On June 19, 2026, former Ethereum Foundation core developer coordinator Trent Van Epps publicly raised alarms about the Foundation's current governance path and financial sustainability (according to a single source). In his view, the "subtraction" strategy that has been constantly packaged and repeated over the past few years—where the Foundation actively weakens its role in the ecosystem—is rapidly colliding with a more undignified reality: the size of the treasury is already limited, and it is now under increasing pressure of contraction and constraints, with less and less space available to act as a buffer. This contradiction is quickly amplified in the core development of the protocol layer: the Client Incentive Program (CIP), originally a four-year program designed to provide long-term incentives and funding for client teams, officially expired in April 2026, and there is currently no public information indicating that a comparable replacement framework has been put in place. Trent warned that with funding sources and support mechanisms for the protocol layer still uncertain, Ethereum core development may face a financial crisis in the next 3 to 9 months, and this time frame will test whether the Ethereum Foundation's "subtraction" is a planned transfer of power or a structural retreat forced by financial constraints.
Turning Point for the Subtraction Strategy: The Foundation No Longer Acts as a "Guardian"
In Trent's view, the "subtraction" approach taken by the Ethereum Foundation in previous years is not merely a budget contraction but a conscious governance strategy: repeatedly emphasizing in public that it is just one participant in the ecosystem, rather than the sole manager, intentionally retreating in terms of technical direction, resource allocation, and narrative dominance to give more space to client teams, research institutions, and the broader community. Trent even stated that the Foundation would not be the main manager of Ethereum over the next ten years, hoping to rewrite the contracts between parties at the social, political, and economic levels (according to a single source), marking a narrative shift from being a "central coordinator" to becoming a "normal node."
However, in reality, the "institutional gravity" left by the Foundation remains very significant: whether in terms of brand and credibility, funding support, hiring core developers, or even media resource organization, it remains highly focused on key upgrades, route choices, and resource allocation. While the ecosystem is being educated to adapt to a "parent-free" future, it instinctively looks back at the Foundation's statements and actions at every moment of uncertainty; this tug-of-war between "wanting to fade out" and "being dependent" has not disappeared due to the narrative of subtraction, but has been further amplified in the context of the CIP expiration and limited treasury space, forming a real examination of who will pay for the protocol layer and who has the authority to continue issuing orders.
End of the Four-Year Client Incentive: Financial Path for Core Development Weakened
The Client Incentive Program (CIP) that Trent mentioned essentially served as a "long-term labor contract" granted by the protocol layer to core client teams over the past four years: through revenue arrangements related to the protocol layer, it provided predictable incentives for teams responsible for the consensus layer and execution layer software, ensuring that development work directly impacting network security and performance would not depend entirely on short-term donations or sponsorships. Within this framework, client teams could plan their human resources, R&D, and security inputs across multiple years, while the entire network maintained its upgrade rhythm and operational stability under this long-term commitment.
A turning point occurred in April 2026. After the CIP officially expired at the end of its four-year term, there has been no public information indicating that a fully equivalent replacement plan has been implemented. Trent views this as a key source of uncertainty regarding protocol funding: on one hand, client teams responsible for public goods suddenly find their future income structure becoming unclear; on the other hand, the Foundation’s treasury is described as limited in scale, with increasing constraints, and coupled with the active contraction of its funding role under the "subtraction" strategy, the buffer that could act as a safety net is thinning. Under such a threefold squeeze, whether the core development of the protocol layer can maintain existing investments over the next few months is no longer an abstract governance topic, but a real risk compressed into the timeline.
Financial Alarm for the Next 3 to 9 Months: A Window of Vulnerability for Core Development
In Trent's statement, the real concern is not the phrase "financial tightness," but the precisely compressed time period: within the next 3 to 9 months, Ethereum core development "may" enter a financial crisis (according to a single source). This window happens to fall in the gap where the old funding framework has already ended, and the new long-term arrangements have not yet been publicly established—protocol layer funding sources and support mechanisms are described as uncertain, while the Foundation’s treasury is characterized as having a limited scale, increasing constraints, and shrinking buffer space. If alternative support cannot be found within this timeframe, core development will have to operate without a safety net.
