For a long time, Zcash has primarily existed in the industry narrative as a "zero-knowledge proof + shielded transaction" technology, seen as an option for providing on-chain privacy to ordinary users. Recently, this channel has come under scrutiny by several Chinese crypto media outlets: in multiple theft incidents, the stolen funds were reported to have flowed into the Zcash network after completing an initial split, using its shielded transaction feature that can hide the identities of the parties involved and the specific amounts, further transferring and concealing the funds. The catalyst came from on-chain detective ZachXBT's public breakdown of the Bitget attack incident, where he pointed out that the attacker had funneled some of the stolen funds into Zcash to obscure their subsequent path using its privacy features; subsequently, another on-chain analyst, Specter, noted that a larger range of stolen funds began to enter this network, including the Ledger-related incident of Cryptobills and a hack involving about $12 million from Triple-A, which the media viewed as representative cases of attackers collectively choosing Zcash as a privacy channel. Discussions around these paths currently mainly come from on-chain detectives and media reports, and have yet to receive a public classification from the project team or regulatory agencies. The tension faced by privacy assets between "protecting the privacy boundary for legitimate users" and "providing a shelter for attackers" has thus been brought to the forefront.
From Bitget Clues to ZEC Money Laundering Demonstration Effect
If the subsequent exposure of multiple cases constitutes a picture of "collective selection" of privacy channels, then the starting point can almost all be traced back to Bitget. According to on-chain analysis published by ZachXBT, the Bitget attackers, after completing the initial transfer, funneled part of the stolen funds into Zcash, using its shielded transactions supported by zero-knowledge proofs to hide the funds' destination and transaction details. The key to this path is: before entering the Zcash privacy channel, the attackers still needed to go through visible addresses and cross-chain/exchange steps. ZachXBT retraced the last few hops "before diving into the dark web" step by step along these visible traces, bringing this method of utilizing Zcash's privacy features to obscure stolen funds to the forefront.
After the Bitget case was revealed, the media began to treat it as an early signal of attackers turning to privacy assets, while on-chain analyst Specter publicly stated that he would focus on monitoring visible fund movements related to Zcash. This kind of attention itself is also creating a "demonstration effect": on the one hand, compliant users see that privacy tools can indeed block external scrutiny; on the other hand, potential attackers read from the Bitget path the operational paradigm of "how to maximize the erasure of traces before entering Zcash." At a time when evidence primarily comes from on-chain detectives and media materials, the Bitget case has been placed at the narrative center, becoming a benchmark for whether subsequent funds identified to flow into Zcash replicate existing patterns.
Follow-up on Cryptobills and Triple-A Stolen Funds
Continuing along the clues after Bitget, the first "follower" named by Specter is the Ledger incident related to Cryptobills. According to his public statement, part of the stolen funds in this case was observed to flow into the Zcash network afterward, classified by the media as a new sample "replicating the Bitget path." Several Chinese crypto media outlets subsequently cited this as an example, placing Cryptobills alongside Bitget as cases that utilized Zcash's shielded transactions to hide the flow of funds, although details regarding specific amounts, addresses, and transaction hashes have not been disclosed in the current reports, and the confidence in the related judgments is only marked as moderate.
Following closely is the case involving the $12 million Triple-A hack. Specter mentioned in the same series of opinions that this larger amount of stolen funds was also said to have entered Zcash and completed concealment through the shielded transaction feature supported by zero-knowledge proofs, viewed as a case of attackers "doubling down" on this privacy channel after Bitget and Cryptobills. The three events have been closely linked by the media, forming a converging path from the escape of stolen assets to their influx into the Zcash privacy channel. In the narrative of on-chain analysts, the repeated appearance of this path is no longer viewed as coincidence but rather as a collective follow-up and imitation by attackers observing the successful experiences of their predecessors.
How Zcash's Privacy Design Obscures Vision
From the perspective of on-chain analysts, Zcash's "invisibility" primarily comes from its shielded transactions and shielded addresses. Users can choose to transfer their assets into shielded addresses, completing the transfer through zero-knowledge proofs: leaving only a cryptographic proof on-chain that verifies the transaction occurred within the rules and that the amount is conserved, without exposing who the sender or receiver is, nor revealing the specific amount. What external observers see is merely a "legitimate transfer event" that occurred, and they are unable to reconstruct the specific relationship map of this transfer between addresses, which is also a key reason it has long been considered a highly private cryptocurrency asset.
