On March 30, 2026, Eastern Eight Time, the global weekly usage of large AI models soared to 22.7 trillion Tokens, a month-on-month increase of 11.2%. In this steeply rising curve, China maintained a weekly usage of 9.857 trillion Tokens, surpassing the United States for the fourth consecutive week, with a month-on-month growth rate of 33.94%, far exceeding the United States' 1.79%, clearly creating a visible inflection point in the global technology landscape. Almost simultaneously, former U.S. President Trump stated to the media on Air Force One that Iran had met "most" of the 15 ceasefire demands posed by the U.S., despite Iran previously rejecting these conditions publicly, intertwining two narratives in the air. The acceleration of the technological race and the pull of ceasefire expectations in the U.S.-Iran conflict together form the most tense parallel line in the current macro environment.

The Curve of 9.857 Trillion Tokens

As of the statistical week of March 30, the global weekly usage of large AI models was pushed to 22.7 trillion Tokens, up 11.2% from the previous week, indicating not merely linear growth but rather an accelerating phase driven by additional factors. Within this global curve, the comparison of growth rates between China and the U.S. stands out: China's weekly usage of 9.857 trillion Tokens, a month-on-month increase of +33.94%, while the U.S. only +1.79%, clearly marking a shift in dominance.

This difference is not an anomaly of one week. Briefings indicate that China's AI usage has exceeded that of the U.S. for four consecutive weeks, transforming its temporal persistence from a "single point explosion" into a trend signal worthy of attention. Four consecutive weeks of leadership suggest that, whether in model deployment scale, scenario penetration, or policy-driven pace, China is probing for greater global discourse power on the usage side with more aggressive strategies.

The surge in usage is likely associated with two types of structural changes: firstly, a periodic breakthrough in the performance of domestic large models, where decreased inference costs and improved effects make large-scale replacements economically viable; secondly, the expansion of application scenarios, from government affairs and finance to industrial internet, where more actual production and management processes embed model usage into business flows, forming high-frequency, rigid Token consumption. A concentrated access and procurement testing by government and leading enterprises, once rolled out, often significantly elevates the slope of the usage curve in a short time.

However, the usage volume is essentially a usage-side indicator, recording "computational power consumption" rather than "absolute technical superiority". High usage does not equate to comprehensive surpassing in algorithm originality, foundational research, and underlying architecture, and may also include repetitive trial and error, redundant usage, and policy-driven "consumptive" use. Understanding the significance of 9.857 trillion Tokens requires recognizing its symbolic value while maintaining a clear understanding of what it can and cannot represent at the technical level.

The Race for Digital Sovereignty: From Computational Power Consumption to Infrastructure Investment

If we view Token usage as a form of "digital power", then the global consumption of 22.7 trillion Tokens and China's share of 9.857 trillion Tokens represent not only commercial behavior but also a proxy signal for digital sovereignty and investment in AI infrastructure. The rapid increase in usage signals a country's willingness and ability to make continuous public and capital expenditures on computational power, data, and model services, which is an external manifestation of a new round of infrastructure construction.

In China, the month-on-month surge of +33.94% in usage is evidently difficult to explain by natural market growth alone. A more reasonable explanation is that behind it lies the concentrated procurement and application deployment by government agencies, large state-owned enterprises, central enterprises, and internet platforms: the intelligent upgrade of government systems, model integration in industrial parks and scenarios, and project implementations in finance, education, and other fields have collectively raised the foundational usage base. In such a framework, the usage curve often displays characteristics of policy rhythm rather than a gradual slope dictated solely by grassroots demand.

In contrast, the U.S. weekly usage volume only increased +1.79%, resembling a market approaching maturity: the usage patterns of leading applications are relatively stable, and marginal new scenarios no longer exhibit explosive expansion; simultaneously, the regulatory environment imposes more explicit constraints on data usage, privacy, and AI risks, which has also somewhat suppressed the impulse for "extensive" usage. The combination of a high base and institutional constraints results in a flatter curve for the U.S., yet this does not imply a retreat from technological competition but rather differences in rhythm and path.

