Author: LXDAO

This article proposes a core proposition: the effectiveness of power constraint mechanisms fundamentally depends on "power reversibility" — the ability of social members to revoke authorized power at low cost and high efficiency. By tracing the historical context of power operation, it reveals a structural dilemma of "easy authorization, difficult revocation" that exists from ancient monarchies to modern representative democracies, leading to institutional rigidity, accountability failure, and the recurrence of corruption cycles.

In the digital age, the algorithmic governance mechanisms built by blockchain and DAOs (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) have technically realized "reversible authorization" for the first time, transforming the revocation of power from a significant political event into a routine operational procedure.

This article innovatively constructs the "Power Reversibility Index (PRI)", quantifying and assessing governance effectiveness from four dimensions: time cost, economic cost, execution certainty, and social destructiveness. Through empirical comparisons of historical institutions and contemporary algorithms, it verifies the revolutionary breakthroughs of DAOs in terms of revocation costs, execution certainty, and social destructiveness. The research indicates that "programmable constitutionalism" reconstructs the temporal structure of power and accountability logic by encoding power relations into automatically executed contracts, providing a technical paradigm and engineering path to solve the millennium governance dilemma.

Keywords: Power Taming; Reversible Authorization; Algorithmic Governance; DAO; Programmable Constitutionalism; Power Reversibility Index (PRI)

01 Introduction: From Power Constraint to Power Reversibility — Breaking Through the Blind Spots of Governance Paradigms

The core mission of political system design has always been to respond to the classic question of "how to prevent the abuse of power." From Hobbes' metaphor of "necessary evil" in "Leviathan" to Madison's idea of "ambition counteracting ambition" in the separation of powers, traditional governance paradigms focus on horizontal checks and balances in the operation of power, while neglecting the technical feasibility of power revocation mechanisms — the core value of this "vertical constraint."

1.1 Structural Blind Spots of Traditional Paradigms

Locke (1689) proposed in "Two Treatises of Government" that "government power originates from the people's delegation, and it can be revoked if the trust is violated," laying the theoretical groundwork for "authorization - revocation," but did not solve the technical problem of "how to execute revocation at low cost." Montesquieu's (1748) separation of powers and Buchanan's (1962) public choice theory both focus on power distribution and supervision processes, yet avoid the decisive impact of revocation costs on the effectiveness of mechanisms. Data from the World Bank (2024) shows that 43% of global constitutional crises stem from "the failure of legally stipulated revocation mechanisms due to excessively high costs," such as the Brazilian Congress impeachment process in 2023, which was stalled by political maneuvering and took 11 months without reaching a conclusion.

1.3 Research Methods and Innovations

This article adopts a "three-dimensional integration" methodology:

Theoretical Dimension: Tracing the evolution of the power taming paradigm (sacred order → constitutional order → algorithmic order) and combining it with institutional change theory to demonstrate the legitimacy of reversible authorization;

Model Dimension: Constructing a quantifiable PRI index to achieve cross-institutional governance effectiveness comparisons;

Empirical Dimension: Conducting comparative analyses of different governance models to verify the breakthroughs of algorithmic governance.

Research innovations are reflected in three aspects:

Conceptual Innovation: Transforming "power reversibility" from an implicit assumption into an explicit measurement indicator;

Methodological Innovation: Constructing a multi-dimensional PRI index to achieve quantitative comparisons of governance effectiveness;

Practical Innovation: Revealing how algorithmic governance can transform "political problems" into "engineering problems" through technical means.

02 Theoretical Framework: The Theoretical Basis of Power Reversibility and PRI Model Construction

2.1 Theoretical Genealogy of Power Constraint and Paradigm Shift

2.1.1 Limitations of Traditional Power Constraint Theories

The theory of power taming can be traced back to the origins of Western political thought. Aristotle's theory of mixed government in "Politics" already contained the idea of achieving constraints through power balance. Since modern times, Locke (1689) clearly stated that government power originates from the people's delegation, and when the government violates the trust, the people have the right to revoke the authorization, thus establishing the theoretical prototype of authorization-revocation. Montesquieu's (1748) systematic exposition of the separation of powers theory became the core framework of modern constitutional systems, while Federalist Madison (1788) revealed the human basis of power checks and balances with "ambition counteracting ambition."

In modern research, Foucault's (1975) theory of "micro-power" breaks through macro analysis but does not address the technical realization of revocation; Ostrom's (1990) theory of self-governance focuses on the distribution of power in public affairs but still fails to solve the revocation dilemma under collective action problems. These theories collectively face the "high-cost trap" — electoral replacements incur cyclical costs, judicial reviews face procedural barriers, and revolutionary upheavals are accompanied by social turmoil, leading to "theoretical feasibility, practical difficulty."

