On April 6, 2026, Beijing time, Iran formally submitted a ten-point response regarding the "Proposal to End the War" to the United States through Pakistan, breaking the external perception of a stagnation in US-Iran communication. Available information shows that this text was drafted under the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran and conveyed through Islamabad to Washington. Formally, it remains "indirect dialogue," but in essence, it places the differences between the two sides at the forefront. Iran emphasized a one-time "permanent solution" in the response, whereas the US had preferred a "temporary ceasefire first, followed by gradual discussions on various topics," revealing a fundamental discrepancy in the design of the path. The publicly disclosed terms consider permanent ceasefire, lifting sanctions, post-war reconstruction support, and a security agreement for the Strait of Hormuz as the three major sensitive demands, corresponding to security, economic, and geopolitical vital interests. An anonymous US official told the media that this ten-point response is "too extreme," resembling "a final agreement framework" rather than a starting point for negotiations, setting a tone of "difficulty far exceeding expectations" for the entire negotiation.

Ten-Point Response Emerges: From Ceasefire Deal to Final Framework

From the limited publicly available information, this ten-point response is not a traditionally defined "tentative list of conditions," but rather resembles a rough blueprint of a final agreement. It attempts to address multiple issues such as ceasefire arrangements, sanction frameworks, post-war reconstruction, and maritime corridor security within one document, presenting a mindset of "drawing the finish line first and then discussing how to reach it," rather than starting negotiations from small increments. Iran places a permanent ceasefire at its core, demanding legal and political constraints to prevent the re-emergence of conflict; the comprehensive lifting of sanctions and support for post-war reconstruction are tightly bound as key pillars of the economic dimension; and the security agreement for the Strait of Hormuz transforms the traditionally viewed threat leverage of the waterway into an international public good requiring written arrangements. The specific order and details of these terms have not been disclosed, but their repeated mention in public discourse indicates their high weight within the overall framework.

Anonymous US officials expressed that this ten-point response "is more like a final agreement framework rather than a starting point for negotiations," describing it with the term "maximalist," directly pointing to its bundled conditions and top-tier demands. For Washington, the expected Iranian feedback should revolve around detailed discussions on ceasefire technicalities, rather than bundling regional security, sanction relief, and post-war economic recovery all in one document. Because of this, this confrontation is viewed as not just about halting a war, but as Iran proactively throwing out a "regional order rewriting proposal"—hoping to lock in the security landscape and economic fate for the years to come through a one-time exchange, fundamentally misaligned with the US view of "divisible and retractable" flexible arrangements.

Hormuz Gambit: Trading Waterway Security for Regime Security

The Strait of Hormuz has always been regarded as a lifeline for global energy transportation, with a significant proportion of maritime crude oil and natural gas globally passing through it, amplifying energy security impacts for both the US, Europe, and major Asian economies. For Iran, this narrow waterway is not only vital for exporting energy but also one of the few realistic bargaining chips that can directly influence the global market in its contest with the West. For decades, Iran has repeatedly used "blockading the strait" and "threatening shipping" as deterrent tools in tense situations, linking Hormuz to international public opinion regarding crisis expectations and soaring oil prices. Against this backdrop, Iran's choice to incorporate the "security agreement for the Strait of Hormuz" into the core demands of its ten-point response carries far more significance than merely a technical security arrangement.

By proactively proposing a "security agreement," Iran attempts to transform its rhetoric from "blocking threats" to "security commitments," packaging what was previously viewed as uncertain geopolitical risks into a bargaining chip that can be exchanged for political and economic returns through institutional arrangements. The so-called "controllable security" means, on one hand, that Iran is willing to take clear obligations regarding vessels' safety within the framework of international rules, while on the other hand, it aims to obtain a higher degree of recognition from the West concerning its regime security and economic developmental space—promising long-term safety has intrinsic motivations only in the context of easing sanctions and the prospect of investment returns. Different from the historical tendency to escalate to blockade challenges, this time incorporating Hormuz into the agreement concept emphasizes a logic of implicit quid pro quo—"stabilizing the waterway in exchange for a stable regime."