When AI usage volume is placed in a geopolitical perspective, an important aspect of the U.S.-China technological competition is reflected in who is consuming computational power and model services on a larger scale and higher frequency. A higher usage volume indicates that more data is being processed and more models are being validated, thus feeding back into the next round of algorithms and product iterations. This positive feedback of "the more you use, the faster you learn" will ultimately crystallize into the application thickness and industrial resilience of each ecosystem in the long term, and inevitably project onto geopolitical bargaining power.

Discrepancy in Ceasefire Conditions: U.S. "Optimism" Coexists with Iranian "Rejection"

Alongside the technological curve being pushed to high levels, there is significant uncertainty surrounding the prospects for a U.S.-Iran ceasefire. In a communication with reporters at the end of March, former President Trump said on Air Force One that Iran has met "most" of the 15 ceasefire demands proposed by the U.S., but refused to elaborate further citing "details not convenient to disclose." This statement has been interpreted domestically in the U.S. as an "optimistic forecast" for the ceasefire, emphasizing that negotiations have made "substantial progress."

However, prior to this, Iran had publicly rejected these conditions, accusing the related demands of infringing upon its core sovereignty and security bottom lines. This sharp contradiction between Trump's assertion of "having satisfied most demands" and Iran's publicly stated hardline stance creates a narrative conflict: one side emphasizes progress, while the other emphasizes rejection, making it difficult for information receivers to piece together a complete picture in a short timeframe.

More critically, there is a significant lack of detail surrounding these 15 ceasefire conditions. Currently, there is no credible, verifiable list available to answer: which items Iran has adjusted, and which it still firmly maintains; whether the so-called "most satisfied" includes core sovereignty claims or merely some technical and security-related additional clauses. According to briefing requirements, these details are explicitly marked as missing and prohibited from speculation, and there is similarly no credible confirmation of whether a draft of the ceasefire text has been shaped or whether negotiations have entered the textual refinement stage.

In this environment of information asymmetry, market expectations of the situation's direction are forced to build upon a partially credible, partially ambiguous puzzle. The gaps between official and semi-official statements provide space for various second-hand interpretations, emotional outpourings, and political maneuvers: optimists may amplify the rhetoric of "having satisfied most requirements," while pessimists may emphasize Iran's previous "public rejection," and together they culminate in volatility premiums and risk premiums in asset prices.

Spike in Probability of Pakistan Meeting: Betting on Third-party Mediation Channels

While the path to a ceasefire remains unclear, prediction markets have swiftly provided a directional bet. According to Polymarket data, the probability of an event titled "Pakistan hosting a U.S.-Iran meeting" surged to 59% at the end of March, an increase of 21 percentage points in a single day. This magnitude of jump indicates a large concentration of funds betting on the "Pakistan option," seeing it as relatively feasible within the current ceasefire routes.

This change reflects the market's repricing of third-party mediation paths. Pakistan's unique role through its geopolitical location, religious ties, and security cooperation networks grants it the natural attribute of a "transitional platform": maintaining multilayered security cooperation with the U.S. while also having complex connections with Iran and the broader Muslim world. In Polymarket data, the "Pakistan option" has gained strength as traders collectively chose a narrative median—neither directly betting on U.S.-Iran bilateral secret negotiations nor completely dismissing diplomatic exits.

In the broader context of Middle Eastern diplomacy, Pakistan is often not an isolated actor but a key node seen, together with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as potentially forming some form of regional mediation alliance: Saudi Arabia holds discourse on energy and religion, Turkey balances between NATO and the Middle East, while Pakistan serves as a bridge on security issues between South Asia and the Middle East. The premium in prediction markets for a "Pakistan meeting" essentially votes for the operational capacity of this potential alliance.

However, even with rising meeting expectations, it does not mean the ceasefire itself is approaching fruition. Briefings clearly emphasize that issues surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and other core demands remain the sovereignty bottom line that Iran steadfastly upholds, and also constitute the hard-core challenges any agreement must address. Currently, there is no reliable information suggesting that these deep-seated disputes have been substantively resolved. In other words, a 59% probability of the meeting does not equate to a 59% probability of the ceasefire, nor does it imply an established timeline for an agreement to be signed in the short term.

