Chains, like people, strive for narrative in youth, focus on cash flow in middle age, and in old age, compete on who can run away first.
Written by: Fortune
The last day of July is the death date of Moonbeam, officially referred to as a "strategic pivot." On July 3, Moonbeam's official account posted an announcement on X, sounding as cheerful as launching a new product: "Today we are announcing the full migration of the GLMR token to Base," without a trace of the words "suspension." On July 7, Wormhole chimed in, warning users to quickly transfer the assets that should be moved, stating that after the 31st, the team "will not be able to assist in recovering any assets," which translates to "if you lose it, don't come looking for us." Moonwell is even more decisive; the MIP-M45 proposal directly lowers the collateral factor of the lending market, stating clearly in the announcement: "Assets and positions remaining on-chain after this date may no longer be accessible," first moving their protocol to Base, Optimism, and Ethereum's mainnet, leaving Moonbeam alone in an empty city. Even exchanges like Bybit have started planning migrations, firmly setting the deadline in the announcement—after July 20, "deposits made via these networks after the cutoff will be rejected." The notifications are akin to moving companies telling you when the water and power will be cut off.
A chain that once secured the most participants in Polkadot's history, with a successful crowd loan of 35.76 million DOT, now speaks of its future as "1:1 migration to Coinbase's Base," casually announcing its transformation into an AI Agent settlement network.
In plain language: the original business became hard to sustain, pivoting to capitalize on the AI craze, while finding a larger platform to reside in. This scene resembles a dignified person, after bankruptcy, who doesn't admit to being bankrupt but claims to have "optimized asset allocation."
From Crowdfunding King to Closing Down
The life of Moonbeam indeed started with great promise. Launched in 2020, it touted itself as "the only fully EVM-compatible parachain on Polkadot," which essentially provided Ethereum developers with a back door, allowing them to enter Polkadot's yard without learning new things. In the 2021 slot auction, 200,000 people participated in the crowdfunding, an unprecedented figure in the Polkadot ecosystem, fully igniting market sentiment.
In January 2022, when the mainnet went online, the token price surged to nearly $30, and TVL peaked at $275 million, with StellaSwap and Moonwell as the prominent players. Wormhole and Axelar scrambled to integrate, everything looked promising. The foundation was also generous at that time, with the Ignite initiative distributing GLMR subsidies in rounds, trading volume and the number of addresses quickly rising, bustling like a temple fair.
But temple fairs, once dispersed, leave the bustling atmosphere behind. After 2024, sibling parachains like Astar and Manta can also support EVM, making Moonbeam's earlier claim of "the only" feel embarrassing. TVL continued to decline, dropping to just $1.34 million in July this year, which is over 99% down from its peak. The token price fell from nearly $30 to mere cents, with the market value shrinking to just over $10 million, using "halved" feels like an exaggeration; it’s practically vanished below the neck.
Thus, on July 3 this year, the official farewell letter announced a full migration to Base, casually inserting the flag of "AI Agent settlement," resembling a well-known store putting up a QR code at the door when closing down, stating they will switch to live-stream commerce.
Cause of Death Determination: Not Homicide, But Chronic Illness and Neglect
The death of a chain rarely happens at once; most often, it drags on slowly, much like a person getting ill.
Technically, Moonbeam's EVM compatibility layer is Frontier, essentially an adapter mounted on Substrate rather than something that developed natively. It's like putting a smart lock on an old house; it can work, but any upgrade needs to firstly negotiate with the foundation of the old house, making efficiency inherently compromised. The mixed architecture incurs high maintenance costs, and the security audit scope is significantly broader than pure EVM chains. In 2021 and 2022, it suffered from integer overflow vulnerabilities leading to complete network downtime, with the team repeatedly scrambling to patch, witnessed by users who had their confidence eroded time after time.
Ecologically, Moonbeam has not produced a standout application these years. Moonwell lending and StellaSwap trading are, at their core, multi-chain players; when the market turns sour, they immediately disengage to other places, showing no loyalty to Moonbeam. In contrast, projects that can truly support a chain are those that risk their life on it; Moonbeam has none of those, relying solely on treasury subsidies to stay alive. Once the subsidies stop, the data immediately reveals the truth, akin to a beach revealing who was swimming naked after the tide recedes.
In the competition, Moonbeam has committed a major blunder: homogeneous competition. Within Polkadot, numerous EVM parachains are competing for the same group of developers, while externally, Base, Arbitrum, and Optimism as Ethereum L2s are eyeing hungrily, overwhelmingly crushing user volume and fiat inflow. The most fatal aspect is that the Polkadot official has personally stepped in these past two years, creating dual virtual machine solutions, PolkaVM and REVM, within the Asset Hub; REVM natively supports Ethereum bytecode, outperforming Moonbeam’s "second-hand adapter" in performance and integration. It's as if a father personally swooped in to take over half of his son’s business, a storyline that sounds rather tragic.
