Event Overview
Recently, the Trust Wallet browser extension version 2.68 was reported to have a security vulnerability, leading to asset theft for some users during its use, which has raised significant concern within the community. On-chain analyst ZachXBT estimated the losses from this incident to be at least over $6 million based on public transfer records and victim feedback, with the number of affected users described as "hundreds." This remains a preliminary estimate from a single source. Trust Wallet has confirmed that only the browser extension version 2.68 is affected, while the mobile wallet and other versions are explicitly stated to be secure. An emergency release of version 2.69 has been issued, urging all extension users to upgrade immediately to block potential attack paths. It is important to note that key information surrounding this incident remains incomplete, including specific vulnerability details, a complete list of affected addresses, and the flow of funds, which are still being organized. As on-chain data and official investigations progress, the scale of losses and the extent of the impact may be revised or amplified.
Key Data
From the currently available information, the quantitative data regarding the Trust Wallet extension vulnerability mainly comes from a few analysts. ZachXBT disclosed on social media that based on some known stolen addresses, the loss amount is "at least over $6 million." This figure has not yet received formal endorsement from the project team or third-party auditing agencies, and should therefore be regarded as a preliminary estimate from a single source. Similarly, the claim that "hundreds of users are affected" is primarily based on self-reported cases from victims and unofficial statistics, which have limitations in sample coverage and deduplication, making it difficult to treat it as a complete list of victims in the short term. The official stance currently clarifies that the incident is limited to the browser extension version 2.68 and does not involve the mobile application or other versions, and it is inappropriate for the public to extrapolate the existing loss data to the entire Trust Wallet ecosystem. Due to the lack of a systematically disclosed list of stolen addresses and cross-chain distribution information, analysts find it challenging to accurately determine whether the funds are concentrated on a single or a few public chains, or dispersed across multiple EVM chains, thus limiting further quantitative assessments of the attack scale, patterns, and risk spillover effects.
Extension Risks
As a primary entry point for users connecting to DeFi, NFTs, and various DApps, browser extension wallets inherently bear the burden of high-frequency signing and authorization operations, exposing a unique attack surface distinct from pure mobile wallets: any malicious scripts loaded on a page, hijacked RPC configurations, or forged interaction requests can exploit the bridging relationship between the extension and the web page, amplifying the consequences of permission abuse. In contrast, mobile wallets typically operate within a more closed application sandbox, where permission requests are often isolated and reviewed at the operating system level. Desktop extensions rely more on the browser environment and the user's own operational habits to maintain security boundaries. The Trust Wallet incident, concentrated in version 2.68, also reflects the risks associated with extension products in terms of updates and version management: if any release step, dependency package, or configuration encounters an issue, it can be rapidly distributed to users' browsers in a very short time. In the absence of specific technical details being disclosed, a more reasonable discussion should focus on architectural aspects, such as the trust chain design between the extension and the web page, backend services, and dependent components, rather than making unverified technical speculations about attack methods.
Self-Custody Paradox
A major focus of market sentiment surrounding this incident is the cognitive dissonance between "centralized brand endorsement" and "user self-custody responsibility." After being acquired by Binance in 2023, Trust Wallet has long been viewed as the official self-custody entry point within the ecosystem of large exchanges, leading many users to perceive it as a "safer" wallet option and psychologically project part of the security responsibility onto Binance and the Trust Wallet team. However, self-custody wallets emphasize a design where "the private key is in the user's hands, and the platform cannot intervene in asset management," meaning that key aspects such as permission misuse, version selection, and security settings should theoretically be the user's responsibility. As the browser extension becomes the default entry point for connecting to DeFi protocols and airdrop interactions, many users' expectations of its security obligations have become significantly blurred: they wish to enjoy the security commitments represented by centralized brands while also expecting compensation arrangements similar to those provided by exchanges in the event of losses. This vulnerability directly challenges the narrative that "holding your own coins is always safer," reminding the market to reassess: self-custody is not unconditionally secure, but rather a set of risk trade-offs predicated on technology and operational discipline.
Historical Comparison
From an industry historical perspective, the Trust Wallet incident is not an isolated case. In 2024, the leading browser extension wallet MetaMask was reported to have faced similar supply chain-related attack risks, prompting a collective reflection on the upstream dependencies and release processes of the extension ecosystem. At that time, community discussions focused on issues such as poisoned third-party dependency packages, controlled build environments, and the abuse of extension release channels, all of which are common vulnerabilities faced by browser extension wallets in their design. Comparing the MetaMask case with the Trust Wallet incident reveals commonalities in their attack surfaces: both are concentrated on the extension as an endpoint, highly bound to the trust relationships between the DApp environment, browser, and build chain; in terms of response strategies, both project teams have taken urgent measures to release new versions, remind users to upgrade, and check for abnormal authorizations in an effort to quickly block potential attack chains. However, it is important to emphasize that the claims regarding "suspected supply chain attacks" in the Trust Wallet incident are still pending verification, and there is currently no public evidence sufficient to classify it as a supply chain attack case similar to that of MetaMask; related statements should be viewed as risk hypotheses rather than established facts.
Responsibility and Expectations
In terms of responsibility attribution and compensation expectations, market voices have begun to diverge. On-chain analyst ZachXBT publicly stated that if subsequent investigations confirm that Trust Wallet bears direct responsibility for this vulnerability, he hopes the project team will fully compensate affected users. This viewpoint has garnered support from some victims and observers on social media. In contrast, Trust Wallet's official stance currently only acknowledges the security issue in version 2.68 and provides a technical response plan to upgrade to version 2.69, without releasing any details on whether, how, or to what extent compensation will be provided. As a wallet product operated by a centralized company, its actual responsibilities in legal and public opinion terms often lie between those of a "technology provider" and a "financial service institution": on one hand, brand premium and user growth depend on the community's trust in its security; on the other hand, the self-custody design makes it difficult to simply apply the rigid repayment standards of traditional financial institutions. This incident undoubtedly serves as a stress test for the brand credibility of Trust Wallet and its underlying Binance ecosystem, potentially suppressing new user acquisition and extension usage frequency in the short term, while the medium to long-term effects will depend on the transparency of the vulnerability investigation, user communication, and the design of subsequent compensation mechanisms to rebuild trust.
Risk Insights
Surrounding the vulnerability incident of the Trust Wallet browser extension version 2.68, the market is re-evaluating the security boundaries of browser extension wallets: they are both a key infrastructure connecting to the DeFi world and a vulnerability that integrates browser environments, dependency supply chains, and user operational risks. For ordinary users, the most basic and cost-effective actions at this stage include: immediately checking the extension version they are using to ensure it has been upgraded to the latest version confirmed as safe by the official; regularly cleaning up unnecessary DApp authorizations to avoid signing and authorization operations on unknown websites; and prioritizing official channels when installing and updating extensions to reduce the link risks posed by third-party mirrors and informal distributions. For the entire industry, this incident once again points to several urgent areas for improvement: strengthening security audits of extension build chains and dependency packages, promoting standardization in permission isolation and signing prompts within the browser extension ecosystem, and providing more timely and specific disclosures of affected addresses and event timelines to facilitate independent verification by external analysts. As more on-chain data is organized and the official investigation by Trust Wallet progresses, current judgments regarding the scale of losses, attack methods, and responsibility attribution may change, requiring users and institutions to continuously monitor subsequent disclosures rather than relying on early fragmented information.
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