If some form of security arrangement is indeed reached, the energy security expectations of the US and its allies will undergo complex changes. On one hand, a textual security commitment in the short term could help suppress extreme fluctuations in oil prices, providing some "insurance" for the global market. On the other hand, to ensure the effectiveness of this arrangement, the US military presence in the Gulf region, the maritime deployment of allies, and deterrent rhetoric against Iran may be forced to adjust: excessive militarization might be viewed by Iran as a breach of the agreement, while excessive withdrawal would raise doubts among regional partners about the credibility of US security commitments. Consequently, Hormuz is transformed from a "crisis card," as Iran attempts to reshape it into an "order card," reflecting its hope to exchange waterway security for broader institutional security.

Sanctions and Reconstruction Chips: Iran Does Not Want the Pause Button

Long-term sanctions have profoundly and cumulatively suppressed the Iranian economy and its people's livelihood: limited energy exports, financial systems locked out of mainstream channels, and barriers to foreign capital and technology influx have left clear imprints on the domestic social structure and political stability. Therefore, when Iran lists the lifting of sanctions and post-war reconstruction support alongside a permanent ceasefire as three core terms in its ten-point response, it emphasizes that without addressing economic shackles, any military-level ceasefire would merely continue to keep a strained society simmering in its existing pressure cooker. Positions relayed by Iranian media even state directly that "a temporary ceasefire is an insult to our people's suffering," defining a ceasefire plan that does not include economic relief as disregarding the current predicament.

Within this narrative framework, the reason a ceasefire is termed "an insult" does not deny its value in terms of stopping the bleeding, but points to its limits as a "superficial repair": the state of hostility still exists in legal and security structures, the sanction network has not been substantially dismantled, and the destruction caused by the war cannot be systematically repaired. For Iran's decision-makers, with social tolerance being gradually depleted under years of sanctions, merely exchanging a period of battlefield silence for political concessions is hard to gain long-term legitimacy domestically. Therefore, the negotiation goal is more framed as a "new starting point after the war"—a node implying that the conflict structure is redefined and that there is an opportunity for economic pathways to restart, rather than treating the ceasefire as a "battlefield pause button" that can be pressed repeatedly.

From the US perspective, sanctions have always been one of the hardcore red lines in its policy towards Iran, serving as both a pressure tool and viewed as a "leverage reserve" in regional security issues. In terms of post-war reconstruction, the experiences of the US and its allies often adopt a "phased, project-based" support model, linked to security and political conditions, making them naturally wary of obvious “package” sanction relief plans. Iran's direct inclusion of sanction relief and reconstruction support into its final proposal demands a much higher price than the gradual path typically accepted by the US. This means that even if the two sides can find some compromise on ceasefire technicalities, the key difficulty in subsequent negotiations will still be how to handle economic issues without breaching Washington's traditional red lines.

Third-Party Mediation: Pakistan's Role as a "Buffer and Amplifier"

Since 2025, US-Iran communication on sensitive issues has gradually formed a model of "third-party mediation," with regional countries such as Pakistan frequently playing the roles of information intermediary and position tester. The reasons for the limitations on direct US-Iran dialogue include the long-standing structural contradiction of mutual non-recognition of each other's political legitimacy and each side's domestic politics being highly sensitive to “sitting at the same table openly”: Washington must consider Congress and allies, while Tehran needs to balance its internal hardliners and street sentiments. Under such realities, submitting the ten-point response via Islamabad has become a compromise solution balancing substance and posture.

The act of conveying such a critical document through Pakistan itself carries multiple symbolic meanings: on one hand, Iran can claim to be merely informing a "friendly country" of its stance, rather than making direct requests of the United States, thus retaining some deniability; on the other hand, the document received by the US is clearly marked as "Iran's official response," necessitating internal assessment and external response at a certain level. The third party is not only a messenger but can also act as a "tone adjuster": when relaying to their domestic media, they can choose to highlight "opportunity windows" or "extreme demands," thereby reserving leeway for future concessions or firmness.

The side effects of this indirect communication are also significant. The wording of the document is more easily intercepted and amplified by various media during cross-language and cross-channel transmission, with labels such as "too extreme" and "maximalist" quickly appearing in report headlines, inadvertently restricting the flexibility of decision-makers to adjust positions. If the third party purposefully or unintentionally amplifies certain expressions in their reports, it may inadvertently exacerbate misunderstandings, making a proposal that originally retained some ambiguity be interpreted as a complete "either all or nothing" stance. In this structure, mediating countries such as Pakistan act as both stabilizers and amplifiers, with their control over the temperature of the discourse directly shaping the initial posture in future negotiations.

