🧐 a16z Annual Analysis Helps You Understand the Real Threat of Quantum Attacks | Quantum Computing × Blockchain: A Severely Misunderstood Future Threat

In recent years, there has been a panic in the industry: quantum computing is coming, and the encryption of blockchain will be shattered.

a16z's analysis is the second most professional explanation I've seen on this matter:

Quantum is not what we should be most afraid of right now; the real danger is the wrong decisions we make in panic.

The core points of this content can be summarized in three:

1️⃣ Quantum attacks are at least 10 years away.

2️⃣ PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) is immature, the migration path is huge, and implementation is complex.

3️⃣ The potential damage from premature migration is greater than the quantum attack itself.

Below, I will try to explain in the simplest, least technical way whether quantum will threaten blockchain and why "premature migration to PQC" is a greater risk.

1️⃣ Quantum attacks are severely exaggerated (at least 10 years away)

The media often says, "Quantum can crack private keys soon!"

But the reality is far from that.

To use quantum to crack ECDSA/RSA, a special type of quantum computer is needed—

Large-scale, with perfect error correction and extremely high stability.

Such devices are currently not even 1% complete.

a16z's viewpoint is:

The "cryptographic-grade quantum machine" that can truly crack encryption is, at best, 10+ years away.

So, there is no such thing as "quantum will destroy blockchain next year."

The industry has been in panic for too long.

2️⃣ So what should we be most afraid of now? The answer is surprising: PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) itself.

Many people think, "Quantum is coming → so we should quickly switch to new encryption algorithms (PQC)!"

But a16z's warning is very clear: premature migration is more dangerous than not migrating.

Why?

Because the current state of PQC is like a new L1 that has just been released and has not undergone stress testing:

Not enough real-world attacks

Protocol implementation is immature

Libraries, compilers, and toolchains are rapidly changing

Performance and security are constantly being overturned and updated

There is not enough wallet, node, and infrastructure ecosystem support

In other words:

It's not that it's unsafe, but rather "it hasn't been proven safe yet."

Migrating all assets of the chain to PQC is like moving a trillion-dollar system to a testnet-level encryption algorithm. This is not evolution; it's a gamble.

3️⃣ The greater risk: it's not "the algorithm is immature," but rather "the migration itself is a systemic risk."

This is the most critical insight and the easiest to overlook.

Migrating to PQC is not as simple as "updating a wallet version"; it will trigger a chain reaction throughout the entire ecosystem:

All wallets change logic

Address formats change entirely

All user assets need to be re-signed

Contracts need to be upgraded

Nodes need to synchronize

Cross-chain bridges need to be redesigned

Multi-signature, MPC, and threshold keys all need to be rewritten

Any mistake in code, signature, or key management logic could lead to:

Faster, broader, and irreversible losses than a quantum attack.

The quantum threat is 10 years away; migration failure could happen tomorrow.

This is why a16z says:

Fear of migrating too late is misguided.

The real danger is migrating too early.

4️⃣ What is the real current threat to blockchain? It's not quantum; it's ourselves.

If you look closely at all the large-scale losses over the past few years:

Multi-signature implementation vulnerabilities

Wallet seed leaks

Contract logic errors

Cross-chain bridges being hacked

Node consensus failures

Social engineering attacks

None of these are related to quantum.

a16z's viewpoint is clear:

What the industry truly needs is engineering robustness, not new panic.

We haven't even achieved 100% security in multi-signature, MPC, and key management locking models; why fantasize that switching to PQC will solve everything?

5️⃣ So what should the industry do? The answer is not "change algorithms," but rather "prepare an upgradeable path."

Quantum will definitely come in the future, but the future solution will certainly not be today's PQC.

What we need is not a panic upgrade, but:

Address formats that reserve upgrade capabilities

Wallets that can migrate seamlessly

Protocols that reserve soft fork entry points

Testing the migration process (drills)

Phased key switching

Modular signature schemes

Allowing users to flexibly transition between old and new signatures

In other words:

Now is not the time to change parachutes, but to ensure that we "can change parachutes in the future."

This is the practice of a mature industry.

6️⃣ The last point, and my personal strongest viewpoint:

The industry's biggest misunderstanding about quantum is thinking it is an imminent survival crisis.

A greater misunderstanding is thinking that switching to PQC is a simple matter.

What we truly need is an upgrade path based on reality, engineering, and long-termism.

Not another round of technological panic.

I hope this article and my interpretation can help everyone understand the true nature of quantum attacks.

If you find it useful, please like and share!

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