Table 1 Core Views and Defects of Traditional Power Constraint Theories

Theoretical School

Core View

Defects of Revocation Mechanism

Social Contract Theory

Power originates from the people's delegation (Locke, 1689)

Not specified

Execution Path

Public Choice Theory

Governance is a "political trading market" (Buchanan, 1962)

Transaction costs have dramatically changed in the digital age

Legal Realism

Legal effectiveness depends on execution mechanisms (Holmes, 1897)

Did not incorporate the enhancement of execution efficiency by technology

2.1.2 Paradigm Shift in Blockchain Governance Research

Blockchain governance research has undergone a paradigm expansion from technology to society. Satoshi Nakamoto (2008) proposed distributed ledger technology, providing a technical possibility for the decentralization of power. Buterin (2014) positioned Ethereum as a "decentralized application platform," shifting blockchain from a monetary tool to a governance vehicle. Reijers et al. (2016) were the first to associate blockchain governance with social contract theory, proposing that smart contracts are the technical realization of social contracts.

Recent research presents two major branches: the technical governance path focuses on consensus algorithm optimization, smart contract security, and other issues; the institutional governance path, with Weyl et al. (2022) proposing the concept of "decentralized society," incorporates soul-bound tokens (SBT) into the reputation governance framework, enriching the supervision dimension of power operation. However, existing research still has significant gaps: the value of power constraints in blockchain remains largely at the level of theoretical deduction and qualitative description, lacking a systematic theoretical construction that centers on 'reversible authorization' as a core analytical concept, making it difficult to effectively separate and empirically measure its governance advantages from traditional paradigms.

2.2 Construction and Operationalization of the Power Reversibility Index (PRI)

2.2.1 Indicator Dimension Design

Based on the "cost - efficiency - security" triangular framework, the PRI includes four core dimensions, covering the full process characteristics of power revocation:

Table 2 Indicator Dimensions and Measurement Methods of the Power Reversibility Index (PRI)

Indicator Dimension

Theoretical Meaning

Measurement Method

Indicator Direction

Time Cost (T)

Duration from discovering power abuse to completing revocation

Case tracking method (e.g., days of impeachment procedures, on-chain voting cycles)

Negative

Economic Cost (C)

Total resources invested in the revocation process (human, financial)

Cost accounting method (e.g., election expenses, Gas fees)

Negative

Execution Certainty (E)

Whether the revocation process can be completed automatically and without dispute

Success rate statistics (e.g., judicial execution rates, smart contract trigger rates)

Positive

Social Destructiveness (D)

Social shocks caused by revocation (e.g., protests, economic fluctuations)

Volatility coefficient method (e.g., GDP volatility rate, frequency of social conflicts)

Negative

Based on the above dimensions, the core functional expression of the Power Reversibility Index is: PRI=f(−T,−C,+E,−D)(1)

Through this model, governance systems can be categorized into four ideal types:

Table 3 Ideal Types of Governance Systems Based on PRI

Type

Type Performance

Core Characteristics

High Reversibility - Low Destructiveness

DAO Governance,

Blockchain Autonomous Systems

Code executes automatically, costs approach zero

High Reversibility - High Destructiveness

Violent Revolutions,

Military Coups

Coercive forces drive, high social costs

Low Reversibility - Low Destructiveness

Representative Democracy,

Periodic Elections

Procedurally legitimate, but inefficient

Low Reversibility - High Destructiveness

Absolute Despotism,

Totalitarian Regimes

Revocation relies on subversion, extremely high risk

03 Historical Dilemma: The Dual Origin of Power, Alienation Logic, and Limitations of Traditional Taming Paths

3.1 The Dual Origin of Power and the Legitimacy Paradox

Power originates from two interwoven dimensions:

Functional Origin: As a natural product of social division of labor (Weber, 1922), power spontaneously forms due to differences in ability, knowledge, or resources, such as the command authority of tribal leaders or the technical authority of craftsmen;

Contractual Origin: As a result of political authorization (Locke, 1689), power is voluntarily delegated to public institutions through social contracts, such as the administrative power of modern governments.

This dual origin sows the seeds of a legitimacy paradox: functional power easily transforms into "hereditary privilege" (e.g., the European medieval nobility), while contractual power easily breaks through the boundaries of delegation (e.g., modern absolute monarchies). Patterson (1982) reveals in "Slavery and Social Death" that the ultimate alienation of power is "complete and eternal domination over individuals" — whether through the personal possession of slaves or the total control of totalitarian regimes, both are extreme forms of "irreversible authorization."

