On March 30, 2026, U.S. Republican Senators Cynthia Lummis and Bill Cassidy jointly proposed the Mined in America Act in the Senate, attempting to formally integrate the "Strategic Bitcoin Reserve" narrative previously promoted through a presidential executive order into the federal legislative system. The bill ostensibly focuses on establishing a "voluntary certification program" for mining pools, regulating the sources of mining facilities and equipment, but fundamentally binds Bitcoin's computing power, mining machine supply chains, and national security. On one end, the U.S. hopes to strengthen its initiative in a new round of monetary and technological competition through domestic computing power and reserve layout; on the other end, there is a high level of vigilance and potential severance concerning "foreign adversaries" in mining machine and pool supply chains. As Bitcoin's strategic reserve attempt escalates from the executive order level to an institutional arrangement in a written bill, the U.S. is clarifying its path of viewing Bitcoin as a new type of strategic asset—this will not only reshape the computing power map between China and the U.S. but also rewrite the balance of power in global mining and on-chain governance.

From Executive Order to National Policy: Bitcoin Incorporated into Sovereign Asset Narrative

To understand the political significance of the Mined in America Act, we must return to the executive order proposed by the Trump administration in 2024 to "establish a strategic Bitcoin reserve." At that time, this initiative was largely seen as a high-profile bet on the “digital gold” narrative in the context of high inflation, monetary credibility controversies, and intertwined electoral politics, as well as a symbolic action signaling the goal of becoming a "global digital asset hub." The executive order itself did not constitute a complete legal framework; it more so reserved policy space for a future potential reserve system.

This time, the Mined in America Act, propelled by Lummis and Cassidy, systematically follows through on this line of thinking at the legislative level. Research briefs indicate that the bill explicitly incorporates the content concerning the strategic Bitcoin reserve from the 2024 executive order into the federal legal system, moving beyond a single government's administrative preferences, becoming an institutional arrangement that can be sustained across administrations. Market supporters have even directly remarked that this bill "is a continuation of Trump’s commitment to build a global digital asset hub", emphasizing the continuity of the route rather than the short-term operations of a single administration.

From the perspective of sovereign asset structure, elevating Bitcoin reserves to a legislative option equates to preemptively arranging a "digital reserve slot" for the U.S. aside from traditional foreign exchange reserves and gold reserves. Against the backdrop of questioning the dominance of the dollar and various countries exploring diversified reserve assets, incorporating Bitcoin into the narrative of national-level asset allocation is itself a forward-looking bet on the future landscape of monetary competition. This does not necessarily mean that the U.S. will extensively buy Bitcoin in the short term, but it has already acknowledged discursively: Bitcoin can be one of the strategic resources available for national level invocation and dispatching.

Mining Pool Certification and Equipment Elimination: National Security Embedded in the Computing Power Basis

The most direct and controversial part of the Mined in America Act is the regulatory design for mining pool certification programs and equipment sources. According to research briefs, the bill demands the U.S. Department of Commerce to establish a voluntary certification program for mining pools, presenting what sounds like a gentle institutional framework: enterprises can choose whether to participate, and the government guides market preference through certification labels. However, in a context where national security is emphasized, "voluntary" often implies de facto coercion—non-certified mining pools and facilities may face hidden barriers in gaining access to large domestic clients, acquiring financial services, and participating in government projects.

More critically, the bill explicitly states that participating certified facilities must gradually eliminate equipment related to "foreign adversaries". This directly targets global layouts of mining machine manufacturers, chip suppliers, and mining site construction: once classified under the supply chain of "foreign adversaries," they will likely face systematic exclusion in the U.S. domestic market. For overseas manufacturers already laying out mining sites in North America or supplying to U.S. clients, this means complex adjustments are needed in production chains, brand structures, and even equity compositions.

The research briefs also mention that external discussions on domestic equipment localization rate requirements and other detailed terms are still unverified information, and the bill's public text does not provide clear ratios or technical details. This combination of “ambiguous timelines + vague standards” not only makes it difficult for the market to accurately assess compliance costs but also reserves maneuvering space for future regulatory enforcement. From the perspective of national security, the U.S. goal is straightforward: to reduce reliance on potential adversarial countries' supply chains as much as possible in critical sectors of mining computational power—such as mining machines, pools, and hosting facilities—avoiding a situation where foundational computational power falls into the hands of foreign manufacturers in future monetary and financial games.

