On January 26, 2026, Neo co-founder Erik Zhang and founder Da Hongfei publicly split over project governance, bringing long-simmering conflicts to the forefront. The dispute focused on three main points: whether to establish a verifiable financial oversight mechanism, whether to abandon the EON project seen as a new direction, and who holds the final authority for external information release. Erik Zhang proposed three governance "ultimatums," while Da Hongfei responded with a proposal for quarterly financial disclosures and a $1 million spot trading plan, exposing their differences in power boundaries and strategic choices. What appeared to be a disagreement over specific proposals was, in fact, a fierce struggle between the ideal of decentralized governance and the reality of control distribution, rapidly evolving into a systemic test of trust in the Neo mainnet, the EON project, and the overall community.
From China's Ethereum to the Dual Founders' Gate
● As early as 2014, Neo entered the market with the narrative of "China's Ethereum," hoping to explore localization in compliance, digital assets, and smart economy, a vision amplified during the early bull market and policy window. At that time, technological iteration and ecological expansion occupied the narrative center, with more external focus on whether Neo could break through in the global public chain competition rather than how its internal power structure was designed and evolved.
● Throughout its long-term development, Neo maintained a governance structure of "dual founders," with Da Hongfei as the more external image representative and Erik Zhang deeply involved in technical and governance design. During favorable times, this structure was seen as complementary: one person responsible for external narrative and resources, the other for technical and rule design; however, when route disagreements and resource allocation conflicts arose, the unregulated dual-core structure quickly transformed from "balance" into a lever amplifying conflict.
● Entering 2025, the controversy surrounding the centralized management model of the NF (Neo Foundation) treasury began to heat up, with community discussions on how funds were used and who made decisions becoming increasingly sharp. During this phase, the treasury transitioned from a "trusted black box" to a governance object that was gradually required to be transparent and accountable, laying the groundwork for the public conflict in 2026 and weakening the old narrative of "just trust the founders."
● Over the years, community skepticism regarding power concentration and transparency gradually accumulated: from the role of the foundation and the power boundaries of the development organization NGD to route choices and ecological resource allocation. While the doubts did not immediately explode, they settled as emotions in each governance event. The January 2026 "dual founders' gate" seemed more like a long-term imbalance being released, pushing the question of "who truly steers Neo" to the forefront.
Three Governance Ultimatums: Oversight, EON, and Discourse Power
● On January 26, Erik Zhang proposed three key governance demands: first, to establish a verifiable financial oversight mechanism for audit-able disclosures of fund flows from NF and NGD; second, to require the team to abandon the EON project, avoiding a split in community and resources between old and new routes; third, to remove the final authority for external information release from individuals and incorporate it into a more balanced structure. These three points directly target the three core levers of assets, routes, and discourse power.
● In a public statement, Erik Zhang described the current situation as "the so-called 'limited cooperation' lacking substantive content," emphasizing that without a verifiable oversight mechanism, all cooperative statements are merely posturing. This wording itself conveyed a strong sense of distrust: not only questioning the existing fund management and communication model but also implying that internal coordination had become difficult to reach consensus privately, necessitating a public "ultimatum" demand.
● In the context of public chain governance, financial oversight and information release rights are seen as key levers for decentralization and checks and balances: funds are the "fuel" for technology and ecology, and who can supervise and question the flow of funds determines whether the community has actual discourse power; external information release shapes the project's "official truth," and the party controlling the release often dominates the narrative framework. Erik Zhang's demand for institutional constraints on these two aspects essentially challenges the existing power structure.
● Regarding the EON project, Erik Zhang's demand to "abandon" this route was interpreted by many as an attempt to block a potential alternative path that could evolve into a "new center." For those concerned about resources being diverted from the mainnet, this was seen as a "stop-loss" action to defend the unity of the mainnet; while another group viewed this demand as inherently carrying the meaning of "route cleansing," attempting to complete the division and exclusion of different technical paths through governance demands.
Da Hongfei's Counterattack: Quarterly Financial Reports and $1 Million Spot Proposal
● In response to the above demands, Da Hongfei emphasized in a public reply that he would promote quarterly financial disclosures for NF and NGD. According to multiple media reports, this means that the foundation and development organization need to regularly disclose fund usage. He also stressed that he "opposes personal dictatorial control over community assets," attempting to position himself against "dictatorship and personal control," framing the conflict as a divergence in "how to oppose dictatorship" rather than a one-sided power struggle.
● In terms of fund operations, multiple media sources indicated that Da Hongfei proposed the first batch of $1 million spot trading proposals, emphasizing that it would be an open and accountable operational framework. Although the specific asset composition and trading paths were not fully detailed, its openness was deliberately highlighted to respond to external doubts about "black box operations." At the same time, to avoid further speculation, related statements also deliberately avoided detailed depictions of fund flows.
● For supporters, the quarterly financial report + public spot trading proposal was seen as a compromise to some extent: acknowledging previous insufficient financial transparency while providing regular disclosures and operational norms in hopes of rebuilding trust. However, in the eyes of opponents, these measures appeared more like "symbolic actions"—if the leading power of the oversight mechanism still lies within the existing power structure, merely increasing the frequency of disclosures may not change the substantive balance of power.