3.2 The Self-Reinforcing Mechanism of Power Alienation

Once power is generated, it achieves self-reinforcement through three paths:

Violent Monopoly: Controlling state machinery (military, police) to suppress revocation demands (e.g., Louis XIV of France's "L'état, c'est moi" in the 17th century);

Ideological Manipulation: Constructing narratives of "sanctification of power" (e.g., divine right of kings, cult of ideology) to lower the public's willingness to revoke;

Information Monopoly: Blocking data on power operations (e.g., the "internal documents" system of traditional governments), increasing the information cost of revocation.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) point out in "Why Nations Fail" that this self-reinforcement ultimately forms "extractive institutions" — such as the oligarchic regimes in 19th century Latin America, which maintained power through election manipulation, with revocation costs reaching 15%-20% of GDP, leading to long-term economic stagnation.

3.3 Fundamental Limitations of Traditional Taming Paths

Throughout human history, the two mainstream taming paths have failed to break through the "irreversible dilemma":

Moral constraints based on "theory of human goodness and evil" and institutional decentralization based on "theory of human public and private interests." The former relies on the ruler's virtue and self-discipline, such as Plato's "philosopher king" and the ancient Chinese concept of "sage rulers and wise ministers"; the latter achieves mutual checks and balances through the separation of powers, as designed by Montesquieu. However, both paths face the same fundamental dilemma — once authorization is given, it is difficult to revoke. Whether through electoral replacements or revolutionary upheavals, the process of power revocation is fraught with enormous friction, costs, and uncertainties, making it extremely costly to correct once power is out of control.

04 Algorithmic Governance: Technical Breakthroughs and Empirical Validation of Power Reversibility

The emergence of blockchain and smart contract technology has, for the first time, achieved the symmetry of "authorization - revocation" at the engineering level, constructing a new paradigm of algorithmic governance.

4.1 Technical Realization Mechanisms of Algorithmic Governance

4.1.1 Smart Contracts: Programmable Encoding of Power

Smart contracts transform power relations into precise code through the logic of "conditional triggering - automatic execution," with core mechanisms including:

Atomic Authorization: Based on the ERC-1155 standard, traditional vague powers (e.g., "administrative management power") are broken down into discrete permission units (e.g., "funding approval power - 001," "data access power - 002"), clearly defining revocation targets;

Multi-layer Trigger Mechanisms: Rule-triggered (automatic revocation upon violation), consensus-triggered (execution upon community voting standards), emergency-triggered (initiated by multi-signature committees), covering different scenario needs;

Immutable Records: All power operations (authorization, exercise, revocation) are recorded on-chain, verifiable in real-time through tools like Etherscan, reducing information asymmetry.

4.2 Empirical Comparison: PRI Comparison Between Traditional Governance and Algorithmic Governance

In contrast to the characteristics of traditional political systems, which feature centralized authorization, slow revocation, and delayed feedback, algorithmic governance demonstrates "anti-traditional" features such as instant feedback, transparent execution, procedural autonomy, and minimal disruption.

Table 4 PRI Indicator Comparison of Different Governance Models

| Model | Time Cost | Economic Cost | Execution Certainty | Social Destructiveness | PRI | |---------------------|-----------|---------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------| | Democratic Elections | High | Medium | Medium | Medium | ⭐⭐ | | Violent Revolutions | Low | High | Low | Extremely High | ⭐ | | Judicial Accountability | Medium | High | Medium | Low | ⭐⭐ | | Algorithmic Governance (DAO) | Extremely Low | Extremely Low | High | Extremely Low | ⭐⭐⭐ | | Moral (Negotiation) Constraints | High | Low | Low | Low | ⭐ |

4.2.1 Case Study Validation: MakerDAO's Response to "Black Thursday"

During the market crash on March 12, 2020, known as "Black Thursday," the price of ETH plummeted by 58%, putting MakerDAO at risk of insufficient collateral. The community completed three key operations through on-chain governance within 48 hours:

• Revoked the original "single collateral" authorization;
• Granted permissions for "Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD)";
• Adjusted the liquidation ratio parameter (from 150% to 175%).

In comparison to similar operations by traditional central banks (e.g., the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing in 2008 took 30 days and cost about $200 million), MakerDAO reduced the time cost of power reconstruction by 97% and the economic cost by 99.99% (only $12,000 in Gas fees).

4.2.2 Industry Data Support

According to statistics from DeepDAO (2024), as of Q2 2024, the top 50 DAOs by market capitalization handle an average of 5.7 significant governance proposals per month, with 15% of proposals being voted down by the community due to "risks of power abuse" — indicating that power adjustments and revocations have become frequent and normalized operations within the DAO ecosystem, contrasting sharply with traditional politics where "elections occur every 4-6 years."

4.2.3 Core Findings

• Transformation of Accountability Models: Traditional politics relies on "event-based accountability" (discrete, periodic), while algorithmic governance constructs "process-based accountability" (real-time, continuous), transforming Locke's "right to resist" from a high-cost natural right into a low-cost procedural right;
• Reconstruction of the Concept of Sovereignty: "Programmable constitutionalism" shifts sovereignty from "centralized ruling power" to "distributed revocable consensus," exemplified by the Optimism Collective's "Citizen House + Token House" dual structure, balancing the influence of capital and contribution through SBT reputation weights.