Financially, Moonbeam has failed to receive the continuous lifeblood it hoped for over the years. Behind Base stands the Base Ecosystem Fund from Coinbase Ventures, investing from seed rounds to token issuance comprehensively, and if the project grows, they can smoothly enter Coinbase's green channel. On the other hand, BNB Chain is backed by YZi Labs' billion-dollar MVB fund, which facilitates project launches on Binance Launchpool after investment. This type of lifeblood is not just a subsidy announcement; it encompasses everything from investment and incubation to exchange listings. In terms of Polkadot, all Moonbeam secured back then was an early development grant from the Web3 Foundation, along with a 300,000 DOT earmark from Polkadot's treasury, which actually feels more like a one-time entrepreneurship bonus rather than a long-term safety net to sustain a chain. The treasury can only bear the burden of subsidies and slot renewals; the more it bears, the emptier it becomes, ultimately reaching a point where they can barely afford the continuous lease fees. Once a chain reaches a point where it must rely on its own blood supply but cannot produce any, the outcome is already predetermined.
New Script: First Nurture a Killer App, Then Build a Chain
Homogeneous competition has reached a point where there is little left to discuss; any more talk feels repetitive. What is truly worth talking about maybe only be seen in 2026: an application first nourishes itself, generating stable cash flow and user scale, before returning to build its exclusive high-performance chain.
Hyperliquid is a prominent model on this path. It does not squeeze the common public chain’s territory; at the start, it focuses on just one thing: perpetual contracts on-chain, investing all block space and performance optimization into this one task, avoiding resources being claimed by neighboring meme coins or NFT mints. Their self-developed HyperBFT consensus aims for sub-second finality, and the native order book matching engine does not lag due to EVM compatibility issues, with transaction fees and gas all deposited in their own HYPE, forming a closed loop. Once traffic and cash flow stabilize, they will open a layer called HyperEVM to roll out some supporting lending and treasury applications, but the position of core transactions has never been given up.
This tactic, though labeled novel, isn’t entirely new. Going back a few years, the auction of parachain slots on Polkadot essentially encouraged vertical applications to first accumulate consensus and funds before bidding for exclusive chain resources; similarly, Ethereum encourages projects to develop Rollups and their own L2, following the same logic: first comes the application, then the chain, with the chain as the application’s shell, not its savior. Moonbeam, however, inverted this order, creating a generalized chain first, expecting applications to develop organically, only to find them repeatedly fleeing.
Thus, the arms race of “who can do it faster and who can do it cheaper” between public chains and L2s has long lost its significance. Users do not care if your underlying is Cosmos SDK or Substrate; they care about whether there is an indispensable product. The chain’s performance, TPS, gas fees—these parameters have long become industry standards, and the real moat lies in that killer application tightly bound to the chain, unshakeable.
Upstream is Not Peaceful Either
Moonbeam’s exit is but a footnote in this round of major reshuffling, while the true protagonists are the two giants above it, each with their own hard-to-navigate issues.
On the Polkadot side, founder Gavin Wood personally intervened, developing a new protocol called JAM (Join-Accumulate Machine), with significant ambition to turn the entire relay chain into a trustless supercomputer. The old routine of "slot auctions" for parachains will be replaced by a more flexible Agile Coretime resource market in the future, where anyone can purchase computing power as needed, without having to take a gamble on one-off four-year usage rights. If this path proves fruitful, Polkadot will transform from "a coalition of numerous parachains" to "an on-chain cloud computing platform," with the direction being correct, but the mainnet deployment still more than a year away—Moonbeam, being an old parachain, will not wait till that day.
On the Ethereum side, life is also not easy. Earlier this year, Vitalik personally published an article stating that the "Rollup-centric" scaling script from back then is now outdated, with L1 itself upgrading and accelerating while gas caps are raised, many L2s not achieving true decentralization, relying instead on multi-sig bridges tethered to Ethereum, falsely claiming to be sharded while operating more like independent kingdoms flaunting the Ethereum brand. Following this statement, reactions within the L2 camp varied: Arbitrum emphasized its independence, Base focused on becoming the application entry point, and Linea expressed willingness to align more closely with native Rollup—implying that there are likely a few L2s that may drop the Ethereum façade altogether in the future, building their own validators and settlement mechanisms from scratch. This mirrors Moonbeam's departure from Polkadot to join Base; both scenarios are two versions of the same logic: whoever provides more resources and traffic, that's where they will lean towards, and ultimately, real business must pave the way for operational reality.
Aftermath
Moonbeam’s journey, from the myth of crowdfunding to shutting down and migrating, lasted less than six years, shorter than many internet startups. It has proven several old yet commonly disbelieved ideas: ecosystems relying on subsidies for survival have no future, generalized chains without killer applications cannot weather a full cycle, and in homogeneous tracks, whoever lags first will be first to be washed out by the market. Its pivot to AI Agent settlement might just concoct a new story, but that would already be another life, unrelated to the Moonbeam we are bidding farewell to today.
The world of chains is analogous to the world of human relations; in youth, it’s about who has the bigger spectacle, in middle age, it’s about the stability of cash flow, and as you reach the age of winding down, it’s about who can gracefully find another home. For Moonbeam this time, at least they made the final step not too awkward, though this grace carries a sense of being pushed by reality.
免责声明:本文章仅代表作者个人观点,不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享,不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议,与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权,请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com,本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。