Computing Power Backflow to the U.S.: Reshaping the Industrial Landscape under Policy Synergy

In describing the motivation for legislation, Cynthia Lummis has repeatedly emphasized the need to "bring the mining industry back to the U.S. through forward-looking measures." This sentence sketches out a vision that transcends a single industry: it includes not only the computing power discourse of the Bitcoin network but also the supporting infrastructure of data center construction, electricity consumption, new energy utilization, and related high-technology employment positions. Within this narrative, computing power is no longer merely a chain-based metric but a "new infrastructure" that can be pulled back to the homeland and included in GDP and employment statistics.

Traditionally, the layout of mining sites would migrate towards regions with cheap electricity, favorable regulatory environments, land costs, and climate conditions. North America has managed to attract a large number of mining companies to list and expand through friendly policies in certain states, along with the advantages of power grid resources and capital markets over the past few years. The Mined in America Act, through mining pool certification, equipment source examination, and national security endorsements, now stacks these traditional migratory factors with policy-level support expectations, further amplifying the appeal of the U.S. as a computing power hub.

Once the mining pool certification plan and local computing power development guidance are implemented, the competition landscape among global large mining pools and hosting service providers may also be reshaped. The "compliant pools" that receive official endorsement from the U.S. are expected to take advantage in collaborating with institutional funds and listed mining companies; while pools relying on unverified equipment or falling into the "foreign adversaries" gray zone may risk marginalization. This shift in weighting will not only reflect in the hash rate distribution but will also extend into the governance and upgrade negotiations of the Bitcoin network through pathways such as node operations and soft fork voting tendencies.

With the enhanced discourse power of computing, the U.S. will find its position and preferences in future soft fork disputes related to privacy, regulatory interfaces, and compliance requirements even harder to disregard. Even though Bitcoin continues to maintain its global node distribution and open-source governance mechanisms, an economy with higher control over computing power, while incorporating this power into a national security framework, will itself become a significant variable influencing the evolution of consensus.

New Battleground in Sino-U.S. Tech Competition: From Chips to Computing Power Supply Chains

If we place the Mined in America Act back within the larger narrative of geopolitical competition, its logic closely resembles the past few years' de-risking policies in areas like chips and 5G: using legal and administrative tools to gradually reduce external dependencies in key technologies and infrastructure, cutting supply chains that were originally globally cooperative into more camp-oriented systems. This time, the objects included in the national security viewpoint have extended from communication base stations and advanced process chips to "Bitcoin mining computational power," which was originally regarded as decentralized and borderless infrastructure.

In publicly available information, the bill does not specify a list of "foreign adversaries," but it is widely speculated that a significant portion refers to major overseas suppliers of Bitcoin mining machines and related equipment. Should subsequent detailed regulations bring certain countries’ manufacturers into the field of focus, Chinese mining machine manufacturers and overseas mining operations in the Middle East and North America may face higher compliance thresholds and identity verification pressures in the U.S. market. Even if not directly prohibited, the uncertainty of the policies will increase financing costs and complicate long-term contract negotiations.

It is worth noting that the U.S. officially incorporating Bitcoin mining computing power into national security and industrial policy discussions may very well create a demonstration effect for other major economies. The EU and several Asia-Pacific countries may also begin to see "how much mining and node infrastructure is mastered by domestic entities" as part of their security agendas in responding to energy transitions, data sovereignty, and financial stability risks. The narrative of Bitcoin shifting from "decentralized asset" technology is gradually being layered as a geopolitical narrative of "multinational computing power group competition": different regulatory camps are shaping their own computing power alliances through laws, taxes, electricity subsidies, and security standards.

In the long term, this will weaken the single logic of "free and profit-driven flow of computing power," instead forming several computing power groups constructed around major powers/major economies: each with its own local compliant mining pools, equipment suppliers, and financial services networks. Under this structure, the Bitcoin network remains decentralized, but its practical operations will be more deeply embedded within the constraints and coordinates of geopolitical factors.