05 Challenges of Algorithmic Governance and Response Strategies

5.1 Risk of Rule Rigidity and Resilience Mechanisms

The certainty of "code as law" may sacrifice the system's flexibility to respond to black swan events. Response strategies include:

• Upgradeable Contracts: Allowing governance rules to be iterated through community voting (e.g., Aave V3's "Dynamic Governance Parameter Adjustment Module");
• Emergency Switch: Setting up a "circuit breaker mechanism" controlled by a multi-signature committee to pause power execution under extreme risks (e.g., Compound's "Guardian role").

5.2 Technological Elitism and Monopoly Risks

The technical barriers to code development and auditing may lead to power concentration in a few teams. Solutions include:

• Multi-Party Audits: Mandating that smart contracts be audited by more than three independent institutions (e.g., OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits);
• Open Source Transparency: Fully open-sourcing core code and encouraging community vulnerability submissions (e.g., MakerDAO's "Code Bounty Program").

5.3 Oligarchic Rule Risks and Fairness Mechanisms

The concentration of governance token holdings may lead to "capital dictatorship." Response paths include:

• Quadratic Voting: Suppressing large holder manipulation by making "voting costs proportional to the square of the number of votes" (e.g., Gitcoin Grants' funding votes);
• SBT Reputation Weights: Binding governance weight to non-transferable contribution records (code submissions, community service) to balance capital and capability (e.g., Optimism's "Citizen Score").

5.4 Legal Uncertainty and Compliance Adaptation

The ambiguous legal status of DAOs and the need for confirmation of the legal effectiveness of smart contracts can be addressed through a "hybrid model":

• Off-Chain Entity Anchoring: Establishing "DAO Limited Liability Companies" as legal entities, referencing the DAO Act in Wyoming, USA;
• Compliance Plugins: Integrating regional regulatory adaptation modules into smart contracts (e.g., GDPR data deletion clauses triggered for EU users).

5.5 Insufficient Participation and Incentive Mechanisms

The issue of low governance voting rates (with most DAOs having a voting rate of 20%) can be improved through the following methods:

• Delegated Voting: Allowing users to delegate their voting rights to professional representatives (e.g., Delegates.app's DAO delegation market);
• Participation Rewards: Issuing governance token rewards to voters (e.g., Uniswap's "Voting Incentive Pool"), with Aragon data showing that this mechanism can increase voting rates by over 30%.

06 Conclusion and Future Outlook

6.1 Research Conclusions

Theoretical Breakthrough: Power reversibility is a core indicator for measuring governance effectiveness. Traditional paradigms are trapped in "high revocation costs," while algorithmic governance achieves "low-cost, high-certainty" reversible authorization through technical means, reconstructing the logic of power constraints;

Empirical Findings: The 'Power Revocation Spectrum' model constructed in this article provides a new scientific benchmark for diagnosing and designing governance systems, starting from the 'termination mechanism' of power operation;

Practical Value: "Programmable constitutionalism" offers solutions to new issues such as AI governance and transnational digital sovereignty — for instance, controlling AI decision-making authority through reversible authorization to avoid algorithmic tyranny.

6.2 Research Limitations and Future Directions

This research still has two limitations: first, the weighting of the PRI indicators needs to be quantified through big data in subsequent studies to achieve quantitative analysis of governance models; second, the cases are concentrated in the Web3 ecosystem, with insufficient coverage of traditional governance scenarios.

Future research could focus on three major directions:

• Cross-Chain Governance Interoperability: Exploring PRI collaborative mechanisms between different blockchain systems to achieve cross-network unification of power reversibility;
• AI-Human Hybrid Governance: Studying the power authorization and revocation rules for AI intelligences to construct a reversible governance framework for "human-machine collaboration";
• Ethical Coding Technology: Developing "ethical modules" that can be embedded in smart contracts to resolve value conflicts (e.g., prioritizing the right to life in medical resource allocation).

6.3 Governance Insights

The revolutionary significance of algorithmic governance lies not only in the efficiency improvements at the technical level but also in reconstructing the relationship between "power and the people" — from "one-time authorization" to "continuous verification," from "passive supervision" to "active revocation." As Madison said, "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." In the algorithmic age, humanity has finally gained a technical tool capable of responding in real-time to the reality of "humanity not being angelic" — the reversible authorization mechanism. This mechanism makes "taming Leviathan" no longer reliant on ambition countering ambition, but on code countering power alienation, opening up new technical paths for humanity's eternal pursuit of freedom and good governance.

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