The previous post finished discussing the complete path of "founder demonstrating the wallet purchase of $1", and this one only discusses one question:
Is it possible that this wallet has already been stolen?
First, let me share my Agent's judgment after research:
It is possible, but currently not highly probable.
The Agent estimates the probability of "after the mnemonic phrase was leaked, it was recovered and taken over by a third party" to be about 30%.
Why is it not 0?
Because at the 2025 Robinhood launch event, Vlad did indeed import this wallet in front of the live camera.
In the footage, it is possible to identify approximately 8 mnemonic phrases.
If this is a common 12-word mnemonic phrase, then 4 words are still missing. Based on just these 8 words, an ordinary person cannot directly import the wallet, but the security strength has already been significantly weakened.
Theoretically, the 4 missing words still have trillions of valid combinations, which cannot be cracked by just running a script randomly; however, for a wallet whose address is already public, targets are clear, and may possess significant narrative value, it is not entirely impossible for a professional team to invest computational power for targeted cracking.
A more dangerous situation would be:
Other frames of the complete video, on-site footage, or internal documents might also contain the remaining mnemonic phrases.
If different images can piece together a complete 12-word mnemonic, then it is not "possibly stolen," but this wallet has actually lost its security since the day of the launch event.
On-chain activities also appear a bit suspicious.
This wallet was silent for nearly 10 months, and after becoming active again, it did not immediately conduct any formal operations, but instead first transferred a very small amount to itself.
This kind of "self-transfer" transaction has no economic meaning and seems more like a test:
To check whether the private key can sign normally and whether the wallet control is indeed usable.
About 40 minutes later, a new address, which had only been used once, transferred approximately 0.0808 ETH to it.
Only then did the wallet begin to perform cross-chain operations.
The entire sequence is:
Quiet for nearly 10 months
→ Small self-transfer test
→ New address provides funds
→ Start cross-chain
→ Transfer funds to new wallet
If viewed from the perspective of "the wallet has been stolen," this process is very similar to:
Someone recovered the wallet using the mnemonic phrase, tested the control, then supplemented operating funds from their new address, and finally used this publicly demonstrated wallet to create on-chain signals.
This is also the reason I’m willing to give the theft hypothesis a 30% probability.
But why do I not think it is highly probable?
Because real theft usually leaves very obvious traces of asset liquidation.
If someone obtained the complete mnemonic, they would control not only the address on Arbitrum but also the same address on Robinhood Chain.
However, as of now, the old wallet still retains:
About 0.167 ETH;
About 3 WETH on Robinhood Chain;
And enough ETH and other assets to pay transaction fees.
The operator has already proven capable of using Robinhood Chain but did not transfer away these 3 WETH.
The old wallet has not been emptied, there has been no bulk authorization, nor have assets been consolidated into unknown addresses.
The new wallet purchased about 6,409 coins of $1, which also have not been sold.
So the current behavior does not resemble that of an ordinary hacker:
Obtaining the private key
→ Sweeping all assets
→ Cross-chain consolidation
→ Quickly liquidating
This is also the core reason the probability of theft has not exceeded 50% at this time.
Of course, there’s a more complex possibility:
The attacker may not care about the few ETH in the wallet at all.
What they are truly trying to utilize is the identity tag of this wallet.
A "wallet used by Vlad at the official launch event," only requires a symbolic purchase of 0.01 ETH, and could potentially lead the market to understand it as:
The founder of Robinhood personally participating.
The attacker could easily ambush $1 with another wallet in advance, then utilize the publicly demonstrated wallet to complete a small purchase, creating the narrative of the founder's entry, and finally sell from other addresses.
If this were the method, not emptying the old wallet or selling the $1 in the new wallet could actually make the signals appear more authentic.
So right now, one cannot simply use "the assets have not been swept away" to completely rule out third-party takeover.
The most reasonable conclusion at this point is:
Ordinary crypto theft attacks have a low probability;
The original controller or someone related to Robinhood operating it still remain relatively more probable explanations;
However, a third party gaining control through leaked mnemonic phrases and then utilizing the wallet's identity to create market signals deserves about 30% vigilance.
What really needs to be monitored next is:
Whether the 3 WETH in the old wallet have been transferred;
Whether the new wallet starts to sell $1;
Whether the address that supplemented the old wallet with 0.0808 ETH can form a funding closed loop with the early chip wallet of $1;
And whether anyone can piece together the remaining mnemonic phrases from the complete launch event video.
Before this evidence appears, the most rigorous statement is not "Vlad bought it," nor is it "the wallet must have been stolen."
But rather:
We confirm that this wallet has regained active control.
But for now, we cannot confirm whether the person controlling it is the original one.
In conclusion, this is a mystery drama, and based on the behavior, the possibility of insider manipulation seems greater.
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