Original Title: Vaulta Foundation's "Eating the Last Resort" Record: Plummeting Coin Prices, Disappearing Audits, and Complete Collapse of Community Trust

Original Author: MMK (@mmk_btc), Vaulta Community Member

Once claiming "the community employs the foundation," it has now become "the foundation bites back at the community." The Vaulta Foundation (formerly the EOS Network Foundation) is experiencing an unprecedented collapse of trust: burning through tens of millions of dollars over four years, yet the coin price continues to hit new lows; projects have repeatedly failed, financial records have gone from public to non-existent; management has "resigned with dignity," but the authority has yet to be handed over… This article will reveal the various mysteries of Vaulta, telling a story of eating the last resort.

Yves Resigns: Dignified Exit or Behind-the-Scenes "Shadow Governance"?

On November 12, 2025, Yves La Rose, the former CEO of the Vaulta Foundation (formerly the EOS Network Foundation, hereinafter referred to as VF), suddenly announced his resignation on the X platform, stating that he had notified the 21 block producers of the network on October 29 that he would voluntarily step down and elect new representatives through on-chain governance. The statement was dignified, filled with "gratitude" and "vision," but a week later, the community was shocked to discover—the core multi-signature account of Vaulta was still under Yves's control, and there was no handover at all.

Not only that, but after resigning, Yves secretly pushed for Aaron Cox, the founder of Greymass, to take over his position. The first thing Aaron did when he was brought to the forefront was to initiate a massive proposal of 10 million $A (EOS) to continue funding the core development budget. This move sparked widespread skepticism in the community: this is simply borrowing a name to "extend life," transferring remaining public funds.

Charge One: Lavish Spending, Marketing Expenditures Become a Mystery

Since VF was established in 2021, ecological development has not accelerated over time.

On the contrary, what the community has seen is another disturbing curve: the budget has expanded year by year, while the results have shrunk year by year.

In the name of "ecological revitalization," VF launched a market expansion plan in 2022-2023. VF did recruit an excellent marketing team, and they did put in efforts in brand operation and international events.

But the key question is—what exactly have these extravagant investments brought?

According to the nine quarterly reports that have been disclosed, marketing-related expenditures (PR & Marketing) alone reached: in Q4 2022, marketing expenses soared to $1,709,800; in Q1 2023, another $1,072,887 was spent.

In just six months, nearly $2.8 million was invested in brand promotion and public relations activities. However, the results visible to the community are only:

• Number of conference attendances, pictures, and reports;
• Growth in Twitter followers;
• 2000 days without downtime;
• EVM performance stress tests;

These data are not meaningless, but they resemble PR slides rather than a true ecological state. Developer growth? Absent. Daily on-chain activity? Not disclosed. TVL? Almost nonexistent. Why does spending more lead to lower community perception? When all reports only discuss "highlights" and not "results," transparency naturally slips into a black box.

Charge Two: Immediate Payouts, Ongoing Controversy Over Greymass's $5 Million Budget

In June 2024, VF allocated 15 million $A (EOS) to establish a "Middleware Special Fund," with the first batch of 5 million $A (EOS) allocated to the Greymass team, while the remaining 10 million is still in the eosio.mware account.

On-chain data shows:

• Funds were transferred from the foundation's eosio.mware account to Greymass's newly established account uxuiuxuiuxui;
• Subsequently, this wallet transferred funds monthly to the http://funds.gm account, noting "Operation + USD/CAD price," resembling "salary payments";
• Then, funds.gm transferred to ewards.gm, ultimately distributed to several accounts such as jesta, inconsistent, apporc.gm, etc., with transfer records annotated "Reward Payout + USD amount";
• Most salaried accounts quickly transferred their funds to krakenkraken accounts or exchanges like Coinbase for cashing out.

Note: The "middleware" built by Greymass refers to infrastructure tools that simplify account creation and interaction processes.

Although the Greymass team released several development updates at the beginning of the funding, there have been almost no technical achievements or interim summaries published in the past year. In particular, Greymass's middleware tools still have many technical issues regarding compatibility and stability, and have not been widely adopted by mainstream developers.

The community's focus of skepticism is:

• Is there a lack of transparency regarding the 5 million $A (EOS) in terms of duplicate salaries and unidentified accounts receiving payments?
• Is the fund allocation closely coinciding with Aaron's appointment time, raising suspicions of "self-approved budgets"?
• Does the salary distribution structure lack third-party oversight?

We do not deny that Greymass has made contributions to ecological development, nor do we deny Aaron's early technical reputation.

But were they misled by the new policy? Did they deviate from the original development intention after losing oversight?

These questions remain unresolved.

What can be confirmed is that the "Greymass $5 Million Project"'s silence and low output make it difficult to respond to the external trust crisis, further exacerbating the community's doubts about the rationality of the foundation's fund usage.

Charge Three: Plummeting Coin Prices, Foundation "Silence," Responsibility Becomes a Blind Spot

If technical achievements can be debated and marketing effects quantified, then token prices are the most honest indicators.

This year, $A (EOS) has plummeted, hitting a low of $0.21—this is a dangerous signal that should put any ecosystem on red alert. However, as the community continues to inquire, the foundation's response has always been: "The coin price is not within the foundation's responsibilities."

