On the evening of December 24, 2025, UTC+8, CZ posted on Binance Square, asserting that "address poisoning attacks can be completely eradicated," and announced that the Binance wallet now supports the identification of malicious addresses, issuing warnings when users attempt to transfer funds to "poisoned addresses." He also called for an industry security alliance to maintain a real-time blacklist. This statement did not directly trigger significant price fluctuations, but it opened a new narrative window in terms of security infrastructure, wallet products, and industry governance.

Core of the Event

Around 19:55 UTC+8 on December 24, 2025, CZ publicly stated on Binance Square: "We can completely eradicate this type of poison address attacks," clearly defining "address poisoning attacks" as a target that the industry should collectively eliminate. Earlier, at 19:31:51 on the same day, media reports had already revealed that the Binance wallet currently supports the identification of malicious addresses, warning users when they attempt to transfer funds to such addresses and advising them to filter out small junk transactions. This feature is already in a fully implemented state rather than just a concept.

From CZ's complete statement, three key pieces of information are worth breaking down. First, he believes that all wallets "should simply check whether the receiving address is a poisoned address and prevent users," essentially requiring wallets to add a layer of "security review" at the sending end. Second, he emphasized that "this is just a blockchain query," attempting to describe this capability as a technically low-threshold basic operation rather than a complex black-box algorithm. Third, he proposed that "the security alliance in the industry should maintain a real-time blacklist of these addresses so that wallets can check before sending transactions," elevating this product feature to a vision of industry collaborative governance. In other words, the functionality update of the Binance wallet is a tangible product action, while "completely eradicating poisoning attacks" and "real-time blacklist alliance" are more aligned with CZ's personally led industry initiative.

At the same time, the market's attention to CZ is not limited to security issues. Within 24 hours, discussions surrounding his previous purchase of Aster and the USD1 Booster activity launched by Binance (such as the discussion on December 24 at 13:07:22 regarding the USD1 exchange rate premium reaching 1.0022) continued to ferment, inevitably placing this security statement in a context of "brand, public relations, and business layout interweaving."

Perspective Breakdown

Surrounding the statement on "eradicating address poisoning attacks," support and skepticism emerged almost simultaneously, reflecting the differentiated preferences for security and control among different user groups and business models.

Supporters mainly come from groups primarily composed of CEX users and general retail investors, as well as some institutions concerned about compliance and fund security. For them, address poisoning attacks are a frequent risk that often accumulates losses in small amounts and is difficult to completely avoid through mere "learning about security knowledge." Attackers poison users' wallets by forging historical transaction records and creating new addresses that are highly similar to real commonly used addresses, misleading users into selecting the wrong address when copying and pasting, resulting in erroneous on-chain asset transfers. In this model, "wallets automatically identifying malicious addresses + pop-up warnings before sending" are seen as a basic infrastructure upgrade close to a "preventing foolishness and scams" foundation, rather than a substantial deprivation of user freedom.

Opposition or reserved attitudes mainly come from users with a stronger decentralized ideology, heavy DeFi players, and observers wary of the expansion of centralized power. Their concerns do not deny the harm of address poisoning attacks but question: who defines "poisoned addresses"? Will the blacklist gradually expand from "security threats" to scrutiny of projects, trading behaviors, and even political factors? Coupled with current community controversies regarding CZ's other actions (such as some viewing his Aster operation as "strong influence signaling" and Binance's USD1 Booster as a means to drive traffic to its own products), this group naturally holds skepticism about the boundaries of "blacklists + wallet reviews."

It can be seen that supporters emphasize "outcome orientation"—reducing operational losses and lowering entry barriers; skeptics emphasize "process and power"—who has the authority to draw lines, who can enter or exit the list, and whether users have space for appeals and workarounds.

This also determines that this event is not a simple "good news for security," but a re-discussion about control over on-chain entry and the boundaries of scrutiny.

Interwoven Narratives

Placing the event back on a longer timeline for the year, several narratives can be seen overlapping at this moment:

First is the refinement of the security narrative. From previously focusing on major thefts and systemic vulnerabilities, to now an increasing number of attacks shifting towards refined models of "social engineering + interface deception," address poisoning attacks are a typical representative. They do not rely on consensus layer vulnerabilities but exploit user operational habits and wallet display logic. CZ's emphasis that "this is a blockchain query" essentially states that this type of attack behavior has identifiable repetitive patterns on-chain, sufficient to be recognized and warned against using rules or models.

