On November 1, 2026, an on-chain operation that was supposed to be a hacker's "cash-out" turned out to be the most ridiculous and glaring segment of the entire incident. According to a report by Deep潮 TechFlow citing Lookonchain data, an address marked as related to the Binance attack dumped a total of 908,793 PROM tokens into a trading pool that was "nearly dried up" on Uniswap V2. According to Lookonchain's estimation, the theoretical market value of this batch of PROM was around 5 million dollars, but under the constant product market-making model, the hacker evidently did not realize that placing such a large order in a pool with almost no liquidity would trigger nearly catastrophic extreme slippage and price impact. The final outcome of the transaction was brutal— the pool was instantly drained, and he only got back 0.0316 ETH, roughly equivalent to 71 dollars. The gap between this number and the 5 million dollars was plainly written in the block by a transparent on-chain transaction. In most narratives, hackers are often imagined as "dark web experts" who are intimately familiar with protocols, depths, and paths, but this PROM sell-off played out like a public exam, exposing his unfamiliarity and misjudgment of the fundamental mechanisms of DeFi to all observers. What follows is a discussion of how this on-chain "car crash," from 5 million to 71 dollars, reflects the hacker's true operational ability and hints at the harsh reality of the current DeFi usage threshold.

Crashing into a Dried-Up Pool: How a Sell Order Self-Destructed 5 Million in Value

To understand this on-chain tragedy of "5 million turning into 71 dollars," one must first return to the underlying trading mechanics of Uniswap V2. It employs the classic x*y=k constant product market-making model: the product of the balances of the two assets in the pool must remain constant, and the price is determined by the ratio of the two balances. When one asset is sold in large quantities, the balance on that side increases sharply, the other asset is rapidly depleted, and the price slides down along a curved functional path rather than linear "at face value." In a pool with ample liquidity, this curve is relatively flat, and the impact of a single trade on price is limited; but once the pool itself is "nearly dried up," even a moderately sized order can directly push the curve to an extreme position close to the coordinate axis, resulting in a pitiful amount of counter-assets for the trader.

According to Lookonchain data, the address labeled as related to the Binance attack chose to sell approximately 908,793 PROM tokens all at once on Uniswap V2, dumping this entire batch into a PROM/ETH pool that was already nearly dried up. There was hardly any ETH left to exchange in the pool, and under such extreme imbalanced input, the constant product formula could only maintain the "equation's validity" by drastically lowering the PROM price, resulting in price impact and slippage being amplified to uncontrollable levels. Ultimately, the actual outcome recorded on-chain was that this seemingly "gamble-like" sell-off only returned 0.0316 ETH, roughly 71 dollars, while Lookonchain estimated this batch of PROM's theoretical market value was around 5 million dollars. In other words, the value did not evaporate instantaneously in the global market but was squeezed down to 71 dollars through the hacker's choice of the wrong pool and the wrong transaction size, bit by bit, along a cold x*y=k curve as a lesson.

On-Chain Public Execution: The Hacker's Mistake Amplified Across the Network

This operation that turned about 908,793 PROM tokens into 0.0316 ETH through "self-harm" was not uncovered afterward; it was monitored in real-time by on-chain monitoring accounts from the moment the order was placed. According to AiCoin data, this address, which has been marked by Lookonchain as related to the Binance attack, had every step of its token swaps and every interaction with the Uniswap V2 pool recorded in the public ledger. Lookonchain quickly compiled the sell-off quantity, the ETH amount received, and the comparison of "approximately 5 million dollars in theoretical market value only returning 71 dollars" using several clear on-chain screenshots, breaking down this mistake into a public execution that everyone could understand. Subsequently, Deep潮 TechFlow continued to amplify the details of this extreme loss and operational error in its report, elevating what had occurred in a nearly dried-up liquidity pool from a "technical crash" to a laughingstock widely observed across the network.

The narrative here reverses: previously, the public remembered the asymmetry of "Binance being attacked, and the hacker taking away the assets," but after this transaction on November 1, more people began discussing the notion that "the hacker, who obtained the tokens, could also turn the spoils into 71 dollars on-chain." For potential attackers in the future, this transparency means that how to handle the obtained assets is no longer a phase where one can quietly experiment in the shadows; for ordinary users and observers, the addresses and transaction data related to the event will remain on-chain for a long time, allowing anyone to revisit the full process of "choosing the wrong pool, miscalculating the slippage," and recalibrate their judgments regarding the hacker's capabilities, risk awareness, and rules of on-chain games.

