This week, multiple channels have reported that COSCO Shipping has resumed new booking services from the Far East to the Gulf countries in the Middle East, but has chosen a more restrained and cautious route in its execution: its container ships will not pass through the Strait of Hormuz in the current plan. Instead, a transit network focusing on multiple ports in Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia is taking shape, echoing the transshipment structure previously established by CMA CGM. Shipping routes do not have a static "best solution"; they are constantly recalculated in the balance between geopolitical risks and supply chain stability. This round of adjustments is unfolding around this main line as a new round of games.

Hormuz Tensions: Throat of 30% of Global Oil

The Strait of Hormuz has long been regarded as a critical artery for global energy transport, with public data widely estimating that it accounts for approximately 30% of the world's maritime oil trade. It is also one of the only maritime export routes for crude oil and refined oil from many countries in the Middle East. Tankers and some container ships departing from various ports within the Persian Gulf form a high-density "traffic bottleneck" in this narrow waterway, creating a natural systemic risk point for the global energy and shipping landscape.

Recently, tensions in the region surrounding this water body have been continuously accumulating, with increasing frequency of conflicts and friction, leading to the market continuously re-pricing the navigation risk premium of passing through Hormuz. Whether it is insurance costs, security deployments, or concerns about potential blockade scenarios, all amplify this strait's "single point of failure" characteristic for the global supply chain. Shipping companies are now facing not just traditional weather and freight rate fluctuations, but also harder-to-predict variables such as sanctions and conflict escalation.

Against this backdrop, diverting and re-routing is becoming a practical option for shipping giants restructuring their networks. By weakening rigid dependence on Hormuz in advance during route planning and transferring some cargo flows to alternative ports and routes, companies attempt to find a new balance between capacity utilization and asset security. This is also the fundamental reason why COSCO's actions are highly regarded by capital and industry: it points to a systemic risk hedge for a critical chokepoint.

COSCO Resumes Booking Yet Refuses to Cross the Chokepoint

After a brief pause for adjustments, COSCO Shipping has reopened new booking services for shipments from the Far East to the Gulf countries in the Middle East, covering primarily general cargo, marking the resumption of its commercial rhythm on Middle Eastern routes. However, unlike traditional paths, the company has made it clear in its announcement and market communication that under the current plan, container ships will not pass through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning they will not directly enter this highly sensitive area.

This premise is based on risk control considerations under extreme scenarios. For a global shipping giant, the safety of vessels and crew, reliability of delivery schedules, and ability to fulfill contracts are equally crucial, and Hormuz is no longer merely a "normal risk zone" under the current environment. Should there be unexpected regulations or escalation of military conflicts, the tail risks of vessels being stranded, rerouted, or even seized can quickly amplify, leading to multi-faceted impacts on finances, insurance, and customer relationships.

Public opinions from the market point out that COSCO's adjustment is a reflective avoidance adjustment for key energy and shipping channels. In other words, the company is not simply withdrawing from the Middle Eastern market but is decoupling its dependence on the single chokepoint of Hormuz through route reconfiguration while continuing to serve Gulf customers and removing the most sensitive segment from its controllable range. This logic reflects a calm expectation of long-term geopolitical uncertainty.

Routing Scheme Takes Shape: The Dance of Sohar, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, and Jeddah

In order to maintain coverage of the Gulf while not passing through Hormuz, COSCO Shipping has opted to leverage multiple regional ports to build a transit network. According to multiple sources, its plan introduces Sohar Port in Oman, Khor Fakkan and Fujairah Ports in the UAE, and Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia as core hubs. These ports are located at critical junctions in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea, and already possess certain container handling capabilities and regional outreach.

It is noteworthy that this layout is not creating a "new shipping route" from scratch but is an addition and amplification of existing industry paths. Long before COSCO, CMA CGM had already established a similar transshipment scheme, also relying on Omani and UAE ports to guide cargo flows to safer waters, and then extending into the Gulf through branches or other means. COSCO's participation indicates that this model is evolving from a tactical choice of individual companies into a feasible option for the entire industry.

The biggest change brought about by multi-point transshipment is that risks, which were previously highly concentrated and lacking redundancy in Hormuz, are redistributed across multiple nodes. By conducting "connections" at ports such as Sohar, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, and Jeddah, mainline container ships can remain in relatively safe and controllable waters, while regional fleets closer to the inland bays assume the final segment of transportation. While safety significantly improves, both timeliness and operational complexity inevitably face certain losses, and the industry is striving to find a new balance between these two.