Exposure of Position Gaps: The Struggle Between Ceasefire Technicalities and Final Order

Through this ten-point response, the clearest contrast is the fundamental difference between the US and Iran in terms of negotiation order and goal setting. The long-preferred US route is "first a ceasefire, then discuss other matters": first pressing the pause button on the battlefield to control the spillover risks, and then engaging in multi-round negotiations on sanctions, security arrangements, and political structures. This framework retains sufficient maneuvering space, where each link can adjust strength based on the other party's performance and domestic political pressures. In contrast, Iran has clearly chosen an "all-inclusive final agreement" approach, tying permanent ceasefire, sanction framework restructuring, and post-war economic starting points to the same timeline, attempting to achieve consensus on the final outline before any ceasefire arrangements take effect.

The US official's remark that "this is more like a final agreement framework" essentially publicly corresponds to a failure in expectations: Washington originally expected to see a starting point that could be gradually dismantled, but what it received was a draft that demands prior recognition of the endpoint. From the differences in phrasing between "permanent ceasefire" and "temporary ceasefire," one can see the different imaginations of regional order. For Iran, "permanent ceasefire" means no longer defaulting to Israel and other adversaries maintaining their regime's blockade and military deterrence in a long-term hostile state, and it also entails that various proxy forces it supports need to be incorporated into some new security formula; for the US and its allies, "temporary ceasefire" is more a technical means to alleviate immediate flames and public opinion pressures, which would still require military presence and regional alliance systems to maintain a long-term deterrence balance afterward.

Because of this, the current stance difference is described by the US as "exceeding expectations," reflecting not only numerical discrepancies but also misalignments in understanding the future order. This misalignment directly raises the difficulty of reaching any textual agreement in the short term: if returning to the US path, it means Iran must temporarily accept a ceasefire while not addressing the endpoints of sanctions and security; if insisting on the Iranian proposal, it demands the US to make preconditional commitments about the regional landscape without allies' psychological preparation. Both models seem to pursue "cooling down," but the targets of that cooling are entirely different: one is aimed at battlefield temperatures, and the other at order baselines.

Where Will the Negotiation Lead: Breaking the Impasse, Delays, and Decomposing Exchanges

In summary, the pricing structure exposed by the ten-point response shows that Iran is attempting to push for negotiations on "post-war order" and "economic relief" before the battlefield situation is fully defined. Its strategic consideration is that while still having military leverage and regional proxy influence, proposing a high-starting bundled plan enables it to seize the psychological upper hand in negotiations; once passively entering a prolonged low-intensity phase, discussing sanctions relief and reconstruction support will inevitably diminish its bargaining power. The most likely path for the US next is to try to compress the scope of topics, pulling the negotiation focus back into a “ceasefire priority” technical framework, thus lowering the negotiation threshold by marginalizing certain political and economic demands, while Iran will likely insist on packaging everything together, using delays and low-intensity conflict as tools to resist pressure.

In this tug-of-war process, the three elements of the Strait of Hormuz, security commitments, and sanction easing are likely to be gradually split and reorganized into more operable exchange combinations in subsequent discussions. For instance, first reaching a phased arrangement around Hormuz security and limited sanction exemptions to test mutual trust and execution capabilities, then discussing more systematic reconstruction support and adjustments to the sanction framework according to the evolution of the situation. The entire process will involve complex arrangements about “what comes first, what to ask for later,” with any loosening of sequence from either side potentially being interpreted by domestic opinion as "concession" or "betrayal of interests."

For external observers, the next key focus will be on the official statements from the US State Department and the details of their representations, particularly whether they publicly acknowledge or downplay internal evaluations such as “final agreement framework” and “maximalist”; at the same time, the reactions of regional allies—especially those highly sensitive to the topics of Hormuz and sanctions—will also determine whether the US can gain support in its negotiation space. If Washington and its allies begin to shift from a negating posture to discussing "acceptable minimum exchange combinations," it would mean that this negotiation is likely to transition from the current “posturing stage” into a genuine “transaction phase”; conversely, if public discourse continues to revolve around “extreme and unrealistic,” then delays and the protraction of localized conflicts will become a scenario that needs to be taken seriously.

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