# Event Summary

On January 13, 2026, Polycule officially confirmed that its Telegram trading bot was hacked, resulting in approximately $230,000 in user funds being stolen. The team quickly updated on X: the bot was taken offline, a fix was rapidly developed, and they promised compensation for affected users on the Polygon side. Several announcements from last night to today have intensified discussions about security in the Telegram trading bot space.

# How Polycule Operates

Polycule has a clear positioning: to allow users to browse markets, manage positions, and allocate funds on Polymarket via Telegram. The main modules include:

Account and Dashboard: /start automatically assigns a Polygon wallet and displays the balance, while /home and /help provide entry points and command explanations.

Market and Trading: /trending, /search, and directly pasting the Polymarket URL can pull market details; the bot offers market orders/limit orders, order cancellations, and chart viewing.

Wallet and Funds: /wallet supports viewing assets, withdrawing funds, swapping POL/USDC, and exporting private keys; /fund guides the recharge process.

Cross-Chain Bridging: Deeply integrated with deBridge, helping users bring assets from Solana and automatically deducting 2% SOL to convert to POL for Gas.

Advanced Features: /copytrade opens the copy trading interface, allowing users to follow trades by percentage, fixed amount, or custom rules, and also set pause, reverse follow, strategy sharing, and other extended capabilities.

The Polycule Trading Bot is responsible for conversing with users, parsing commands, managing keys in the background, signing transactions, and continuously monitoring on-chain events.

After a user inputs /start, a Polygon wallet is automatically generated in the background, and the private key is securely stored. Users can then continue to send commands like /buy, /sell, /positions to check market status, place orders, and manage positions. The bot can also parse Polymarket web links and directly return to the trading entry. Cross-chain funds rely on integration with deBridge, supporting the bridging of SOL to Polygon, and automatically deducting 2% SOL to convert to POL for subsequent transaction Gas payments. More advanced features include Copy Trading, limit orders, and automatic monitoring of target wallets, which require the server to be online for extended periods and continuously sign transactions.

# Common Risks of Telegram Trading Bots

Behind the convenient chat-based interaction are several security vulnerabilities that are hard to avoid:

First, almost all bots store user private keys on their own servers, with transactions signed directly in the background. This means that if the server is compromised or data is inadvertently leaked during operations, attackers can batch export private keys and steal all users' funds at once. Second, authentication relies on the Telegram account itself; if a user experiences SIM card hijacking or device loss, attackers can control the bot account without needing the mnemonic phrase. Finally, there is no local pop-up confirmation step—traditional wallets require user confirmation for each transaction, while in bot mode, if there is a flaw in the backend logic, the system may automatically transfer funds without the user's knowledge.

# Unique Attack Surfaces Revealed by Polycule Documentation

Based on the document content, it can be inferred that this incident and future potential risks mainly focus on the following points:

Private Key Export Interface: The /wallet menu allows users to export private keys, indicating that reversible key data is stored in the backend. If there are SQL injection vulnerabilities, unauthorized interfaces, or log leaks, attackers can directly invoke the export function, which closely matches the scenario of this theft.

URL Parsing May Trigger SSRF: The bot encourages users to submit Polymarket links to obtain market data. If inputs are not rigorously validated, attackers can forge links pointing to internal networks or cloud service metadata, causing the backend to "fall into a trap" and further steal credentials or configurations.

Copy Trading Listening Logic: Copy trading means the bot will synchronize operations with the target wallet. If the events being listened to can be forged, or if the system lacks secure filtering for target transactions, following users may be led into malicious contracts, resulting in locked funds or direct theft.

Cross-Chain and Automatic Currency Exchange Steps: The automatic conversion of 2% SOL to POL involves exchange rates, slippage, oracles, and execution permissions. If the code does not rigorously validate these parameters, hackers may amplify exchange losses or misallocate Gas budgets during bridging. Additionally, any lack of verification for deBridge receipts could lead to risks of false recharges or duplicate entries.

# Reminders for Project Teams and Users

What Project Teams Can Do: Deliver a complete and transparent technical review before restoring services; conduct special audits on key storage, permission isolation, and input validation; reorganize server access control and code release processes; introduce secondary confirmation or limit mechanisms for critical operations to reduce further harm.

End Users Should: Consider controlling the scale of funds in the bot, promptly withdraw profits, and prioritize enabling Telegram's two-factor authentication, independent device management, and other protective measures. Before the project team provides clear security commitments, it may be wise to wait and avoid adding more capital.

# Postscript

The Polycule incident serves as a reminder: when the trading experience is compressed into a chat command, security measures must also be upgraded in tandem. Telegram trading bots will continue to be a popular entry point for predicting markets and meme coins in the short term, but this area will also remain a hunting ground for attackers. We recommend that project teams treat security construction as part of the product and publicly share progress with users; users should also remain vigilant and not treat chat shortcuts as risk-free asset managers.

We, ExVul Security, focus on the offensive and defensive research of trading bots and on-chain infrastructure, and can provide security audits, penetration testing, and emergency response services for Telegram trading bots. If your project is in the development or launch phase, feel free to contact us to eliminate potential risks before they materialize.

# About Us ExVul

ExVul is a Web3 security company, offering services that include smart contract audits, blockchain protocol audits, wallet audits, Web3 penetration testing, security consulting, and planning. ExVul is dedicated to enhancing the overall security of the Web3 ecosystem and always stands at the forefront of Web3 security research.

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