Full Analysis of the $6 Million Theft from Trust Wallet Extension

CN
3 hours ago

Event Overview

Recently, the Trust Wallet browser extension version 2.68 has been reported to have serious security issues, resulting in the theft of users' crypto assets. The incident involves multiple public chains and several trading platforms. According to on-chain tracking and disclosures from security agencies, the confirmed scale of the theft has reached at least $6 million, and this figure is still considered a conservative lower limit. Affected assets are distributed across Bitcoin, EVM-compatible chains, and Solana, among other mainstream networks, and have been transferred and split through various paths, further complicating tracking efforts. As risks gradually became apparent, Trust Wallet issued a security alert, explicitly naming the browser extension version 2.68 as having security risks, urging users of this version to immediately disable or uninstall the extension, check their account and asset security, and carry out necessary migration and self-check operations.

Fund Flow

From the currently quantifiable on-chain data, the confirmed stolen amount in this incident is at least $6 million, of which approximately $2.8 million remains in addresses controlled by hackers, dispersed across Bitcoin, various EVM-compatible public chains, and Solana networks; this portion of funds that has not yet fully exited constitutes potential space for future freezing and recovery. Meanwhile, over $4 million has been rapidly funneled into several centralized and semi-centralized platforms, with approximately $3.3 million flowing into ChangeNOW, about $340,000 into FixedFloat, and around $447,000 into KuCoin, indicating that attackers attempted to evade traditional compliance risk control and on-chain tracking early in the incident by splitting funds, cross-chain transfers, and diversifying across multiple platforms. After being finely dissected, the funds frequently jump between different chains before entering exchange platforms, representing a typical "splitting—cross-chain—exit" path combination, which also reflects the hackers' mature operational patterns in evading regulation and choosing money laundering paths.

Exchange Response

With nearly $4 million of the involved funds flowing into platforms like ChangeNOW, FixedFloat, and KuCoin, these centralized exchange and trading platforms face significant compliance and risk control pressure in a short period, needing to identify and label related suspicious funds while rebalancing user experience and risk isolation. Since the main intelligence regarding this incident has been provided by on-chain security agencies and independent analysts, such as PeckShield and ZachXBT, which monitored approximately $2.8 million remaining in hacker addresses, exchanges have increased their reliance on external on-chain intelligence sources. In the absence of complete judicial conclusions, the main measures that platforms can take remain focused on: implementing real-time monitoring of marked suspicious addresses and their associated addresses, freezing or delaying withdrawals of incoming funds when necessary, and cooperating with on-chain analysis teams and law enforcement for fund path tracking. The incident also highlights the importance of real-time address monitoring across exchanges, blacklist sharing, and intelligence synchronization mechanisms, which play a crucial role in blocking the exit paths of illicit funds and enhancing overall ecological risk control.

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Current public information only confirms that this security incident is directly related to the security issues of the Trust Wallet browser extension version 2.68, but the underlying technical causes have not been disclosed, making it impossible for outsiders to determine whether it involves supply chain attacks, specific code module defects, or some type of dependency component being hijacked. Browser extension wallets are inherently exposed to a high intensity of attack surfaces, including the listing of counterfeit extensions, malicious update pushes, and high-frequency risk scenarios such as phishing attacks using pop-up interactions and authorized signatures as bait. Historically, vulnerabilities related to WebAssembly reported in 2022 have exposed structural vulnerabilities in the permission boundaries and execution sandbox of browser plugin architectures, providing negative precedents for similar incidents today. Based on current information, it cannot be confirmed whether this incident is directly related to specific browser ecosystems, plugin review processes, or some form of supply chain attack; relevant technical details remain undisclosed, and a cautious approach must be maintained regarding such critical information to avoid making inferences or technical attributions about unverified details.

User Impact Landscape

Regarding the actual number of affected users, market information describes the scale as "hundreds," but this figure currently comes from a single source and cannot be considered fully confirmed data, and its uncertainty should be clearly noted. In terms of the structure of financial losses, considering the usage habits of browser wallets and the distribution of on-chain assets, current losses are more likely to present a pattern of coexistence between a few large addresses and many small addresses: a small number of users may have lost amounts as high as hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in a single theft, while more users' losses are concentrated in the range of thousands to tens of thousands of dollars. This structure will directly affect the efficiency of subsequent recovery negotiations and the organizational costs of collective action. Approximately $2.8 million remains in hacker addresses on-chain, theoretically providing some recovery space for future judicial cooperation and exchange freezing, but the actual recoverable proportion still highly depends on the cooperation of centralized platforms and the progress of cross-jurisdictional judicial collaboration. For ordinary users, the true determinant of loss limits is often not how much can be recovered afterward, but the speed of self-checking and loss mitigation after the risk is exposed, and the operational decisions made; the earlier potential attack paths are identified and cut off, the more controllable the range of damage typically is.

Self-Protection and Operations

In light of the currently incomplete public information, for users who have used the Trust Wallet browser extension version 2.68, the primary action is to immediately disable or uninstall this version of the extension and quickly migrate any assets still in the related wallet to a new secure environment. A more prudent approach is to generate a brand new mnemonic phrase, redeploy the wallet on an unaffected device or a new browser configuration, and after verifying the address and signature environment's security through small test transfers, gradually complete the migration of larger assets. At the same time, users should systematically organize information related to the theft, including suspected theft timeframes, loss amounts, involved cryptocurrencies and networks, all relevant transaction hashes, and interaction platforms, to facilitate subsequent appeals and evidence submission to wallet officials, exchanges, and judicial institutions. In the medium to long term, practices such as permission management (reducing unnecessary long-term authorizations), using anti-phishing plugins and domain verification tools, repeatedly verifying the sources of extensions, and splitting assets through multi-signature, decentralized custody, and cold-hot separation should all be incorporated into daily security habits to reduce the overall financial risk exposure when a single wallet is breached.

Follow-Up Observations

Moving forward, it is essential to focus on whether Trust Wallet will release a more detailed technical review report, clarifying the triggering mechanisms of this incident, the scope of affected users, and the rectification plans for internal security processes, while also monitoring whether any form of compensation arrangements or risk mitigation plans will be proposed. On the other hand, whether the funds that have already flowed into ChangeNOW, FixedFloat, KuCoin, and other platforms can effectively identify and freeze more suspicious assets with the help of on-chain intelligence will directly impact the final recoverable amount and the demonstrative effect of the incident. For the entire browser wallet sector, this incident may become another critical node in promoting the standardization of security and the normalization of security audits, prompting project parties to increase investment in third-party audits, bug bounties, and continuous monitoring before and after version releases. For investors and ordinary users, the truly feasible long-term solution remains to establish a multi-layered asset custody and risk diversification system, distributing assets across hardware wallets, multi-signature structures, centralized exchanges, and decentralized wallets, thereby reducing the overall loss ratio when any single tool faces catastrophic risks.

Join our community to discuss and become stronger together!
Official Telegram community: https://t.me/aicoincn
AiCoin Chinese Twitter: https://x.com/AiCoinzh

OKX benefits group: https://aicoin.com/link/chat?cid=l61eM4owQ
Binance benefits group: https://aicoin.com/link/chat?cid=ynr7d1P6Z

免责声明:本文章仅代表作者个人观点,不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享,不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议,与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权,请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com,本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。

Share To
APP

X

Telegram

Facebook

Reddit

CopyLink