This design is nearly a direct counter to the logic of on-chain tracking. Under normal circumstances, on-chain detectives need to rely on public addresses and amount fluctuations, piecing together a complete path of stolen funds from the attack address, to intermediate jumping points, and then to cash-outs and dispersals; however, once the funds are sent to a Zcash shielded address, this path is cut off in the public view into an unreadable black box, leaving only a time point and amount clue for "entering the privacy pool." For attackers, the motivation to choose this channel is very straightforward: after completing the initial escape and splitting on the public chain, pushing the stolen funds into a privacy layer that is almost impossible to trace further removes a critical segment of the fund migration process from the verifiable on-chain image. As long as they successfully cross this step, how subsequent funds circulate within the privacy channel becomes very difficult to reconstruct externally.
The Long-term Tug of War Between Privacy Coins and Regulation
From the user's perspective, high-intensity privacy assets like Zcash fundamentally provide a layer of transaction protection shielded from being "watched by the entire network"; however, from the perspective of law enforcement and compliance, the same shielding capability can completely conceal the path of stolen funds at critical moments. The dual-use of privacy tools in legitimate protection versus illegal fund concealment is almost embedded in the genome of the entire privacy coin track, keeping them at the center of anti-money laundering and compliance controversies for a long time: on one hand, there is a technological pursuit of stronger anonymity, while on the other, regulatory agencies continuously raise penetration requirements, creating a constant tug-of-war between these two forces on the same timeline.
Returning to the current discussions surrounding Zcash, the so-called assertion that "stolen funds flood into privacy channels" is primarily based on the public observations of on-chain detective ZachXBT and Specter, as well as the concentrated reporting from several media outlets creating a public discourse. Existing materials do not show a clear response from Zcash regarding the relevant fund paths, nor is there any public information indicating that specific regulatory bodies or law enforcement agencies have taken action regarding these cases. Under such an information structure, the suspicions and concerns from the on-chain side can hold, but they are more deductions based on existing visible evidence rather than established conclusions. In the absence of a statement from the project team and results from law enforcement, whether Zcash should simply be classified as the "preferred channel for concealing stolen funds" remains an open question that must be approached with caution.
Will Zcash Transition from a Privacy Tool to the Preferred Option for Stolen Funds?
From the currently reported samples, the Bitget, Cryptobills' Ledger-related incidents, and the Triple-A attack present a sequence of "first the Bitget exposure path, then more cases follow," with stolen funds reportedly first flowing into Zcash, and subsequently completing further transfers through shielded transactions, shaping a narrative of "attackers prefer to use Zcash for concealment." However, this narrative is still limited to the perspectives of a few on-chain analysts and media: public materials have yet to demonstrate broader statistics on address clusters, long-term comparative paths of funds, nor is there a clear risk classification from regulatory agencies. In the context of an incomplete evidence chain, proclaiming Zcash as a systemic "primary landing point for stolen funds" is still premature. What truly needs to be continuously observed is whether future attacks continue to treat the ZEC path as the default option, and whether the Zcash community, tool providers, and even regulatory bodies will provide targeted responses—such as collaborative marking of suspicious shielded addresses and re-discussion of the boundaries of privacy technology—only time will tell which side Zcash ultimately stands on in this tug-of-war between privacy and compliance, as revealed by subsequent on-chain facts and public actions.
Join our community, let’s discuss, and become stronger together!
AiCoin exclusive Hyperliquid benefits: https://app.hyperliquid.xyz/join/AICOIN88
AiCoin exclusive Aster benefits: https://www.asterdex.com/zh-CN/referral/9C50e2
On-chain Telegram community: https://t.me/AiCoinWhaleData
On-chain community: https://www.aicoin.com/link/chat?cid=N6OVMor5g
AiCoin on-chain Twitter: https://x.com/aicoinwhaledata
免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到[email protected]，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。