● Notably, the language used by both sides has revealed a shift from "internal coordination" to "public division." Da Hongfei proposed "cooperation where goals align, and each advances where there are differences," superficially emphasizing inclusivity of differences, but in reality acknowledging that there is no longer a pursuit of unity on key routes and governance principles. In contrast to Erik Zhang's "ultimatum" style governance conditions, Neo's power structure is shifting from a single project co-governance to a fragmented state where each leads their own team and narrative.
The Mainnet Struggle Under the Shadow of EON: Integration or Multi-line Competition
● The EON project is viewed by some developers and community members as a potential "alternative solution" to the Neo mainnet, with this perception primarily resting on routes and resources rather than specific technical parameters. The current controversy is not about consensus algorithms or performance metrics, but rather whether an emerging new chain, shaped as "new Neo" or even "more advanced Neo," will marginalize the old mainnet in terms of governance legitimacy and future resource priorities.
● Once the new chain is imagined by the market as a candidate for "alternative mainnet," the original mainnet's governance rights, resource allocation, and community recognition will all be impacted: developers may need to choose between two technical stacks, ecological projects will consider which route can secure more sustainable funding and traffic support, while ordinary token holders will have to assess the "equity mapping" and discourse power of their holdings across both routes. This uncertainty alone is enough to shake long-term commitments to the mainnet.
● In this context, Erik Zhang's demand to abandon EON attempts to maintain the mainnet's unified narrative and resource focus through "integration"; Da Hongfei, on the other hand, emphasizes the legitimacy of multi-line parallelism with "advancing separately where there are differences." The fundamental disagreement between the two lies not in the technical choices themselves, but in whether to achieve governance clarity through a unified route or to accept multi-chain competition and let the market and time select the winner, representing a fundamental divergence in the entire ecological structure.
● This route conflict inevitably deepens external concerns about whether Neo will experience "on-chain separation": one route continues to center on the Neo mainnet, reinforcing the traditional brand and existing asset system; while another route, led by new projects, attracts new developers and new funds. Even if it does not necessarily lead to a formal on-chain split, as long as key figures, resources, and community opinions show clear factionalization, the expectation of "de facto separation" will continue to amplify.
The Collision of Decentralized Ideals: What Can the Community Actually Govern
● The underlying contradiction of this public conflict can be summarized as a structural conflict between "the ideal of decentralized governance vs actual operational control." Since its inception, Neo has touted decentralization and public chain governance, yet has long relied on founders and the foundation to lead key decisions. When the tension between ideals and structure continues to accumulate, once the founders no longer share a common purpose, all issues of "personal governance masking institutional deficiencies" will be instantly exposed.
● Looking back at the 2025 NF treasury centralized management controversy, the transparency and ownership of the treasury have been repeatedly discussed by the community. For any public chain, the treasury is not just a "money bag," but also the material basis of governance power: whoever controls the treasury has the ability to shape the technical route and support or suppress certain ecological directions. Therefore, once trust in the treasury's operations fractures, the long-term governance legitimacy of the project will also be shaken.
● Interestingly, both Erik Zhang and Da Hongfei narratively claim to be on the side of "anti-dictatorship and protecting community assets," yet they completely diverge on the question of "who checks whom and how to establish checks and balances." The former emphasizes the need to extract greater oversight power from the current structure, no longer relying on personal commitments; while the latter emphasizes opposing "personal dictatorial control over community assets," but is more inclined to increase disclosure frequency and operational norms within the existing framework rather than reshaping the power distribution itself.
● In this power struggle, community members, developers, and investors are forced to seek new alignment coordinates: some may care more about who can better protect the safety of their assets, some may choose the side that aligns more closely with their technical route, while others may only care about whether the short-term project can continue to provide resources and traffic support. Regardless of stance, this conflict is substantively redrawing the boundaries of the concept of "Neo community"—who remains internal and who is already observing from the outside.
After the Break: What Choices Remain for Neo
This governance turmoil has directly damaged Neo's brand image, developer ecology, and community trust: at the brand level, the once "unified Neo" narrative has been torn apart; at the developer level, the uncertainty between the mainnet and EON has increased the costs of technical and resource decision-making; at the community level, the doubts surrounding the treasury and governance structure have shifted from whispers to public debates, forcing a revaluation of trust. These damages are unlikely to be repaired through a single announcement in the short term.
In the future, Neo may face several paths: one is to promote more formal governance reforms, attempting to rebuild consensus along the same main line through institutionalized oversight and power redistribution; the second is to allow both sides to lead their chains and narratives, forming a de facto separation; the third is that if internal friction continues and reforms are slow, it may be marginalized in a new round of public chain competition, seen as a "cautionary tale of governance rifts." Which path ultimately takes shape largely depends on the actual actions in the coming quarters, rather than the current public relations statements.
More broadly, this incident once again brings a question to the forefront of the entire industry: When founders no longer share a common purpose, are the rules sufficient to suppress personal governance? If treasury oversight and discourse power still heavily rely on personal credibility rather than replaceable and accountable institutional arrangements, then any narrative of "decentralization" will struggle to withstand internal fractures. For investors and developers, a more rational attitude at this stage is to temporarily avoid emotional surface-level disputes and focus on whether subsequent quarterly financial disclosures are implemented, whether treasury oversight truly introduces third-party checks and balances, and whether clear boundaries emerge in the relationship between EON and the mainnet, using time to verify whether Neo can emerge from this crisis with a genuinely institutionalized governance path.
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