Second is the synergy between platform security stack and business layout. Binance's recent launch of the USD1 Booster activity indicates its ongoing efforts to enhance product activity in areas like payments and wealth management; at the same time, CZ's high-profile participation in discussions of certain projects (such as the Aster controversy) continuously sends signals to the market about the "high binding of personal influence and platform resources." In this context, the launch of the malicious address identification feature in the Binance wallet not only enhances security but also makes "whether using the Binance ecosystem wallet is safer and more compliance-friendly" a new selling point.

Third is the polarization of community sentiment. Research briefs show that the direct feedback to this security statement is overall positive, with many users supporting the "unified eradication of address poisoning attacks" and recognizing the attempts of the Binance wallet. However, on the same timeline, criticisms regarding CZ's past actions (such as discussions about his motivations for buying Aster) are also active, indicating that any new actions will automatically be placed within a framework of "motive scrutiny" by some. Thus, the security narrative is strongly tied to the trust narrative: the same blacklist mechanism, in the hands of different entities, receives completely different trust discounts from the market.

Deep Game

At a deeper level, the discussion about "address poisoning attacks that can be eradicated" reflects the long-term tug-of-war between security and decentralization, as well as the power restructuring surrounding control over on-chain entry.

From a technical perspective, CZ's claim that "it can be completely eradicated" is not without basis. Address poisoning attacks heavily rely on patterned behavior: attackers typically send tiny amounts of transfers to a large number of addresses, constructing new addresses that are extremely similar to real commonly used addresses, thereby "confusing" the wallet's historical records. This process has clear behavioral fingerprints on-chain, such as high-frequency small-amount broadcasts, batch creation of similar prefix addresses, and concentrated distribution of target addresses. In theory, as long as the wallet calls a set of threat intelligence sources (blacklist + behavioral feature models) before sending transactions, it can directly mark or pop up warnings for most poisoned addresses at the UI level, compressing the attack space to a minimal size.

The difficulty lies in governance, not identification. Who will maintain this "real-time blacklist"?

If led by exchange alliances, security companies, or similar industry associations, it will need to address:

• Identification process: What kind of behavior is recognized as "poisoning attacks"? Is cross-validation required?
• Updates and rollbacks: Once a false positive or misuse of the list is discovered, is there a publicly transparent appeal and correction mechanism?
• Multi-chain and multi-jurisdiction: Different chains and countries have varying definitions of "malicious behavior"; how to maintain the uniformity and legality of the list?

On the wallet side, this blacklist and risk labels could potentially turn the wallet into a de facto "soft regulatory layer." Once the wallet has the capability to "hide small junk transactions" and "default not to display specific address transaction records," it technically possesses the power to filter and rearrange visible information for users, which is currently applied to "security optimization" but could theoretically be expanded to "compliance restrictions" and "business diversion" scenarios in the future.

This means that the security module could be both a safety belt protecting users and evolve into a filter that redefines the "visible world." How its boundaries are defined will be one of the focal points of ongoing contention in the coming years.

For the industry power landscape, if leading platforms further bind users to on-chain interaction entry through wallets, security modules, and blacklist systems, it will weaken the voice of independent security companies and third-party security data providers; at the same time, those insisting on absolute neutrality in decentralized wallets may choose to distance themselves from alliance blacklists, using "no scrutiny at all" as a selling point to build a differentiated narrative among a smaller but more committed user base.

Bull-Bear Game

Surrounding the security narrative, both bulls and bears can find relatively ample arguments.

The bullish logic first points to "security dividends and compliance dividends." For mainstream retail and institutional investors, "worrying about misoperations transferring money to the wrong address" is one of the real barriers to entering the crypto market. The implementation of malicious address identification and warning functions in the Binance wallet, if emulated by more wallets, is expected to marginally reduce the risk of such "black swan-type operational errors." Further, as regulatory requirements for anti-money laundering and anti-fraud continue to rise, platforms that can provide standardized threat intelligence and blacklist services will have a clear advantage when dealing with traditional finance and institutional funds. In this framework, the security module is not just an optimization of user experience but a key weight in the "risk premium discount" of platform valuation.

