On April 15, at 8:00 AM Beijing time, a Pakistani delegation arrived in Tehran and presented Iran with the latest ceasefire proposal from the United States. This marked a new phase in the covert struggle between the US and Iran over the ceasefire framework. The two sides did not engage in direct dialogue but exchanged texts through Islamabad: one side presented a 15-point plan, while the other provided 10 items in response from Iran. The numerical difference reflects fundamental divergences in their understanding of ceasefire conditions and regional order. As sensitive topics like Persian Gulf security dominance and the Iranian nuclear issue were packaged into the same negotiation framework, this ceasefire maneuver is much more than about "ceasefire" itself; it is more like a long-term game around the future regional security architecture and sovereign boundaries, with its outcomes and directions remaining highly uncertain.

Pakistan's Shuttling Role: Messenger of Ceasefire and Negotiation Stage

The timing of the Pakistani delegation's arrival in Tehran on April 15 itself served as a signal: amidst the lack of direct dialogue channels and nearly depleted mutual trust between the US and Iran, Islamabad took on the role of a "messenger," conveying the latest information from the US regarding the ceasefire framework directly to Iran. This action reflects, on one hand, the US's unwillingness to engage in high-profile negotiations with Iran in public, and on the other, Iran's willingness to gain insights into US intentions through a third party recognized by it, instead of outright rejecting contact.

Pakistan’s role did not stop at merely delivering messages. According to reports, Islamabad is also preparing for a possible second round of negotiations, meaning it is simultaneously taking on the role of "information transmission line" and building a "negotiation venue." For Pakistan, this dual role encompasses both security and diplomatic interests: on one hand, easing US-Iran tensions helps reduce the risk of regional spillover and avoids the flames of conflict spreading beyond geographic borders into South Asia; on the other, being a key mediator helps boost its leverage and visibility before the Islamic world and Washington.

The US and Iran's choice to bypass public bilateral negotiations is also a form of rhythm management. For the US, using a third party allows it to test Iran's bottom lines while adjusting the plan's contents at lower political costs, avoiding premature entrenchment of positions in domestic and international opinion arenas; for Iran, through Pakistan, it can absorb and provide feedback on information, preserving negotiation maneuver space and a hardline stance on domestic political narratives without having to "lower itself" to sit at the same table openly. However, this indirect communication naturally lengthens the game cycle, with each textual exchange needing reinterpretation and repackaging, increasing the risks of misjudgments and loss of control over the rhythm.

Fifteen versus Ten: The Equality Struggle Behind the Ceasefire Proposals

Currently, public information only confirms the existence of the "15-point plan" and the "10 items," with specific contents undisclosed, but the numerical difference is already laden with symbolic significance: one side attempts to lock in ceasefire conditions and subsequent behavioral constraints in a more detailed and itemized manner, while the other reflects its core concerns and sovereign bottom line in relatively compact terms. Reports suggest the US plan is interpreted by Iran as implying a "full acceptance" stance—hoping Iran would accept a pre-designed framework in its entirety rather than shaping it through item-by-item negotiations.

Iranian officials openly criticize this design, stating, "This does not conform to the logic of negotiation and dialogue." This statement reflects not only dissatisfaction with a specific clause but also skepticism towards the negotiation structure: from Tehran’s perspective, true political negotiation should signify mutual compromise based on equal status, not limited adjustments under the pre-established framework of a dominant party. If the US insists on promoting the ceasefire text as a "complete package," it essentially places the question of "whether to accept the American order" before the ceasefire, making it difficult for Iran to explain its stance to domestic opinion and regional allies.

Thus, the so-called "15 versus 10" is not merely a textual dispute on the surface but a power struggle over who has the authority to define issues, set procedures, and define "equality." By making the statement "not conforming to the logic of negotiation and dialogue" public, Iran sends a signal to the outside world: the current stalemate is not solely due to Iran's unilateral rejection of the ceasefire but arises from differing understandings of procedural justice and power structure. This publicized mutual distrust, once accumulated, will significantly reduce both sides' trust in any "compromise" expressions from each other, and every step forward in negotiation may quickly regress due to domestic political pressure.

Struggle for Dominance in the Persian Gulf: Iranian Security Anxiety and US Passage Strategy

The report clearly indicates that Iran's proposal places the dominance of the regional security architecture at its core, a design stemming from long-accumulated security anxiety and strategic demands. From Tehran's perspective, the deployment of US military forces, sanctions, and military deterrents around the Persian Gulf constitutes continuous oppression of its living space and political system. Therefore, any ceasefire arrangement that does not address the fundamental question of "who will lead regional security" in Iran's eyes is merely a short-term tactical ceasefire rather than a genuine security rebalancing.

Correspondingly, the US hopes to further cement its dominance over the security of passage in the Persian Gulf through the ceasefire framework. This concerns not only the safety of energy transport lines but is also closely related to its security commitments to allies and the layout of global military presence. Washington needs to demonstrate to its allies that it can effectively intervene in crises and maintain maritime passages; otherwise, its broader security commitments will be subject to doubt. The pressures from allies and existing commitments make it difficult for the US to make overt concessions on the "dominance of waterways" issue during negotiations.