In specific terms, the parts that are often the first to feel uncertainty are those highly reliant on long-term funding commitments: the teams responsible for client maintenance require continuous investment to keep up with network upgrades and bug fixes, protocol optimization, and long-term research rely on relatively stable manpower and time windows. Once funding sources weaken, the common chain reaction is a slowdown in hiring, an increase in expected turnover, and a shift in project rhythm from "progressing as planned" to "depending on the budget" (in line with general industry consensus). Trent's warning remains a personal risk alert, and the current public information shows that the Ethereum Foundation has not yet provided detailed responses regarding the specific degree of funding pressure, which means that the so-called "3 to 9 months financial crisis" still resides at the level of hypothetical scenarios, requiring the market to continuously observe the actual behavioral changes of various participants in the coming period to determine whether this window of vulnerability will truly open.
Resetting Contracts: Who Will Pay for Ethereum Core Development
When Trent mentions the need to "reset contracts at the social, political, and economic levels," he is not just pointing at the Foundation’s budget but rather the entire distribution of responsibilities and discourses. Based on his public statements, the Ethereum Foundation will not be the primary manager over the next ten years, sending an early signal to all parties in the ecosystem: the core development of this public product for the protocol layer can no longer be assumed to be backed by a single entity. Who benefits, who pays, and who voices concerns all need to be separated and written into a new "social contract."
Against the backdrop of the Foundation's active "subtraction," the weight of funding and governance must inevitably shift from a single center to multi-party games: Layer 2 project parties expect the protocol layer to cover scalability and security costs, infrastructure companies bear long-term maintenance costs on client and node services, and community DAOs represent more decentralized user and developer demands. The challenge is that the spillover effects of protocol layer core development nearly cover the entire network, but funding parties often have their own business goals and technical preferences. Finding a new balance between the public product properties and the expectations of funding parties typically relies on diversified funding, governance participation, and reputational constraints to gradually fine-tune. Whether these funding contributions can translate into governance influence that is commensurate yet not overly concentrated will become a key window to observe the reshaping of power structures in Ethereum over the next few years and the core variable to test whether this "contract reset" can be successfully implemented.
Ethereum Enters the "Growing Pains of Subtraction": Here are Three Things to Watch Next
The current contradiction is clear: on one hand, the Ethereum Foundation actively promotes "subtraction," emphasizing that it will not be the main manager over the next ten years; on the other hand, the development of the protocol layer remains highly dependent on the Foundation in terms of brand, credibility, funding, and core developer hiring. The expiration of the CIP, the pressure on the treasury, and the lack of long-term funding plans amplify the dissonance between this "fading out" and "dependence." In the coming seasons, the first thing to watch is whether a new funding framework for the protocol layer will emerge—whether led by the Foundation or collaboratively built by multiple parties. As long as it can publicly provide a long-term commitment similar to the CIP, it will alleviate the funding uncertainties in the next 3 to 9 months pointed out by Trent. Secondly, it is worth observing whether the Foundation adjusts the pace and boundaries of its "subtraction" in response to external doubts, for example, by more clearly defining its mid-to-short-term role in treasury usage, core development funding, and governance discourse control. Lastly, how core client and research teams respond in public matters: whether they begin to actively disclose funding pressures and seek diversified funding or maintain the status quo and wait for the new framework to take shape—these concrete actions will directly reflect how far along the funding and governance reconstruction process has progressed. It can be expected that before a new contract is solidly formed, the reorganization process surrounding "who pays, who speaks, and who safeguards protocol security" will continue to impact Ethereum's ecosystem confidence and protocol development path over the coming quarters.
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