The user claims to have lost 4.56 million without a signature; how does Aster respond?

CN
1 hour ago

In the early morning of November 13, according to X user furongfei's account, his Aster account suddenly showed continuous outgoing transaction records, totaling 7 transfers within about 44 minutes, amounting to approximately 4.56 million US dollars, all flowing to a newly created unfamiliar account that had never interacted before. Furongfei emphasized that he did not sign for these transfers, nor did he lose the wallet's private key, suspecting that the anomaly was related to the platform's mechanisms, and publicly disclosed the relevant details on social media. On November 17, Aster's official user account manager responded that the platform had formed an investigation team to look into this suspected theft incident, while reminding users to protect their private keys and account permissions. However, as of now, there has been no public authoritative conclusion regarding the cause of the incident and the division of responsibilities.

7 Transfers in 44 Minutes: The Night the Account was Taken Over

According to user furongfei's description on X, the anomaly occurred around the early morning of November 13. During this time, his Aster account was continuously "emptied" within a window of about 44 minutes: system records show that there were 7 transactions in total, all outgoing, with each transfer occurring shortly after the previous one, as if someone was systematically splitting assets and liquidating them step by step, rather than a one-time operational error or a single mistake.

What frightened him even more was that during this entire time frame, he claimed he neither logged in to initiate any transactions nor completed any signature confirmations on any device, yet he saw funds being withdrawn one after another. Furongfei stated that the recipients of these 7 transfers were all the same newly created unfamiliar account that had never appeared in his fund flows before, emphasizing that there was no interaction record between the two parties prior to this (according to his account). In his view, this combination of "unattended operations yet continuous outflows, with funds concentrated on a strange new address" was almost equivalent to his account being quietly taken over.

The Questionable Proxy Key: A Double-Edged Sword of Automatic Authorization

Tracing back along the funding line of the 7 transfers, furongfei focused his suspicions on the "proxy key" that was "automatically generated" by the system when he initiated a transaction on Aster's web platform. From his description, this resembled an authorization credential created in the background by the webpage: when a user clicks to activate or enable a transaction feature, the system simultaneously generates a "key" independent of the private key, which is then used to represent the user account for subsequent operations. In this incident, furongfei claimed that this proxy key was subsequently used to register a new account, which then completed the 7 continuous outgoing transactions over about 44 minutes.

The issue is that when such a proxy key is automatically created without the user's full understanding, and it may remain valid for a long time and be reused in the background, its authorization boundary becomes very sensitive: what permissions did the user actually grant, can these permissions be used to create new accounts and initiate transfers, and can the user revoke or view them at any time? If the authorization scope is designed too broadly, or if lifecycle management is not transparent, it could potentially be abused in extreme cases, becoming a springboard for attackers to "take over accounts." However, as of now, Aster has not publicly disclosed the specific technical implementation and security design of this proxy key, and there is no evidence from the external links to prove that the mechanism itself has a known vulnerability, nor can the actual attack path of the abnormal transfers be restored, so whether this "key" is a sharp blade or just a contested prop can only await further investigation for a clearer explanation.

Delayed Response from the Platform? Investigation and Communication Games

After discovering that there were 7 unusual outgoing transfers from his account around the early morning of November 13, furongfei promptly began contacting the Aster platform and simultaneously disclosed the situation on social media, continuously urging the platform for a response. It was not until November 17 that Aster's official user account manager responded through official channels: on one hand, confirming that the platform had formed an investigation team to look into this so-called "theft" case; on the other hand, reminding users to protect their private keys and account permissions. However, in this unified response, the platform did not make any public commitments regarding how to classify responsibilities, nor whether there would be arrangements for asset recovery or compensation, and did not disclose more detailed progress on technical investigations.

From the timeline, this means that there was a gap of several days between the exposure of the unusual transfers on November 13 and the platform's first formal response on November 17. As the incident was shared multiple times on broader social media during this period, some security-related accounts also participated in its discussions, causing what was originally a dispute between a single user and the platform to quickly escalate into a public issue concerning the security of Aster accounts and proxy authorization mechanisms. In the absence of a published investigation conclusion and the still ambiguous attribution of responsibility, this response gap has been viewed by many observers as a weakness in communication, and has placed the platform under dual examination regarding trust from the public and the need for public relations responses.

Who Will Foot the Bill for Account Security: Platform Custody and User Responsibility

From furongfei's account, one party insists "no signature, private key not lost," while the other emphasizes "protecting the private key and account permissions" in their response. This is almost the most common confrontational stance in disputes over custodial platforms: users believe the problem lies with the platform's mechanisms, while the platform focuses attention back on the user's security habits while initiating an investigation. As of now, there is no public information indicating that Aster has taken responsibility for this incident or announced a specific compensation plan, nor is there any information showing law enforcement or third-party security agencies have provided formal conclusions, which means that any judgment on "whose fault it is" can only remain at the hypothetical level.

What complicates matters is that this dispute does not exist in isolation within Aster. On one hand, according to users, a "proxy key" is automatically generated when they activate transactions on the web platform; on the other hand, many trading and wallet products throughout the industry have already reduced the frequency of signature requirements using proxy authorizations and session keys to provide a smoother user experience. This design objectively raises the security architecture and user understanding barriers for the platform: it needs to prove that its authorization links have not been abused, while users must clearly understand what permissions they have granted. Given that existing facts only come from the parties' statements and the platform's brief responses, with no technical details disclosed, discussions about who should bear the risks of such convenient mechanisms can only be temporarily suspended under a question mark.

Three Signals to Watch Next

The most crucial next step is to see whether the investigation team established by Aster will truly publish a comprehensive report: including a timeline of the 7 transfers completed in approximately 44 minutes, totaling about 4.56 million US dollars, the signatures and logic of the "proxy key" relied on at each step, as well as corresponding mechanism changes and patch plans; if the investigation results remain internal and only communicated verbally, this event, which currently relies almost entirely on the statements of the parties and the platform's brief responses, would find it difficult to move out of a "Rashomon" state. The second signal is to observe whether other users gradually report similar experiences of “unsigned transactions initiated by a proxy key” through public channels—currently, only furongfei's case has been widely discussed; if it remains an isolated incident, it resembles a case accident; once more similar narratives emerge, it may indicate broader structural risks within Aster or similar authorization tools. The final signal actually falls on each user: when using web-based transactions and various proxy authorization tools, users need to actively review and manage the scope and validity period of the authorizations, clarifying which permissions allow asset transfers and which authorizations are pending long-term and not revoked, treating the "one-time convenience" of a checkbox as a safety switch that must be reviewed and turned off as needed.

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