Risk Spillover to the Supply Chain: Delays Become the New Normal

From both time and routing perspectives, avoiding Hormuz means that originally direct or nearly direct routes will be broken down into multi-segment combinations such as "Far East–transshipment port–inland Gulf branch." Mainline vessels will need to dock in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, or Red Sea, waiting for transshipment and connections, and cargo will see an increase in one or more phases during loading, unloading, and re-sorting. Overall travel times and turnover cycles will be difficult to shorten and are more likely to show a slight elongation trend.

Redistribution of capacity will follow. Vessels that were originally concentrated on a few direct routes will be partially redirected to support the newly added transshipment and branch network; the berths, storage yards, and operational resources at transshipment ports will also face higher pressures. For cargo owners, this change may initially manifest as increased uncertainty in delivery schedules and more complex links, and in the medium to long term, could indirectly transfer to end prices and inventory management strategies through a re-evaluation of freight rate structures.

This adjustment will impact not only the transport of general consumer goods or industrial products but will also lead to a rebalancing effect on the rhythm of manufacturing and energy-related cargo flows between Asia and the Middle East. Refineries, engineering materials, chemicals, and supporting goods related to energy projects, originally scheduled around Hormuz, may need to be recalibrated based on new port nodes. For companies that rely on "just-in-time" and refined supply chain management, longer delivery cycles and higher uncertainty will force adjustments in safety stock and multi-source procurement.

A Collective Testing Ground for Shipping Giants: Rewriting Risk Control Priorities

When COSCO Shipping and CMA CGM's paths are viewed side by side, a more representative industry landscape emerges: in an environment where geopolitical uncertainties are heightened, leading shipping companies are conducting a risk-hedging experiment based on routes. They are not simply halting services to a certain area but are constructing parallel routes and alternative nodes to test the resilience of the supply chain under different shock scenarios.

In this context, the trade-off between contract fulfillment and asset safety becomes particularly acute. Sticking to the shortest, most direct shipping route favors compliance and timeliness but exposes vessels and crew to high-risk areas; choosing to divert and transship means accepting greater operational complexity and potential costs, but achieves more controllable safety boundaries. The choices by COSCO and CMA CGM both indicate: at this current stage, the priority of risk control is being elevated overall.

Thus, rather than viewing this as a permanent rewrite of traditional shipping routes, it is better to see it as a pressure test of multiple routes coexisting. Under the premise of significant geopolitical uncertainty, companies maintain multiple operational modes in parallel and use real cargo flows to validate the reliability, cost elasticity, and customer acceptance of different routes. Once the external environment stabilizes, these temporary and emergency routes may not completely vanish but are likely to remain in a “backup channel” capacity in the toolbox of companies and the industry.

After Avoiding the Chokepoint: A New Normal for Middle Eastern Shipping?

In summary, COSCO's adjustments in the Middle Eastern routes release a clear signal to the market: The safety view on key chokepoints is being reshaped. The past mindset of “as long as it opens, aim for direct access” is being replaced with the operational logic of “actively diversifying risks within feasible limits”; regional ports represented by Sohar, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, and Jeddah are thus incorporated into a larger-scale main network, taking on more important transshipment and buffering roles.

It is anticipated that as the effects of this case accumulate, more shipping companies might replicate or iterate similar diversion schemes to varying degrees, evolving the route network in the Middle East and its surrounding waters from a "Hormonuz absolute center" uniaxial structure to a multi-node, multi-channel mesh structure. This network reconstruction will not happen overnight but will be completed gradually through cycles of localized tensions and relaxations.

Ultimately, the pace and outcome of this process will still be determined by the trajectory of geopolitical situations and external expectations regarding the safety of the strait. If the risk of regional conflict is substantively alleviated and concerns about blocking or restricting Hormuz diminish, some diversion schemes may be "retracted" and revert to backup status; conversely, if uncertainties continue to remain high, the multi-route system may likely solidify into a new normal for the industry. The evolution of this variable will be a key window for observing the pattern of Middle Eastern shipping and global supply chains for the foreseeable future.

Join our community to discuss and become stronger together!
Official Telegram community: https://t.me/aicoincn
AiCoin Chinese Twitter: https://x.com/AiCoinzh

OKX Welfare Group: https://aicoin.com/link/chat?cid=l61eM4owQ
Binance Welfare Group: https://aicoin.com/link/chat?cid=ynr7d1P6Z

免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。