Author: Fang Dao
A notable differentiation has emerged in the market surrounding the latest discussions on the U.S. Clarity Act.
Coinbase faces potential impacts, while the effects on Robinhood and Circle are relatively limited.
With the same regulatory direction, different market outcomes are presented; the underlying issue is not a "stock issue," but rather:
Different business models have varying sensitivities to the same rules.
The core of this controversy lies in the "yield mechanism" of stablecoins.
According to the currently discussed terms, regulation may restrict platforms from providing "passive income" to stablecoin holders, similar to interest on bank deposits. This change directly touches a key growth pathway for centralized trading platforms:
Attracting user funds with yields.
In the existing system, the operational logic of stablecoins is not complex. Issuers invest reserve funds in low-risk assets like U.S. Treasury bonds to earn interest; distribution platforms enhance user stickiness and fund size by passing on part of the income to users.
This structure is essentially a simplified version of a net interest margin model.
This point is particularly crucial for Coinbase.
In recent years, its interest income has continuously increased as a proportion of overall revenue, with stablecoin-related earnings becoming one of its high-gross-margin sources. Therefore, if "yield distribution" is restricted, its impact is not only a decrease in user attraction but also a direct blow to its profit structure.
This is also the financial underlying reason for the market's intense reaction. Because once yield distribution is cut off,
stablecoins revert from being "yield-bearing assets" to "pure fuel."
In contrast, Circle does not directly distribute income to users, with its main revenue coming from the interest margin on reserve assets. Therefore, its risk exposure under this provision is relatively limited and may even benefit from the reallocating of funds.
Currently, Robinhood does not heavily rely on stablecoin income products, and its business structure is less sensitive to this change, so the short-term impact is limited.
This differentiation reveals a deeper change.
From an institutional perspective, this is not a simple business difference but a reconfirmation of value chain positions:
Coinbase loses the liquidity "hook" at the retail end, while Circle solidifies its "moat" at the institutional end for clearing.
Furthermore, the essence of this controversy is not stablecoins themselves but whether they are exercising the core privileges of the banking system—
The essence of the stablecoin dispute is not who issues it, but whether it is exercising the "privileges" of banks.
When stablecoins start to exhibit "deposit-like" attributes, they inevitably fall within the regulatory boundaries.
From a broader framework, the significance of this round of regulation is not merely to restrict a certain type of product but to:
Reduce the "regulatory arbitrage" space in the crypto industry.
In recent years, some platforms have built a "deposit-like system" outside traditional financial regulations through stablecoin yield mechanisms to attract funds with lower constraints.
As rules begin to become clearer, the market is undergoing a repricing:
The differentiation in market pricing of the Clarity Act is essentially a systematic reset of the "regulatory arbitrage space."
However, it is important to note that this rule has not yet been finalized.
The focus of the current debate is on how to define "passive income" versus "incentives based on behavior." If reward mechanisms based on trading, usage, or participation are allowed to exist, then platforms may still maintain user appeal through structural adjustments.
Business models may be compressed, but they will not disappear.
From a longer-term perspective, the significance of this event is not in short-term fluctuations but in a deeper structural change:
Stablecoins are being integrated into the traditional financial system.
This also raises a more critical question: When stablecoins lose their "capacity to attract deposits," what is left?
The answer may be simpler than one might think:
It will become the most efficient global settlement "stamp" in human history.
And the more macro change is:
The wild growth of the crypto industry has come to an end, replaced by "dancing with shackles" within the confines of traditional finance.
References
Needham Research Analysis on the Clarity Act
Stablecoin Interest Margin Model and Reserve Structure
Industry Public Information
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