Technical Curve and Shadows of Gunfire: Expectation Pricing Under Parallel Narratives

When we juxtapose the accelerating curve of China's AI usage with the repeated fluctuations in expectations for a U.S.-Iran conflict ceasefire, a thought-provoking dual narrative emerges: on one side, the technical investment boom represented by 9.857 trillion Tokens and +33.94% month-on-month; on the other, the geopolitical tensions marked by "satisfying most demands" and "59% probability of a Pakistan meeting." There is no direct causal link between the two, yet they shape a pricing framework of risks and opportunities within the same macro environment.

For investors, the coexistence of technical investment and geopolitical friction is reshaping the traditional logic of "safe assets" versus "tech assets." Intense investment in AI infrastructure and usage indicates a potential premium for certain countries and enterprises in future productivity and control; meanwhile, uncertainties regarding the U.S.-Iran situation elevate the volatility centers for energy, shipping, and global risk assets. In such a landscape, capital often toggles between "betting on technological dividends" and "hedging against geopolitical tail risks," presenting a stronger tendency for differentiation and hedging at the portfolio level.

It is noteworthy that while both prediction market prices and usage data reflect participants' views of the future, they embody more the intertextuality of emotions and expectations rather than a strict causal chain. The 59% on Polymarket is merely a weighted average of traders' views on the "feasibility of a Pakistan meeting" under current information; while 22.7 trillion Tokens and 9.857 trillion Tokens record the agencies' and applications' "consumption impulse" for AI services during this period. Together, they point to a more crowded and anxious vision of the future, yet cannot directly derive a necessary path for specific pricing.

In such a noisy environment, scrutiny of information sources becomes particularly crucial. The clearly listed omissions and prohibitions in the briefings—including which ceasefire conditions Iran specifically met, details on the timing of the Pakistan transfer proposal, the meeting location, and progress on the ceasefire text—remind us to remain highly vigilant against any scripted deductions based on "unverified diplomatic details." Making extreme bets based on rumors, whether in prediction markets or crypto and traditional asset markets, ultimately often amounts to paying for others' information advantages.

When the Curve of Computational Power Meets the Timeline of Ceasefire Negotiations

In summary, the divergence in AI usage volume between China and the U.S. along with the repeated fluctuations in U.S.-Iran conflict ceasefire expectations jointly sketch a highly complex macro bottom map: on one side, a technological race propelled by 22.7 trillion Tokens, with China leading with 9.857 trillion Tokens and +33.94% growth rate; on the other side, geopolitical games symbolized by "satisfying most demands" and "59% probability of a Pakistan meeting." Technology and geopolitics are not isolated entities but constantly interweave in reality through flows of funds, emotions, and policy choices.

China's explosive growth in usage, combined with its four consecutive weeks of surpassing the U.S., likely marks a new phase milestone in the competition for digital sovereignty: computational power, data, and model services are being treated as new foundational infrastructures and strategic assets, and changes in the pace of investment will reshape industrial division of labor and technological discourse power over a longer period. Usage volume only scratches the surface, but behind it lies deep adjustments regarding budget allocation, industrial organization, and institutional design.

Meanwhile, the path to a U.S.-Iran ceasefire remains fraught with variables. The rising third-party mediation channels and prediction markets' price hikes for the "Pakistan option" certainly provide a subjective space for conflict resolution, but significant verified breakthroughs regarding core sovereign disputes like those surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have yet to emerge, keeping the ceasefire timeline tightly gripped by uncertainty. Any unilateral trading logic based on "imminent ceasefire" or "collapsed negotiations" must accept the real challenges posed by incomplete information and sudden narrative shifts.

In an era where the acceleration of technology overlaps with geopolitical shocks, the judgments surrounding investments and policies become increasingly difficult to focus on a single dimension. Understanding both the rising curve of computational power and usage while also comprehending the fluctuating paths of ceasefire negotiations and prediction markets is becoming a new foundational skill. Only at the intersection of these two timelines will the true contours of risks and opportunities gradually become clear.

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