Market Narrative and Price Expectations: The Double-Edged Sword of Strategic Asset Labeling

From the 2024 executive order on strategic Bitcoin reserves to the 2026 proposal for the Mined in America Act, the mainstream narrative around Bitcoin has experienced a distinct shift: moving from a highly volatile "speculative asset" to a candidate considered to enter discussions on "national-level asset allocation." During the executive order era, this narrative mainly remained at the level of political slogans and electoral mobilization; now that relevant content has been incorporated into the bill text, capital markets are beginning to reassess Bitcoin and mining companies' positions under a long-term institutional environment.

For mining company valuations, mining sector financing, and derivatives pricing, the psychological impact of the U.S. incorporating Bitcoin into the national policy narrative should not be underestimated. On one hand, the bill signals that "the U.S. will support domestic computing power and reserve institutional interfaces," providing a long-term narrative foundation for listed mining companies and compliant mining pools; on the other hand, the derivatives market may easily trade ahead of a range of yet-to-materialize policy benefits based on optimistic imaginings of "national policy support" and "computing power backflow," thus driving valuations to potentially inflate excessively in the short term.

However, research briefs indicate that the specific implementation timeline for the certification program has not yet been disclosed, and the formal definition of "foreign adversaries" remains unclear, leaving many key details at a framework level. This suggests that there is a considerable gap between the practical execution path and the market's optimistic narrative of "soon-to-make large-scale investments in strategic reserves, enacting tax reductions, and providing substantial subsidies." Current publicly available information has not stated any provisions for capital gains tax reductions, specific subsidy amounts, etc., and investors need to maintain adequate caution regarding such speculative positive news.

In a stage of uncertain institutional evolution, narratives often precede reality, and prices amplify narrative volatility. Whether viewing Bitcoin as a "national policy target" or fearing regulatory backlash, it is essential to distinguish: the legislative path has merely opened a door for Bitcoin's transition from a market asset to a national-level strategic resource, while the actual flow, capital, and computing power migrations will still depend on the complex political negotiations and technological, energy cost games over the coming years.

Bitcoin Transitioning to Geopolitical Asset: The Next Stage of Multinodal Computing Power Competition

In summary, the Mined in America Act has released three parallel signals at the institutional level: first, strategic Bitcoin reserves have been formally incorporated into the legislative track, reserving space for the U.S. to treat Bitcoin as one of its sovereign asset tools in the future; second, by implementing mining pool certification and supporting local computing power, it guides the mining industry and computing infrastructure back to the U.S.; and third, under the narrative of progressively eliminating "foreign adversary" equipment, it initiates a de-risking reconstruction of the mining supply chain. These three forces are combining to pull Bitcoin from the realm of technological and financial innovation into the main battleground of national security and industrial policy.

The biggest unknown currently lies in the ambiguity of implementation details and timelines. When the Department of Commerce's certification program will be launched, what technical standards and review processes will be adopted, have yet to be publicly clarified; the criteria for defining "foreign adversaries" are also deliberately kept flexible to allow for future diplomatic and industrial maneuvers. This uncertainty, on the one hand, provides relevant parties with opportunities for lobbying and redistributing interests; on the other hand, it indicates that regulatory impacts may manifest in waves and phases.

Looking outward, whether in the coming years the European Union and several major Asia-Pacific economies choose to follow suit by incorporating Bitcoin computing power into their national security frameworks will determine whether this trend becomes a U.S.-led unilateral experiment or evolves into a globally participatory rewriting of rules. Once more economies start evaluating computing power distribution from the perspective of security and industrial policy, Bitcoin will be more deeply embedded within the geopolitical order, no longer merely a game of on-chain code and market prices.

For the mining and hardware manufacturers of both the U.S. and China, in the short to medium term, this means a period of growing pains with regulatory uncertainties, rising compliance costs, and business repricing: some business models that relied on the U.S. market and capital will have to adjust their regional allocations and partner selections. However, looking at a longer cycle, computing power is likely to evolve into a multipolar pattern: different countries and regions may form relatively independent yet interconnected computing clusters based on their energy structures, regulatory preferences, and security considerations. In such a world, Bitcoin will still run on a decentralized network but will be increasingly regarded as a new "geopolitical asset" to measure and compete around national strength.

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