This statement itself cannot be refuted.

Technical organizations are not obligated to manipulate the market. But the contradiction lies in—when all ecological indicators decline and community confidence collapses, the foundation has not discussed any "stabilization expectations" or "market protection mechanisms."

What followed was an even more unsettling action: the foundation announced its "dissolution," with no roadmap and no handover plan.

The community's question is not whether the foundation should be responsible for the coin price, but rather: at a critical moment when the ecosystem is in a trust crisis, why choose to withdraw: is it due to inability, indifference, or are there some issues that are inconvenient to face? Responsibility has vanished in this plunge.

Charge Four: From Weekly Updates to Complete Silence, Transparency Disappears Quietly

When VF was first established, transparency was once its biggest selling point.

• 2021: Weekly updates (Everything EOS Weekly Report), providing real-time progress reports to the community;
• 2022: Monthly reports (Monthly Yield Report), with slight lapses for a few months, but still acceptable;
• 2023: Quarterly reports (ENF Quarterly report);
• 2024: Silence… …
• 2025: Silence… …

From the published report data, VF's expenditures peaked in Q4 2022, reaching $7,885,340; thereafter, expenditures gradually declined each quarter.

However, these reports often only disclose total amounts, lacking detailed classifications and specifics, making it difficult for outsiders to determine the direction of funds, and the community has long harbored doubts about the massive expenditures and lack of information transparency.

The reports frequently mention plans like Grant Framework and Pomelo, but in 2023, they experienced a phase of "stagnation"; meanwhile, the promised fund management for specific projects in the white paper has not seen detailed execution or public settlement, and the whereabouts of funds after being allocated to exchanges remain a mystery.

This breakdown in transparency and years of extravagance ultimately led to a collapse in community confidence.

From intensive disclosures to gradually sparse updates, and now to complete silence, the disappearance of transparency almost synchronizes with the curve of ecological enthusiasm.

More notably, since Q1 2024, no financial reports have been released. No financial audits, no budget distributions, no project lists, no unsettled allocations.

The community is forced to accept the fact that the foundation's operations have shifted from "high-frequency transparency" to "complete black box."

At the same time, many of the collaborative projects that VF once publicly promoted have mostly stopped at the "communication stage," lacking actual implementation. The once-promised "transparent operations" have ultimately devolved into a silent cliff.

Charge Five: Arbitrary Allocations, Grants Have Become a "Black Hole," No One Knows Where the Money Went

Looking back at the foundation's early days, VF did attempt to rebuild the Vaulta (EOS) ecosystem through various funding programs, including Grant Framework, Recognition Grants, and public funding pools used in conjunction with Pomelo.

During that phase, the speed and scale of fund disbursement were rapid, aiming to "stop the bleeding quickly."

We cannot deny that it did play a role in boosting morale in the early stages.

Here’s a brief explanation of Grants: VF's funding is divided into publicly recruited "Grant Framework" (milestone-based funding), aimed at individuals, teams, or companies, mostly for technical projects; Recognition Grants (awards given to projects) and public funding channels like Pomelo for distributing funds to ecological projects. That is, funding can be used for both profit-making projects and public goods/charity projects.

For example—in the first report of Q4 2021, VF allocated in one go:

• $3.5 million in Recognition Grants (an average of $100,000 per project);
• $1.3 million to fund five technical working groups to write white papers;
• $1.265 million to support the community self-governing organization EdenOnEOS;
• $500,000 as the funding pool for the first season of Pomelo;

However, the problem is—this was also the only time in the future four years that VF fully disclosed the recipients of the grants in a quarter.

From Q4 2021 to Q4 2023, although Grants consistently accounted for the largest portion of quarterly expenditures (in some quarters, even up to 40%-60% of total expenditures), the reports:

• No longer disclosed specific grant recipients;
• Did not disclose the actual amounts received by each project;
• Did not reveal project acceptance status; did not mention details of fund usage;
• Did not clarify whether projects delivered results according to milestones;

In other words, the numbers are still there, but the information has disappeared.

Only the first quarterly report disclosed the flow of funds for each project. In the subsequent eight reports, while Grants' expenditure remained the "largest portion," it no longer specified the benefiting projects or results.

How much money was spent is visible, but where the money went is forever unknown.

Did the grants truly drive the ecosystem?

Were the funds used effectively?

Were the projects delivered?

Why does the foundation never disclose more information?

It inevitably raises doubts: Did the foundation, from the very beginning, use the banner of "ecological funding" to throw money around? Externally, it buys off the community and wins hearts, while internally it hoards inflationary funds and reserves, lacking results and oversight.

VF's matching pool funds exceed ten million dollars, but most projects have extremely sparse updates, even disappearing after receiving funds.

The End of an Era

The Vaulta Foundation once promised governance reform with a stance of "transparency and community-driven," but over the past four years, it has gradually moved towards closure and corruption.

From Yves's dignified resignation without handing over power, to the $5 million middleware funding with no accountability, from millions in marketing expenses each quarter yielding no results, to complete silence after ecological funding—this is not a failure of "decentralized governance," but a victory of "centralized plunder."

This lengthy article serves as a list of charges and a warning document.

The collapse of Vaulta is not just a tragedy for EOS, but also a microcosm of the trampling of Web3 ideals.

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