Bulls will also connect this action with Binance's layouts in other areas. For example, activities like the USD1 Booster indicate the platform's focus on dollar-denominated assets and wealth management, while enhancing the security stack can improve the overall ecosystem's "investability" image, helping attract more security-sensitive funds.

The bearish logic focuses on "power concentration and compression of innovation space." Blacklists mean that the filtering rights of addresses, funds, and liquidity are in the hands of a few large platforms or alliances. Once standards and execution are opaque, the market fears that any experimental behavior not recognized by mainstream narratives could be categorized as a risk in the future under the guise of "security" or "compliance." Project teams worry that once marked as a risk by major wallets or CEXs, their on-chain liquidity and user reach will be substantially weakened, effectively creating a "soft ban."

For DeFi native users, the concern lies in the potential spillover of scrutiny: today it's address poisoning, but will it expand tomorrow to privacy tools, cross-chain bridges, or certain more aggressive financial contract interactions? As long as the blacklist system has the technical capability, its boundaries can be slowly shifted.

From a neutral perspective, security infrastructure resembles a new type of "public utility." Blacklist queries, address reputation scoring, wallet security SDKs, etc., are likely to become essential underlying capabilities for various wallets, applications, and compliance service providers, serving as both traffic entry points and potential sources of paid APIs or value-added services in the future. At the funding level, what truly needs attention is: who holds the pricing and distribution rights of this "security public utility," and how it will reshape the business models of different track projects.

Outlook and Observation Points

Looking ahead, CZ's call and the functionality update of the Binance wallet are likely just a starting point, with subsequent developments potentially unfolding along three paths.

One path is "fact standardization." If other leading CEXs and mainstream wallets announce the integration of similar malicious address identification and warning mechanisms in the coming weeks or months, and explicitly reference industry alliances or third-party security companies' blacklists and threat intelligence, then the success rate of address poisoning attacks on the user side will be systematically compressed. In this case, the security track will be more easily integrated through platform self-research and alliances, while independent security projects will need to shift towards upstream threat intelligence, on-chain data analysis, or integrate in the form of authorized SDKs into various wallets, rather than being single-point tools.

The second path is the differentiation of wallets between "security faction vs absolute neutrality faction." If some decentralized wallets choose to only provide optional security modules, or even publicly emphasize "not integrating any centralized blacklists," then users will face a clear two-dimensional coordinate when choosing wallets: one end is "security and compliance-friendly," while the other end is "absolute neutrality and self-responsibility." In the long run, this will directly reshape the flow of funds—more conservative and compliance-oriented funds will concentrate towards the former, while funds that prioritize privacy and freedom will flow towards the latter.

The third path is "regulatory binding." Once regulatory agencies begin to link address poisoning attacks with anti-money laundering, anti-fraud, consumer protection, and other policies, some entries on security blacklists may evolve into legally binding requirements, rather than just industry self-discipline. At that time, wallets and platforms will have to meet certain obligations for blacklist queries and interceptions in terms of technical implementation, and the security narrative will naturally upgrade to a regulatory narrative.

For investment and track allocation (the following does not constitute any investment advice), medium to long-term attention can be focused on three directions: first, the sub-track of security infrastructure, including on-chain threat intelligence, address reputation scoring, risk control engines, and wallet security SDKs; second, the internal differentiation within the wallet track, where CEX wallets, Web3 wallets, and hardware wallets will make more differentiation in the depth of security stack integration; third, platform tokens and ecological targets, where security upgrades are expected to continue compressing the "security discount" in valuations, but the pace of implementation and governance transparency will determine the degree of premium the market grants.

In practical terms, several key signals worth continuously tracking include: whether there will be public statistics showing significant changes in the frequency and loss trends of address poisoning attacks; what technical paths and levels of openness are adopted when other leading platforms release similar functions; whether discussions on blacklist governance models evolve towards open standards and verifiable rules; and whether there will be controversial cases arising from blacklist misjudgments or abuses and their handling results in the future.

Ultimately, "eradicating poisoning attacks" is not just a simple security slogan, but a long-term game about who controls the on-chain entry, who sets the security standards, and who holds the filtering rights, the outcome of which will directly affect how each user makes personal choices between security and decentralization values.

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