For this reason, the security issues in the Persian Gulf are tightly bound within the ceasefire framework, making it challenging for negotiations to be simply dismantled into "first resolving the ceasefire, then discussing the security architecture." Once security dominance is written into or implied within the ceasefire text, each ceasefire clause will be interpreted as a pre-vote on the future regional order: who is responsible for patrolling, who has the authority to define threats, and who possesses interpretive power in the event of friction. As a result, several issues that could initially be dealt with technically and in stages become entirely packaged into a zero-sum game framework, making any local compromise politically costly.

Trump's Remarks on the War Approaching Its End? Non-Nuclear Preconditions and Reality Gaps

In this round of competition, former US President Trump's statements constitute another narrative thread. According to reports, on one hand he claimed that the war is "approaching its end," while on the other hand he firmly asserted that Iran cannot possess nuclear weapons, with his team considering "Iran's denuclearization" as a core prerequisite for any agreement. This parallel narrative of "the end of hostilities" and "non-nuclear baseline" effectively sets an almost unshakeable threshold for negotiations: unless Iran makes substantial concessions on nuclear issues, no ceasefire text will receive full endorsement from the US political level.

For Iran, this non-nuclear precondition is not merely a technical issue related to the nuclear program but is structurally tied to regime security, regional discourse power, and even national dignity. Once forced to make a one-sided, irreversible concession on this point, Tehran will struggle to explain to its domestic hardliners and regional partners whether its "security exchange" is equivalent. Thus, while "denuclearization" is regarded by Trump's team as a prerequisite for the agreement, it effectively compresses the negotiating space for Iran, leading it to emphasize issues such as regional security dominance to counteract pressure on nuclear matters.

In sharp contrast to Trump's hardline narrative, some US officials in interviews with AXIOS expressed that "reaching a permanent peace agreement by the end of May is highly likely." This optimistic expectation reflects, on one hand, some factions within Washington still holding confidence in the existing mediation mechanisms, believing a ceasefire text can be drawn from framework to reality within a limited timeframe; on the other hand, it starkly contrasts with multiple structural contradictions in reality. When the politically "approaching end" statements intersect with highly sensitive issues like non-nuclear preconditions and regional dominance, any setbacks in negotiations might be interpreted by outsiders as "overly optimistic predictions," further weakening the US's flexibility in subsequent rounds.

The Power and Limits of Third-Party Mediation: How Far from De-escalation to Structural Rewrite?

In this multi-layered game, Pakistan's mediation serves as both a pressure relief valve and a speed limiter. On one hand, by taking on the roles of messenger and platform, it objectively eased surface conflicts, allowing the US and Iran to exchange proposals and test bottom lines without directly meeting. Each delegation visit and confirmation of channels creates conditions for a new negotiation window, preventing the situation from suddenly spiraling out of control due to misjudgments or escalating emotions.

On the other hand, the absence of key information also magnifies external uncertainty. The report explicitly states that the specific contents of the US's 15-point plan and Iran's 10-item clauses remain undisclosed, and the exact timing for Islamabad’s second round of negotiations is not set. In the context of asymmetric public information, markets, public opinion, and even regional parties can only extrapolate based on fragmentary news and polarized statements, which tend to skew towards extreme emotions: either overly optimistic bets on an "agreement by the end of May" or amplifying pessimistic judgments of "the negotiation logic being unfounded," exacerbating distrust.

More critically, the limitation lies in the fact that when nuclear issues and regional dominance are tightly bound together, third-party mediation finds it challenging to genuinely push the parties from "proposal games" towards "security rebalancing." Pakistan may ease the atmosphere at the procedural level, arrange meetings, and refine wording, but it lacks the power to make structural concessions on non-nuclear preconditions or dominant power issues for either side. In other words, a third party can facilitate the US and Iran in finding a ceasefire proposal that is textually acceptable to both but has difficulty rewriting the fundamental framework of the Persian Gulf security order on its own.

From Ceasefire Text to New Security Order: Three Paths and Key Observations

Looking back at the current progress, the key obstacles facing US-Iran ceasefire negotiations have become quite clear: first, the US insists on making "Iran's denuclearization" the core prerequisite of the agreement; second, Iran attempts to gain a greater discourse power over the regional security architecture within the same framework. These two structural demands logically squeeze each other, causing any concessions from either side to be magnified as strategic retreats, thereby increasing political costs and risks of backlash.

Within the timeframe deemed by US officials as a "high probability node for reaching a permanent peace agreement by the end of May," the negotiation trajectory can be roughly categorized into three paths: first, both sides accelerate text exchanges under third-party mediation and time pressure, finding some "vague" compromise articulation without touching bottom lines, achieving a nominal agreement; second, they repeatedly tug around key expressions and prerequisite conditions, leading to multiple revisions of the text but failing to cross fundamental divergences, resulting in continuous delays in the timetable; third, if mutual distrust continues to accumulate, any localized event could become a trigger, pushing negotiations back to public confrontation or even escalating the situation again.

In the coming days, three key nodes will be crucial in tracking path direction: first, substantive progress in Pakistan's subsequent mediation, including whether it fosters the formation of a second round of negotiations or if new intermediaries emerge; second, changes in the tone and content of US-Iran public statements, particularly whether there is any softening or omission of wording around "negotiation logic," "non-nuclear prerequisites," and "regional dominance"; third, whether a parallel, more technically robust proposal for a new arrangement will emerge in the context of Persian Gulf security discussions outside the ceasefire discourse, reserving space for future "security rebalancing." Until these dynamics clarify, the US-Iran ceasefire remains a shadow war tugging between text and power, far from reaching a true conclusion.

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