committees on November 18 and confirm by November 11 whether he could attend.
The letter focused on requiring Huang to explain the nature of his contact with executive Huang Le and what security measures NVIDIA has put in place against foreign intelligence activities.
The three legislators believed that recent media reports had raised national security concerns about sensitive technologies and information potentially being accessed by China, and that Congress needed to understand the actual risks involved.
It is noteworthy that when this letter was sent, Jensen Huang had not yet publicly acknowledged his infidelity, nor had the NVIDIA board announced the establishment of an independent investigation committee.
Congress's actions had already preceded Huang’s later public apology.
In fact, what the legislators cared about was not only the nature of Jensen Huang's relationship with Huang Le but also whether this relationship could potentially affect NVIDIA's information security and business decisions.
They sought to understand what measures a CEO of the world’s most vital AI chip company took during long-term interactions with overseas clients to prevent sensitive information from being accessed by foreign intelligence agencies.
NVIDIA similarly emphasized that its interactions with relevant clients were normal business activities and that clients could not gain access to sensitive technology information through them.
However, the investigation by Congress does not need to wait for actual leaks to begin.
When legislators believe that a certain business relationship may pose a security risk, they can use their oversight powers to request explanations from businesses, conduct inquiries, or even advocate for regulatory measures.
For Jensen Huang, this process has clearly shifted from the prior focus on lobbying for chip export licenses.
Now, he has to explain to congressional legislators whether he and NVIDIA have appropriately managed potential national security risks.
Even more troubling, after the new Congress takes office in 2027, the Democrats will command more investigative resources.
Trump continues to publicly affirm Jensen Huang, while hardliners within the Republican Party have requested that he undergo an investigation, and the Democrats are about to take control of Congress and have long opposed certain advanced chip exports to China.
For Jensen Huang, the relationships he built in the White House over the past few years are insufficient to combat all political pressure.
This investigation targeting him happens to arise at a pivotal moment of transitioning congressional power in the U.S. amidst an ongoing escalation of debates over U.S.-China chip policies.
Why Now for the Focus on Jensen Huang?
In fact, U.S. intelligence agencies had started paying attention to Huang Le as early as 2025, and Trump himself had been informed about the relevant situation. In spring 2026, U.S. officials compiled an internal memorandum involving the private relationship between Jensen Huang and Huang Le.
However, none of this information was made public, and Jensen Huang did not face any significant repercussions; in fact, he even received the U.S. National Medal of Science awarded by Trump himself in October this year.
It wasn’t until October 29 that the New York Times suddenly exposed relevant intelligence, followed by the Financial Times and other media outlets, and then Congress’s intervention, Jensen Huang’s public apology, and NVIDIA's board initiating an independent investigation.
In just ten days, such a significant transformation occurred.
I personally tend to believe that the concentrated explosion of this controversy is likely related to the internal political struggles within the U.S. surrounding AI chip export policies.
As previously mentioned, Jensen Huang has been actively lobbying the Trump administration over the past two years to loosen restrictions on advanced chip exports to China.
While he has indeed achieved substantial results, he has also offended a group of legislators in Congress who have long advocated for strict technology restrictions against China.
For these individuals, Huang’s previous significant advantage was his ability to directly engage with Trump and persuade the White House to adjust policies through commercial interests.
The current intelligence scandal, however, strikes at the heart of his credibility.
Historically, Congress had to engage in debates around technological performance, national security, and economic interests to oppose NVIDIA’s chip sales to China.
Now, they can question whether Jensen Huang himself poses a security risk, and even further inquire whether his past lobbying efforts on behalf of the U.S. government were unduly influenced.
Hence, once Jensen Huang’s personal credibility is heavily questioned, he may face greater political resistance in future attempts to lobby Trump.
All the more so, this scandal has been brewing in the wake of the midterm elections, with the Democratic Party winning a majority in both houses, exposing Trump to greater congressional oversight.
However, the three committee chairs initially calling for investigations into Jensen Huang are all from the Republican Party.
This indicates that dissatisfaction with Jensen Huang likely transcends the partisan differences between the two major parties in the U.S.
On the issue of advanced chip exports to China, there is already a similarity in stance between hardliners in the Republican Party and certain Democratic senators.
Therefore, the timing of this intelligence being disclosed could possibly involve certain political forces amplifying the event.
At least, from the current developments, it's clear that the U.S. technology hardliners can leverage this turmoil to garner further support for their long-standing policy propositions.
Trump’s situation is equally awkward; he has previously established a good relationship with Jensen Huang and indeed wishes for NVIDIA to continue assisting the U.S. in enhancing its AI industry advantage.
However, if the investigation continues to escalate, and Trump continues to support Jensen Huang, he may be criticized for excessively protecting a tech giant and potentially ignoring national security risks.
In essence, this controversy simultaneously increases political costs for both Jensen Huang and Trump. The ultimate outcome will likely depend on how the U.S. Congress chooses to navigate this situation in the upcoming future.
If the investigation remains focused on personal relationships and corporate security protocols, its impact on NVIDIA might be relatively limited.
However, if Congress reexamines NVIDIA’s chip sales to China, Jensen Huang's prior lobbying activities, and the decision-making process of related export licenses approved by the Trump administration, the situation could become much more complicated.
Personally, I believe that this latter possibility is more likely. For political forces that have long opposed loosening restrictions on chip sales to China, rather than constantly debating with Jensen Huang over the merits of chip sales, directly weakening his political influence in the White House may prove more effective.
Jensen Huang’s past greatest advantages were NVIDIA's unique global position in the AI industry and the relationship he established with the White House.
Now, both of these advantages might come under renewed political scrutiny due to a personal scandal.
And Huang’s troubles may have just begun.
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