Abandoning Centralized Outlets: The Hacker Forced to Take Risks in DeFi for Cashing Out

For the address marked as related to the Binance attack, the most direct disposal path—pouring the ill-gotten gains into centralized platforms and then slowly selling in batches—turned out to be the riskiest route. Identification meant that any attempt to enter the exchange system could result in the account being frozen at any moment, and the on-chain identity would more easily be linked to a real-world identity. Under such constraints, many past attack cases in the industry gradually formed the experience of "prioritizing decentralized pathways": bypassing KYC and centralized risk control, using DEX, cross-chain bridges, or mixing tools to complete exchanges and splits on-chain to reduce the probability of being intercepted in a single centralized node with a "one-size-fits-all" approach.

This time, according to a report from Deep潮 TechFlow, the hacker address chose to sell approximately 908,793 PROM tokens on Uniswap V2 instead of betting the chips in any centralized exchange or public over-the-counter platform. In retrospect, this looks more like a difficult exploration between "anonymity" and "transaction quality": the constant product market-making model of Uniswap V2 ensures that trades can happen without permission, but in a pool that is nearly dried up, large orders will inevitably trigger extreme slippage, ultimately returning only 0.0316 ETH, about 71 dollars, creating a cliff-like drop from the approximately 5 million dollar theoretical valuation. Existing data does not show whether this hacker tried other cash-out paths; we can only interpret this choice as a risk that acts in the usual manner of on-chain attackers under the expectation of being "blocked" by centralized risk control rather than as an optimal decision made after thoroughly comparing options.

PROM Drawn into the Storm: Narrative Pressure on Projects and Holders

Behind this absurd transaction of "5 million turning into 71 dollars," the focus is truly on PROM. Lookonchain's assessment shows that the hacker address marked as related to the Binance attack sold approximately 908,793 PROM tokens at once on Uniswap V2, with a theoretical value of about 5 million dollars, but because of putting that large order into a "nearly dried up" pool, it only received 0.0316 ETH, about 71 dollars. From the perspective of on-chain narratives, such a large position indicates that PROM is not an obscure token with no one paying attention; this passive involvement in the extreme operation following the Binance attack is likely to bind the name of PROM repeatedly with tags like "hacker," "error demonstration," and "on-chain negative teaching material" in the upcoming period.

For the project team and ordinary holders, such binding is not just about technical details but a form of narrative pressure: questions will start to arise, "Why did the hacker hold so much PROM for an extended period?" "Will the project take the blame for this?" "Are there additional concerns regarding protocol security and asset distribution?" However, according to the existing information, we could not see PROM's specific price performance before and after this incident, nor are there follow-up operations by other relevant addresses, and there is a lack of public responses from the project team, community, or major holders. In the absence of these on-chain and market data, this hacker's erroneous sell-off currently remains more of an impact at the level of public opinion, and we cannot infer the actual intensity and duration of PROM's impact in the broader market from this.

A Hacker's Crash: DeFi Survival Guide for Ordinary Users

In the absence of broader market data, the hacker sell-off of "5 million only returning 71 dollars" feels more like a publicly accessible lesson written into the chain: in constant product AMMs like Uniswap V2, directly dumping approximately 908,793 PROM tokens into a pool labeled as "nearly dried up" means that extreme slippage and price impact are not accidents but nearly inevitable mathematical results. For ordinary users, the biggest warning is this—without understanding AMM pricing mechanisms or reading pool depth and slippage risks, even holding "tokens worth millions" on paper can swiftly be wiped to a textbook example of failure in a single confirmed transaction. More importantly, in a completely transparent on-chain environment, such operational errors are not only irreversible but will also be recorded in real-time by on-chain analysts like Lookonchain and amplified by media outlets such as Deep潮 TechFlow. Every mistake made by any address will become material for others to study and review. This "visibility" equally applies to all compliant users. What is worth observing going forward is whether cases of funds from Binance hackers inadvertently entering or misusing DeFi protocols will increase, and whether education and tools surrounding AMM principles and liquidity risks can keep pace, using clearer slippage prompts, more understandable pool information, and more explanations aimed at beginners to lower the probability of similar crashes, turning such extreme events into a pivotal moment for improving awareness and refining protections within the entire on-chain ecosystem.

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